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In this paper, the authors comparatively analyze the development of regional cooperation in Europe after the Second World War and in the Western Balkans since 1999. They compare and contrast regional cooperation in the Western Balkans (with a particular focus on the period after 2006, when the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council, and after 2014, when the Berlin Process was launched) with similar forms of cooperation in Europe, such as the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Visegrad Group, and the Benelux. Therefore, the authors approach a comparative analysis of the composition of these regional forums and their areas of cooperation with the Regional Cooperation Council, the Southeast European Cooperation Process, and the Berlin Process. In this regard, the authors state that there are more than obvious similarities between regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, primarily with the Visegrad Group, and to a significant extent with the Benelux. Regional cooperation on the Balkan Peninsula and between the Nordic countries is similar to a lesser extent, owing to the absence of the formation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western Balkans, which was overlooked in 2013. The authors conclude that there are numerous obstacles to establishing more intensive and deeper regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, the most significant of which are the lack of a multilaterally accepted regional identity, the different interests of regional leaders regarding its \"originality\", the conflicted views of dominant opinions, and the predominant influences of various Western actors.

Abstract ▼

The aim of this paper is to determine which country has technological superiority in the field of industry by analysing the strategic approaches to the industrial development of three leading industrial countries (Germany, China, and the US), as well as selected indicators of industrial development. The results of the research show that China has the most ambitious approach and pretension to take a leading position in a large number of high-tech industries. Since 2014, China has become the second-largest industrial power, right after Germany, while the US has been in fourth place since 2017. China leads in terms of the share of industrial products in global trade and the share of manufacturing value added in the total world gross domestic product. Since 2015, China and Germany have developed intensive cooperation in the area of hi-tech industrial production, while bilateral relations between China and the US are tight due to the trade war. While the US, as the third-largest bilateral trading partner of Germany (after China and the Netherlands), is generating a trade deficit, China is making a breakthrough towards the European market, which is in line with the strategy of taking the position of a global leader in high technology.

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The subject of this paper is to investigate the policy and role of the NonAligned Movement (NAM) on nuclear disarmament in the 21st century. Nuclear disarmament continues to be the highest priority of the NAM, which is why it deserves a special place in the analysis of the activities of the NAM in modern international relations. However, this policy and role have been shaped in the new century as well by the adoption and expression of principled views on the necessity of nuclear disarmament, with very few results achieved, sometimes even among its own membership. Through the analysis of the content and comparison of NAM documents adopted at the NAM summits or within multilateral forums dealing with disarmament and international security issues, as well as secondary sources dealing with this topic, the author concludes that the role of non-aligned in nuclear disarmament is primarily to keep this issue high on the international agenda and as a kind of counterbalance to the demands of the nuclear powers for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, this role is weakened for at least six reasons: the importance that individual NAM member states attach to nuclear weapons; their refusal to accede to or fully implement universal and regional instruments of nuclear disarmament; the (mis) use of the NAM as a means of pursuing individual member states\' interests for the promotion of issues that lack significant support from other member states of the Movement; the absence of any NAM measure to condemn or sanction such behaviour within the Movement, while they are constantly repeated towards other countries such as Israel and the United States; inconsistent \"call out\" of individual NWS for disrespect of the principles and measures for disarmament and lack of the adequate mechanisms; and the intention of the NAM to participate more actively in resolving existing crises regarding disarmament and nonproliferation.

Abstract ▼

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is in search of a new identity after the dissolution of the bipolar world and the completion of the decolonization process. In that sense, the NAM is often perceived as a balance between great powers, particularly the US and China. Therefore, the author will investigate this possibility. However, the focus of this article will be on the analysis of the administrative structure of the NAM and the possibility of transforming it into a more coherent organization. Furthermore, the analysis of the most prominent topics in the area of international law and reform of the United Nations, mainly contained within the final documents of the NAM summits, will also be conducted.

Abstract ▼

The authors deliberate that the EU’s soft power leadership has been inadequate during certain periods of the pandemic, being additionally challenged by proactive campaigns of other international actors. According to the authors, such EU underperformance primarily lies in the damaging fact that the Union perceives and treats aspects like the inoculation process not solely as a health-humanitarian issue, but also as a geostrategic activity. The authors consider that EU logic has been largely shaped by the pre-existing geopolitical distaste for China and Russia, and hence also their subsequent COVID-19-related engagement in Europe. Apart from strategic rivalries, EU international status has been exacerbated by deteriorating relations with the UK. According to the authors, the aforementioned international actors have been applying various soft power instruments during the mass inoculation process against COVID-19 in Europe, which also resulted in consequences that are usually attributed to hard power. Antagonisms between the abovementioned stakeholders manifest in unfavorable phenomena such as “vaccine nationalism” and “jab geopolitics”. The authors argues that a less selective, and more flexible and pragmatic approach would have been more beneficial both for public health and the EU’s impaired reputation in certain parts of CEE.