UDC 328.184:061.1
Biblid: 0025-8555, MP, 62(2010)
Vol. 62, No 2, pp. 348-384

Оriginal article
Received: 15 Apr 2010
Accepted: 15 May 2010


KORAĆ Srđan (Srđan Korać, istraživač saradnik u Institutu za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd), srdjan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

The author analyses how big business interests groups influence the both EU legislative and policy making process, and by doing so how they distort pluralistic concept of public policy networking at the supranational level of governance. The enormous financial resources available to multinational corporations provide them the use of “front group” strategy or the “third party” strategy, manipulative public relations tactics, and an insider position in the European Commission’s consultative fora, which all lead to exclusion of grassroot groups. The author concludes that big business influence on the EU decision-makers will have negative effects on democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions, and he thinks that an efficient institutional control over lobbying activities in Brussels is needed.

Keywords: EU public policy, policy networks, public interest, interest representation, interest groups, lobbying, pluralism, European Union, European Commission, European Parliament