UDC 355.014:355.43(510) 355.56(510)
Biblid: 0025-8555, 72(2020)
Vol. 72, No 4, pp. 678-708
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2004678K

Оriginal article
Received: 01 Oct 2020
Accepted: 23 Nov 2020


T. KOSTIĆ Marina (Naučni saradnik u Institutu za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd), marina@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

Thе paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China’s involvement in the trilateral strategic arms control negotiations. By doing so, the US recognised China as an important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for further reduction of strategic arms. The main hypothesis is the claim that the limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on four indicators or preconditions of China’s involvement in the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China’s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well as the comparative method. The author concludes that the absence of the intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China’s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.

Keywords: strategic stability, New START, arms control, the United States, China, international security