

MEĐUNARODNI PROBLEMI INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

Vol. LXXV

Beograd

No. 1/2023

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


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MEĐUNARODNI PROBLEMI

ISSN 0025-8555

ISSN (Online) 2406-0690

UDK 327
MP, 75 (2023), br. 1, str. 1–178
izlazi tromesečno

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Internet:

<https://www.internationalproblems.rs/>

MEĐUNARODNI PROBLEMI

ČASOPIS INSTITUTA ZA MEĐUNARODNU POLITIKU I PRIVREDU

GODINA LXXV

BEOGRAD

BROJ 1/2023.

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INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

A JOURNAL PUBLISHED BY THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

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BELGRADE

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Sustainable development in the new methodology of Serbia's accession to the EU

Vladimir RISTANOVIĆ¹

Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse all elements of sustainable development, especially in the context of the new enlargement policy for the Balkan countries. Basically, the analysis is based on the concept from Agenda 2030. The second concept consists of two methodologies for EU accession, where the criteria are grouped through chapters (old methodology) and clusters (new methodology). The research question in this paper is whether the new EU accession methodology is a guarantee for achieving better values of indicators of sustainable development or not. Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), more precisely the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP method), is used to prioritize sustainable development criteria based on the sustainable development indicators through two different concepts. The results of the analysis showed that the achievement of the SDGs according to the Agenda 2030 was established methodologically by country, while respecting the specificities of countries and their policies. Also, the results showed that the acceptance of the new methodology, that is, organizing the chapters into clusters and accordingly regrouping the indicators, showed better results. The conclusions from this article can be applied in making decisions about choosing the best approach to sustainable development for individual countries.

Keywords: SDGs, national strategy framework, EU membership, accession process, chapters, clusters, Agenda 2030, AHP method.

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The manuscript was presented at the conference organized by the Institute for International Politics and Economy on April 12, 2022 (Round Table, on the topic of Long-term effects of the COVID-19 on the sustainable development of the countries of the region and the EU) in the form of an oral communication under a similar title.

Introduction

Awareness of the importance and significance of the environment at the global level has been evolving over the years. Officially, it all started exactly 50 years ago in Stockholm (UNGA Conf.48/14), when the UN Conference on the Environment was held, at which it was recognized that there is a need to protect and renew our planet. All further activities on sustainable development were carried out within the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), until the adoption of two important documents: Agenda 21 (of June 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro) (UNGA Conf. 151/26) and the Millennium Declaration (of September 2000 in New York) (UNGA Res.55/2). Today, the Department for Sustainable Development Goals (DSDG) within the UNDESA plays a key role in evaluating the implementation of the Agenda 2030 (UNGA Res. 70/1) as a universal strategy. The idea was quite obvious: countries ought to mobilize all resources to achieve the goals till 2030. However, the achievement of all goals in the mentioned period is limited primarily by the global circumstances that the world has faced and will yet face.

Still present, the multi-year economic and financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic (in addition to causing economic disruption on the demand side) point to two facts. The first is that they partially slowed down the achievement of the goals within a certain period, and the second is that it is necessary to urgently achieve the set goals of sustainable development (SDGs). On the other hand, far more and with greater consequences, global geostrategic games (politics and wars), followed by a crisis in numerous sectors of the economy (causing major disruptions this time on the supply side) called into question the achievement of the goals set in general. For example, only the energy crisis caused the reactivation of old plants with high CO₂ emissions. Overall, the success of the Agenda 2030 will only depend on the *sincere* commitment of all actors in implementing the global goals. That commitment must be supported by convictions, agreements and adjustments. This also applies to the EU, where there is a problem of fully integrating the European Green Deal (EC, 2019) with the UN SDGs (Agenda 2030) incorporated into the EU's development agenda and priorities (EC, 2016) (see also Filipović et al., 2022; Koundouri et al., 2021; Pianta and Lucchese, 2020; Hafner and Raimondi, 2020).

This paper investigates how in practice, through the process of Serbia's accession to the EU, in compliance with all EU rules and procedures, a framework for monitoring the implementation of sustainable development goals is established. In order to evaluate the best procedure in the process of harmonizing national priorities with the ambitions of the main Sustainability Agenda or with the strategic priorities of the EU, the MCDA approach, i.e. the AHP method, was used. Serbia's choice to take the path towards the EU and entering the pre-accession process clearly defined

the path to achieving sustainable development – from 2015 through chapters, and from 2020 with a new methodology through clusters. In other words, the pre-accession process, in which the process of sustainable development is integrated, defined in advance Serbia's path towards achieving the goals of sustainable development. Although a decision was made on the process of joining the EU, and thus on the sustainable development of Serbia, the author wants to examine the possibility of making decisions on the realization of the SDGs as if there is still a right for policy makers in Serbia to choose one of the three options.

Therefore, the aim of the paper is to analyse three different groups of the SDG indicators (the first through the 2030 Agenda, the second through the EU accession process set in chapters, and the third through the EU accession process set in clusters) and enable decision-making based on best ranking. The analysis is conducted through two clearly defined concepts. The first concept is fully applicable to all countries in the world and the SDG indicator values by country are available in the UN database. This concept is based on the 2030 Agenda, which has 17 goals and 169 target values. According to the Agenda 2030, these universal goals are integrated and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development (Environment, Society, and Economy), taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development, respecting national policies and priorities. Thus, both methodologies of Serbia's accession to the EU grouped the goals and their indicators of sustainable development differently. This opened up space for the author to extend the analysis to both sets of goals – the initial chapter-based process and the new cluster-based process were analysed. So, the second concept is realized in two directions, where the mapping of the national strategic framework by the Government of the Republic of Serbia is basically defined. The first direction (called the chapter direction) was determined by the process of Serbia's accession to the EU through chapters, which was characteristic of all countries that were in the process of negotiations for EU membership. The second direction (called the cluster direction) is determined by the process of Serbia's accession to the EU through clusters, which was actualized in February 2020, originally for North Macedonia and Albania, but which was also accepted by Serbia². For the purposes of mapping of the national strategic framework

² The new EU accession methodology was formed as an initiative for North Macedonia and Albania, with the possibility of accepting the same from the two Balkan countries, Serbia and Montenegro. During his first visit to France (on July 10, 2020, <https://www.predsednik.rs/pres-centar/vesti/predsednik-vucic-u-dvodnevnoj-poseti-republici-francuskoj>) after the European Parliament determined the new accession methodology in February 2020, the President of the Republic of Serbia said that Serbia will also follow that path [accepted by the EC, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_5275]. This meant that by accepting the new methodology for EU accession, Serbia will be forced to create a new mix of sustainable development goals and their indicators, defined in advance according to the new methodology (Tables 1-3).

SDGs are divided within the direction of the Chapter into 4 layers: Economic Growth, Human Resources Development, Environment and Climate, and Institutions, Finance and Cooperation, while within the direction of the Clusters into 6 layers: Basic Cluster; Internal Market; Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth; Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity; Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion; and External Relations. More precisely, it meant that by accepting the new EU accession methodology, Serbia will be forced to create a new mix of sustainable development goals and to regroup the SDG indicators.

The basic hypothesis in the paper is: Acceptance of the new EU accession methodology can contribute to achieving better values of sustainable development goals.

For the analysis of these indicators through different concepts in the process of Serbia's accession to the EU, the AHP method will be used. The idea of decision-making analysis according to the AHP model aims to assess whether the already made political decision on accepting the new EU accession methodology can contribute to the achievement of better reference values of certain sustainable development goals and their indicators. AHP method is a well-known and very often used technique of decision-making according to several criteria, in order to make decision on the right actions to be implemented. Complex criteria are broken down into sub-criteria so that performance between them can be directly measured. The application of the AHP method is realized through five steps, in order to calculate the weights of the criteria and alternatives. Policy makers can benefit from this method, as it can help them make the right decisions needed to achieve an adequate level of sustainability.

Sustainable development during the process of Serbia's accession to the EU

For many years, the topic of sustainable development was weaker discipline for Serbian Government. Meanwhile, sustainable development is becoming the dominant discipline. And the most importantly, for the social community, the Government has shown a high level of interest in the sustainable development and we've started with improving all activities related to them. Significant efforts are being made to establish an institutional framework for monitoring the achievement of the country's sustainable development goals (PPS, 2021; PPS, 2020; PPS, 2017).

Taking into account the general interest and recommendations coming from the UN, the Serbian authorities immediately started implementing the activities.

Namely, Inter-Ministerial Working Group for the Implementation of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development was established in December 2015, and the Sustainable Development Goals were defined at the next meetings at global forums. The same activities continued during the COVID 19 pandemic period. It was a successful period from the aspect of sustainable development in times when the economy showed slow economic activities and an unfavourable trend. In that period, Serbia achieved better values of SDG indicators, especially in the area of legislations, parts that are defined in the action plan.

Serbia applied for EU membership in 2009, following the signing of the Stabilization and Association Process, as a special framework for the countries of the Western Balkan. Serbia received the status of a candidate in March 2012, and with the European Commission, it started screening EU legislation, the “Acquis communautaire” (an analytical examination of the chapters) in September 2013. Progress towards EU membership is being made through 35 negotiation chapters (European Council, 1993). Serbia was achieving its path to membership through the chapters (opening and closing chapters) until 2020, when a new methodology for EU accession based on the clusters (EC COM[2020] 57 final) was accepted. The methodology presented by the European Commission has been revised to launch the enlargement process through stronger political governance and in a more credible, predictable and dynamic way. The negotiating chapters are organised according to the new methodology in 6 thematic clusters, which is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. The thematic clusters of negotiating chapters

1. Fundamentals	23 - Judiciary and fundamental rights 24 - Justice, Freedom and Security; Economic criteria; Functioning of democratic institutions; Public administration reform 5 - Public procurement 18 - Statistics 32 - Financial control
2. Internal market	1 - Free movement of goods 2 - Freedom of movement for workers 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 4 - Free movement of capital 6 - Company law 7 - Intellectual property law 8 - Competition policy 9 - Financial services 28 - Consumer and health protection

3. Competitiveness and inclusive growth	10 - Information society and media 16 - Taxation 17 - Economic and monetary policy 19 - Social policy and employment 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy 25 - Science and research 26 - Education and culture 29 - Customs union
4. Green agenda and sustainable connectivity	14 - Transport policy 15 - Energy 21 - Trans-European networks 27 - Environment and climate change
5. Resources, agriculture and cohesion	11 - Agriculture and rural development 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 13 - Fisheries 22 - Regional policy & coordination of structural instruments 33 - Financial & budgetary provisions
6. External relations	30 - External relations 31 - Foreign, security & defence policy

Source: European Commission, 2020

Note: Chapter 34 "Institutions" and chapter 35 "Other issues" will be handled separately.

It is important to emphasize that basically the same rule applies to both methodological approaches, i.e. that chapters are opened and closed one by one. The difference that comes with the new methodology is that each cluster consists of several chapters, forming a new whole. In other words, the connection of the SDGs with the new EU accession methodology is based on negotiation chapters grouped into different clusters (PPS, 2021).

Table 2. SDGs through the chapters and clusters

SDGs	EU chapters	EU clusters
GOAL 1: No Poverty	2, 17, 19, 23	1, 2, 3
GOAL 2: Zero Hunger	11, 12	5
GOAL 3: Good Health and Well-being	1, 14, 21, 24, 28	1, 2, 4
GOAL 4: Quality Education	23, 26	1, 3
GOAL 5: Gender Equality	19, 23, 24, 28	1, 2, 3
GOAL 6: Clean Water and Sanitation	27	4
GOAL 7: Affordable and Clean Energy	15, 21, 27	4
GOAL 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth	1, 2, 4, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 30	1, 2, 3
GOAL 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure	10, 14, 15, 20, 21, 25	3, 4
GOAL 10: Reduced Inequality	17, 19, 23, 24, 30, 31	1, 3, 6
GOAL 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities	14, 20, 23, 26, 27, 31	1, 3, 4
GOAL 12: Responsible Consumption and Production	5, 10, 26, 27	1, 3, 4
GOAL 13: Climate Action	27	4
GOAL 14: Life Below Water	:	:
GOAL 15: Life on Land	27	4
GOAL 16: Peace and Justice Strong Institutions	10, 23, 24, 30, 31	1, 3, 6
GOAL 17: Partnerships to achieve the Goal	8, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32	1, 2, 3, 4, 6

Source: Author's elaborations.

Table 2 presents the mapping of SDGs within two different methodologies in the process of Serbia's accession to the EU: the old methodology in relation to the negotiating chapters (column 2) and the new methodology in relation to thematic clusters (column 3). It is obvious that many SDGs are represented in a number of chapters. This unequivocally confirms the fact that SDGs need to be viewed through their interconnectedness, not separately. Here are two examples:

Ex. 1. It is hard to achieve decent economic growth (SDG8) or even food security (SDG2) without first taking care of our ocean (SDG14) as well as was demonstrated in Newfoundland during the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery in the 1990s.

Ex. 2. Let's use the more recent example of the coronavirus crisis, we can't have everybody in good health (SDG3) and achieve no poverty (SDG1) without taking care first of our land (SDG15), forests and our greenhouse gas emission (SDG13).

So, in order to achieve high levels of sustainability, SDGs need to be properly interconnected. The synergy of two or more SDGs guarantees better results. So, the greater their interconnectedness, the greater the sustainability.

Each of the SDGs has one or more indicators to measure the progress of that goal. These indicators are the subject of constant debates in scientific and research circles because there are differences in their interpretation and meanings within the objectives. They are constantly improved and developed, due to their nature, reliability and availability, as well as their relationship to the goal. Therefore, the governments are free to decide and develop their own set of specific goals, in the context of the specifics and characteristics of the economy and the challenges it faces. The first official list of SDG indicators was compiled by the United Nations Statistical Commission in 2017, which was previously prepared by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs). In the following years, through clarifications, refinements and decisions, the list was up-dated and presented through a Global Indicator Framework (UNGA A/RES/71/313). This Framework covers a total of 248 indicators, but 231 is a unique indicator. In fact, thirteen indicators are repeated under two or three different targets (see Annex, Table A1).

In the last few years, the Government of Serbia has made a significant step forward in terms of SDG indicators. The latest version of the 2030 Agenda (PPS, 2021) contains over 70 public documents, plus 20 completely new documents, as well as over 50 new indicators that will be adapted to the UN methodology of Sustainable Development Goals. From the aspect of availability of official documents, 117 out of 248 sustainable development goals (or 47%) and 130

exploring data sources (or 53%) are available on the official website of the Statistical Office (SORS, 2022).

The mapping of the strategic framework of the Republic of Serbia in relation to the SDG is incorporated in all active strategic documents of the Republic of Serbia. The strategic documents whose adoption is planned according to the National Program for the Adoption of the “Acquis communautaire” are also listed. For each SDG, relevant international processes are described, primarily European ones, in which Serbia participates, and which are important for achieving that goal. The analysis of the mapping results used elements of the United Nations RIA (Rapid Integration Assessment) methodology to identify gaps in the strategic framework, as well as to determine the relative importance of individual strategies for SDGs (PPS, 2021). The application of the RIA toolkit is aimed at faster inclusion of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the state’s readiness to implement them within national and local planning, determining their importance for the country’s context, as well as the interconnections between the goals (UNDP, 2017).

SDG mapping through the national strategic network is presented in detail in Table 3 through three concepts. According to the first concept, i.e. 2030 Agenda (columns 1 and 2), mapping was conducted through three layers: Environment, Society and Economy. The 2030 Agenda concept is based on three overlapping circles. In other words, sustainability is usually defined as a place where the economy, social reality and environmental health overlap. The idea of sustainability is seen as the inclusion of several goals of sustainable development - for example, the preservation of the planet, gender equality and profit. This has helped companies realize that more than financial capital is needed for long-term sustainability. It also helped clarify that when companies consider what sustainability means to them, they do not give up on the idea of financial success, with a higher level of social responsibility. In fact, the creation of the 2030 Agenda aimed to change the course of observation of states, companies, institutions and individuals, expand environmental awareness, as well as increase social responsibility. The results show great global progress in the years behind us.

In addition to this mapping concept, the Government of the Republic of Serbia also implements the mapping process through the EU accession process. There are two directions. The first direction refers to the process of parallel mapping through its own planning framework until 2020 (columns 3 and 4), all in accordance with accession negotiations with the EU and dedicated to realization SDGs (PPS, 2017; PPS, 2020). Thus, for mapping purposes, SDGs are classified into 4 segments: Economic Growth; Human Resource Development; Environment and Climate; and Institutions, Finance and Cooperation.

Table 3. Mapping SDGs of the national strategic framework

Agenda 2030	SDGs	EU Chapters	SDGs	Negotiating clusters	SDGs
Environment	6, 13, 15	Economic growth	8, 9	Basic cluster	16
Society	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 16	Human resources development	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10	Internal market	3
Economy	8, 9, 10, 12	Environment and climate	6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15	Competitiveness and inclusive growth	1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10
		Institutions, finances and cooperation	16, 17	Green agenda and sustainable connectivity	6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15
				Resources, agriculture and cohesion	2
				External relations	17

Source: Author's elaborations.

Note: SDG 14 is omitted.

In the **Economic Growth** segment, the results of mapping the planning framework of the Republic of Serbia in relation to SDG8 and SDG9 are described, which primarily relate to sustainable economic growth, employment, improvement of working conditions and sustainable industrialization, infrastructure development, science and innovation. The significance of this segment is that it is deeply connected with many other segments that are the subject of other goals of sustainable development. The **Human Resources Development** segment, as part of the strategic framework, contains several closely related objectives. Poverty reduction SDG1 is closely related to the realization of the goals of SDG2, SDG5 and SDG10, so they form one whole, while SDG3 (health) and SDG4 (education) are described as separate entities. In the **Environment and Climate** segment, the results of mapping the strategic framework in relation to the goals that are relevant for environmental protection (SDG6, SDG7, SDG11, SDG12) and the fight against climate change (SDG13, SDG15) are described. In the last segment, **Institutions, Finance and Cooperation**, the strategic framework of Serbia in relation to SDG16 and SDG17 is mapped, which define relevant horizontal principles for the

implementation of the entire 2030 Agenda, such as institution building, rule of law and partnerships.

Within the second direction of this concept, the mapping of SDGs through the strategic framework in Serbia has been successfully linked to the new methodology of EU accession (PPS, 2021). As mentioned above, the new methodology is based on clusters, which consist of individual chapters. Since the chapters are linked to the corresponding SDGs, further analysis will regroup the SDGs across chapters into negotiating clusters (columns 5 and 6). In accordance with the new mapping of the strategic framework, SDGs are classified into 6 segments: Basic Cluster; Internal market; Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth; Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity; Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion; and External Relations. The **Basic Cluster** segment presents a mapping of the strategic framework of the Republic of Serbia in relation to SDG16, which defines relevant horizontal principles for the implementation of the entire 2030 Agenda, such as institution building, rule of law and justice. The **Internal market** segment analyses the development of the market and existing capacities in the context of public health protection (SDG3). The **Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth** segment describes the results of mapping the strategic framework in relation to the goals relevant to human resource development. Poverty reduction SDG1 is closely related to the implementation of SDG5 (gender equality) and SDG10 (inequality) and forms a whole, while SDG4 (education) is described separately. SDG8 and SDG9 were also analysed, which primarily refer to sustainable economic growth, employment, improvement of working conditions, as well as sustainable industrialization, infrastructure development and innovation. It is worth noting here that the *Competitiveness and inclusive growth* segment of the new methodology overlaps with the two segments *Economic Growth* and *Human Resources Development* of the old methodology of Serbia's accession to the EU.

The next segment of the **Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity** describes the results of mapping the strategic framework in relation to the objectives relevant to environmental protection and the fight against climate change. This segment of the new methodology corresponds to the segment *Environment and climate* of the old methodology of Serbia's accession to the EU. The **Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion** segment shows the level of agricultural development as well as the availability and safety of food. In the **External Relations** segment, the degree of partnership between state institutions, the private sector and civil society was observed (SDG17). This area includes a number of sectoral policies aimed at improving the level of cooperation at the domestic and international level. In this segment, there is a partial overlap with the segment

Institutions, finances and cooperation of the old methodology of Serbia's accession to the EU.

In the next part, the analysis of SDGs will be conducted through all two previously mentioned concepts, using the multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). The aim is to assess which of the following concepts gives the best results in determining the criteria of sustainable development priorities for Serbia.

Data Sample and Methodology

Data

Official data from the UN (UN 2022) and the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS, 2022) will be used to analyse the criteria for sustainable development priorities. All data is available on the site and is easy to use. The second part of the data, which is an integral part of the analysis of the multi-criteria decision-making process, comes from experts. Namely, independent external experts were hired to assess the criteria and alternatives in the decision-making process (Table 4). Experts come from academic institutions, participated in the implementation of various local and national environmental projects, were members of teams for the implementation of regulatory measures and rules related to sustainable development. For the weighting process, experts in the field of sustainable development were questioned³. These experts were chosen from four different groups: academic institutions, authorities, ecology, and commercial

³ An interview was organized for the experts, where they were orally introduced to the idea of the work and the goal of the analysis. Experts were asked to prepare and create criteria structures based on their knowledge and experience, as well as projects in which they analyzed different approaches to the evaluation of SDG indicators. One of the experts presented an analysis from the framework of the analysis of inclusive growth, which he conducted from the point of view of the mix of SDG indicators. He opted for a mix of goals and their indicators that largely correspond to a concept that is closer to a more detailed approach of the new methodology of accession through clusters. Two other experts analyzed the resources and gave preference to the second criterion (two methodological concepts from the EU pre-accession processes) over the first (Agenda 2030). Another two experts analyzed the internal and external market, and their results showed a high degree of generality in the analysis of SDG indicators through Agenda 2030. The remaining two experts analyzed the environment through SDG indicators, and the results did not differ significantly through both methodological concepts. It is important to emphasize that for this analysis the contribution of experts is huge and of great importance, and that this new experience will be useful for future research.

sector, in order to be able to analyse differences as well as similarities between these concepts. The task of experts within the methodological concept of the AHP model is to review and evaluate pairs of criteria and alternatives through different levels in relation to the set goal within the hierarchical structure. In this analysis, the task of experts was not to determine pairs of criteria and alternatives within the hierarchical structure, due to the fact that they are predefined and grouped, but their task was to review the application of predefined groups of objectives and indicators. All of them analysed the expediency of applying such grouped indicators in the structure and analysed the connections that exist between different hierarchical levels within the structure from their expert point of view. Evaluation is based on the experience, knowledge and skills at their disposal. The main disadvantage of this type of evaluation is subjectivity in evaluation and decision making. This problem is easily solved within the AHP method, by identifying the degree of consistency at one point during the evaluation process. This eliminates errors in the assessment of experts in the process of assessment and decision-making. Such advantage of the AHP method decisively influenced the decision that this method, from the corpus of numerous MCDMs, should be used in this analysis.

Table 4. Experts' profile

	Gender	Age	Education level	Experience	Sector/Institution
Expert 1	Male	52	Master	> 25 YRS	Environment (Association for Food)
Expert 2	Female	38	Master	> 10 YRS	Economy (Chamber of Commerce)
Expert 3	Female	42	Master	> 15 YRS	Ministry (Government)
Expert 4	Male	34	PhD	> 5 YRS	Economy (University)
Expert 5	Female	49	PhD	> 20 YRS	Research (Institute)
Expert 6	Male	55	PhD	> 30 YRS	Organizational Science (University)
Expert 7	Male	61	PhD	> 30 YRS	Ecology (University)

Source: Author's elaborations.

Methodology

Making decisions in the context of sustainable development, through economic, social and ecological criteria, is the basis for the application of multi-criteria optimization methods. The application of the exact method in decision-making helps managers to make a rational decision, in such a way that complex issues are approached with methods of objective reasoning, rather than intuition in order to reach sustainability.

Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) involves the use of various valuable tools, i.e. methods (MCDM) that can be applied to many complex decisions. It has the greatest use in solving the problem of choosing among the alternatives. We find the advantage of this analytical process in significant decision support. The analysis is also interesting because it allows individuals to discuss complex trade-offs between alternatives.

Within the MCDA, there are a number of MCDM methods that are useful in solving complex problems. Researchers, scientists and practitioners have been using multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) intensively in the last two decades. Sousa et al. (2021) confirm that the MCDM can help decision-makers to address multidimensional issues related to key issues under the 2030 Agenda. Due to its flexibility for decision makers to simultaneously analyse all criteria and objectives, various MCDM methods are applied in many scientific and research fields: energy development and policy (Rigo et al., 2020; Bharadwaja et al., 2019; Kumar et al., 2017), sustainable manufacturing (Malek and Desai, 2020; Kandakoglu et al., 2019), agro-economy (Tošović-Stevanović, 2021, Optiz et al., 2019), management (Danesh et al., 2017), supply chain management (Mangla et al., 2018), sustainable companies' business models (Jurik et al., 2020; El hilali et al, 2020) innovation (Monsonís-Payá et al., 2017), environment (Dutta, et al., 2020), geography (Lehner et al., 2018; Nayak et al., 2018), banking (Ristanović et al., 2021), healthcare waste disposal system (Chauhan et al., 2021), system of education and training of teachers (Weng et al., 2019), decision-making at the local level (Phonphoton and Pharino, 2019), etc.

Previous literature has shown that the AHP method is one of the most attractive and used of all MCDM methods. There are numerous studies that have confirmed this now proven fact. Malek and Desai (2020) conducted a systematic review of the literature of 541 selected articles (from January 2001 to March 2019) and found that as many as 122 papers used the MCDM method, of which 30 were AHP method. Similarly, Kandakoglu et al. (2019) reviewed 343 articles dealing with sustainable development decision-making, published in the period from 2010 to 2017, and showed that AHP/ANP were the most used among MCDM methods.

Also, Mardani et al. (2015) analysed 393 articles published in the period from 2000 to 2014 and showed that the AHP method is the most needed and best ranked. Don Santos et al. (2018) took a step closer to the analysis of sustainable development using the AHP model by conducting a systematic literature review (173 manuscripts published between 2014 and 2018) of the AHP's support for decision making related to SD, thus making it possible to identify gaps and future research pathways. The AHP methods have been used in connection with sustainable development in many different fields: for adoption of green supply chain management (GSCM) (Shen et al., 2015), for monitoring sustainability in the corporate sector (Salvado et al., 2015), for resource planning in manufacturing process (Patalas-Maliszewska, and Łosyk. 2020), for evaluation of operational risk in banking (Ristanović et al., 2021), for responsible research and innovation (RRI) policies and initiatives (Monsonís-Payá et al., 2017), in agriculture (Gómez-Limón et al., 2020; Rezaei-Moghaddam and Karami, 2008), in smart city (Myeong et al., 2018), in energy management (Nakthong et al., 2019; Cheng et al., 2018), and in well-being (Hienuki et al., 2019). In some cases, different integrated and hybrid AHP methods were used, for instance, in management (Calabrese et al. 2019; Ramos-Quintana et al. 2019). From the previous review of the literature, it can be seen that the application of the AHP model mainly refers to decision-making at the micro level, enterprise level, or local level, but not to decision-making related to the general goals of society. However, the application of the AHP model of multiple decision-making at the macro level is the core of such a complex analysis and from that point of view this paper will represent a pioneering endeavour. This certainly limited the author to focus the discussion on the results of the same or similar researches, thus influencing the discussion that will follow to be mainly focused on the results of this research, and very little on the results of other analyses and researches. In the belief that the macro-level analysis will provide adequate results for decision-making by policy makers, the model will be presented below, and after evaluating the weights and links within the hierarchical structure, the results of the analysis will be presented.

The AHP method


The real question is whether Saaty (1980) could have assumed, in the years when he created the analytical hierarchy process method (AHP method), that his method would be so popular and used in decision-making processes. One of the main advantages of the AHP technique is that the cross-hierarchical structure successfully divides a complex problem into several simple problems. In other words, complex decisions are made through a series of one-to-one comparisons.

All the above-mentioned characteristics of the multi-criteria analytical hierarchy process (AHP method) were the motive for its selection in this article.

Saaty (1980) emphasizes that the AHP method is carried out through three main stages: decomposition, comparative judgement and synthesis. At the beginning, it is necessary to establish a hierarchical structure of objectives, criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives. That structure must have a logical sequence, first to present the problem, then to give logical reasons for it, and then to solve it. Comparison of pairs of criteria and/or alternatives is performed by experts based on their knowledge and experience. In the process of rating compared pairs, experts use Saaty's scale of values, bringing a higher level of objectivity to the evaluation.

Decomposition. The AHP method is based on organizing problems through a logical hierarchical structure, where the general goal (problem) is at the highest level, while the criteria are arranged at the next level. The alternatives (attributes) are located at the last level. Figure 1 illustrates the structure hierarchy tree. This is its original form, and for research purposes it is simple to apply and can be easily decomposed.

Figure 1 Saaty's hierarchy of criteria (C) and alternatives (A) in the analytic hierarchy process model



Source: Saaty, 1980.

Comparative judgement. All elements within the hierarchical structure are interconnected. The criteria are then ranked in pairs. Then, with the help of the AHP method, weights are obtained for each of these selected criteria, which indicates their importance levels. The advantage of paired comparison is that it makes decisions giving preference to only two options in comparison, regardless of other options (Gompf et al., 2021).

The basis of the AHP method is the ranking of all criteria within the structure (complex criteria are broken down into sub-criteria). Ranking is carried out using a system of comparisons in a pair of elements of the hierarchy. Saaty (1994) created a table for comparisons in pairs (Saaty's scale of relative importance), according to which verbal judgments are converted into numerical values on a scale from 1 to 9 (1 means that two criteria are equal, and 9 the importance of one criterion increases relative to another).

Table 5. Saaty's scale of relative importance

Scale	Judgment
1	Equal importance
3	Moderate importance of one over the other
5	Essential or strong importance
7	Very strong or demonstrated importance
9	Extreme or absolute importance
2,4,6,8	Intermediate values between the two adjacent judgements

Source: Saaty (1980, 1994)

A set of criteria (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) is created. In the next step, each criterion a_i is related to the weight w_i on the basis of $n \times n$ comparisons collected in the comparison matrix A . The principal eigenvector w is obtained by solving the system of equations 1:

$$(A - \lambda_{\max} I) w = 0 \quad (1)$$

, where I is the unit matrix; λ_{\max} the largest or principal eigenvalue of A ; and w the principal eigenvector (vector of priority factors).

The elements of the matrix in each row are multiplied together, and then the n -root is taken (where n is the number of elements in the row). The normalized

matrix is obtained by dividing these values by their sum. In the last step, the consistency of the comparison or consistency is checked. Since perfect consistency rarely occurs in practice (If the matrix is perfectly consistent then $CI=0$), the consistency coefficient (CR) is used to check the consistency of the AHP method. As a rule, pairwise comparisons in the judgment matrix are considered inconsistent if the CR value does not exceed 10%. Otherwise, when the degree of consistency is above 10%, then it is necessary to repeat the entire process of evaluating the vector matrix, i.e. repeat the pairwise comparison procedure until the level below 10% is reached. The consistency coefficient is calculated via the consistency index (CI) which must be evaluated via the random consistency index (RCI) given in the following table 6 (values depend on n – number of criteria).

Table 6. RCI values for different values of n

n	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
RCI	0	0	0.58	0.9	1.12	1.24	1.32	1.41	1.45

Step by step, the column sum of the even matrix is multiplied by the normalized eigenvector and the maximum eigenvalue λ_{max} is calculated. [$CI = (\lambda_{max} - n) / (n - 1)$]. All the above steps are summarized in Table 7 (El hilali et. al, 2020). For more information, see Saaty (1994, 2003); Lipušček (2010); Ristanović et al. (2021); Gompf et al. (2021).

Table 7. Calculations to Obtain the Vector Criteria

Criteria	C1	C2	C3	Cn	Eigenvector	Criteria vector
C1	1	a_{12}	a_{13}	a_{1n}	$V_j = \prod_{i=1}^n a_{ij}^{(1/n)}$	$W_j = V_j / \sum V_j$
C2	$1/a_{12}$	1	a_{23}	a_{2n}		$W_j = V_j / \sum V_j$
C3	$1/a_{13}$	$1/a_{23}$	1	a_{3n}		$W_j = V_j / \sum V_j$
Cn	$1/a_{1n}$	$1/a_{2n}$	$1/a_{3n}$	1		$W_j = V_j / \sum V_j$
Eigenvalue λ_{max}	$\sum_{i=1}^n a_{ij} * W_j$				$\sum V_j$	$\sum w_j = 1$
Consistency Ration (CR)	$\frac{(\lambda_{max} - n)/(n - 1)}{RI}$					

Source: El hilali et. al, 2020

Synthesis. Now the priority vectors become columns within the decision matrix. The final results are obtained by multiplying the alternatives with the global weight of the single decision criteria. Thus, the global priority of that element is obtained, which is further taken to weight the elements that are at a lower level compared to each other, and so on down to the bottom level. Finally, the obtained values are ranked (priorities with the highest total weight receive the highest rank value) and a final decision is made.

Results and Discussion

The goal of this analysis is to choose the best alternative for Serbia to achieve sustainable development in the EU accession process. The goal is decomposed into three criteria for achieving indicators of sustainable development, which are grouped according to the 2030 agenda, the approach through chapters and the approach through clusters. The sub-criteria are identified in accordance with tables 1 to 3, as a framework for forming the logical hierarchical structure of the problem.

The analytical process of the AHP method involved selecting criteria and sub-criteria, then comparing them in pairs with the goal (using the Saaty's scale), and then performing a paired comparison of alternatives according to each criterion. Potential errors in determining the value of the criteria in the matrix of pair comparisons were determined by calculating the degree of consistency. The obtained value of the consistency index for all three concepts was less than 0.1. This means that the comparison matrix was well defined (inconsistent). In the next step, the assessment of alternatives was performed according to each criterion separately. The overall hierarchical structure implies that the priorities of the criteria according to the goal and the priorities of the alternatives in terms of criteria are calculated and that the priorities are determined according to the goal. This is done according to the weight vector. At the end of the procedure, a synthesis of the entire selection problem was performed. Only then was it possible to rank all segments according to three different SDG mapping concepts. (Table 8).

Table 8. Ranking SDGs through the different concepts

Agenda 2030	RANK	EU Chapters	RANK	Negotiating clusters	RANK
Environment	2	Economic growth	3	Basic cluster	6
Society	1	Human resources development	2	Internal market	3
Economy	3	Environment and climate	1	Competitiveness and inclusive growth	2
		Institutions, finances and cooperation	4	Green agenda and sustainable connectivity	1
				Resources, agriculture and cohesion	4
				External relations	5

Source: Author's calculation.

Note: SDG 14 is omitted.

The results showed clear similarities for some criteria, but also significant differences for other criteria. For example, all four groups of experts consistently advocated the point of view that the first concept (Agenda 2030) gives assessments of a general character. The results resulting from the process of European integration provide more detailed, concrete and effective evaluations thanks to a greater degree of dynamism and interconnectedness. Also, all four groups of experts ranked environmental criteria higher than the others. However, a consistent ranking could not be concluded, because the results partially differed between the four groups of experts regarding the grouping of certain objectives in all three different evaluation concepts. In any case, economic criteria were not ranked better than ecology and resources by any criteria. In the ranking of alternatives, for example, all four groups of experts consistently ranked two concepts resulting from EU integration, and it was possible to conclude a consistent ranking. Between the two concepts, the cluster concept is better ranked and favored than the chapter concept.

The results of the analysis showed that there are no significant differences in the mapping of the SDG strategic framework in the process of Serbia's accession to the EU, but that they exist in relation to the more general approach through

Agenda 2030. In fact, the highest ranking was given to those SDGs that relate to basic and existential elements, and then to environmental elements, social values.

Specifically, according to the ranks, of all the segments in each of the concepts, the first two best ranked contain almost identical SDGs:

- In 2030 Agenda these are: SDG6, SDG 13, SDG15 (Environment) and SDG1, SDG2, SDG3, SDG4, SDG5, SDG7, SDG11, SDG16 (Society);
- In EU Chapters these are: SDG1, SDG2, SDG3, SDG4, SDG5, SDG10 (Humane Resource Development) and SDG6, SDG7, SDG11, SDG12, SDG13, SDG15 (Environment and climate);
- In Negotiating clusters these are: SDG1, SDG4, SDG5, SDG8, SDG9, SDG10 (Competitiveness and inclusive growth) and SDG6, SDG7, SDG11, SDG12, SDG13, SDG15 (Green agenda and sustainable connectivity).

These results unequivocally reflect that the priority in the global framework is environmental protection, climate change and maintenance of social values. In addition, the dominance of these segments stems from the large number of sustainable development goals they already contain. At the same time, each of these segments is an integral part of each of the two concepts analysed in this article. In this regard, the hypothesis that the best-rated SDG indicators are grouped through the concept of Serbia's accession to the EU through clusters, characterized by dynamism and interconnectivity, was confirmed.

Conclusion

In this analysis, the author focused on the issue of selecting criteria for achieving the SDGs. Although the process of achieving the SDGs for Serbia was already defined in advance through the process of Serbia's accession to the EU, the analysis was extended to different concepts of grouping SDG indicators. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the various criteria for achieving the SDGs in Serbia, their ranking and the selection of the best option for which today's policy makers could decide on their own.

The presented research confirms the expectation that the grouping of SDG indicators according to the concept based on the 2030 Agenda leads to the achievement of sustainable development that does not change the essence of the activities defined by national strategic documents. In other words, the concept that balances the three dimensions of sustainable development (Environment, Society and Economy) is suitable for each country, and although it can be adapted

to the characteristics of the country and the system, it is not necessarily tied to the process accession of Serbia to the EU. It is defined by the UN methodology and is not favoured over other concepts in the analysis of this paper. As such, it is implemented in parallel with the achievement of the SDG indicators defined by the pre-accession process.

The shown connection of the SDGs with the new EU accession methodology, which is based on negotiating chapters divided into clusters, shows the best results. The new joining methodology has the most effective associated goals and indicators. Their evaluation process showed that grouping goals can have a more effective outcome, which can be achieved simultaneously in several areas during negotiations. Closing a cluster means opening several chapters at the same time, i.e. achieving a greater number of SDGs and adequate coverage of the area with the existing strategic framework.

Criteria, weighting criteria, weight vector values, and alternatives are calculated by the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP method). This methodological concept enabled an adequate assessment of all three concepts that are crucial for mapping SDG in accordance with the negotiation process between Serbia and the EU.

The prepared analysis confirms the dominant influence on the goals of sustainable development, and not their grouping when observing the old and new methodology of Serbia's accession to the EU. It is certainly easier to open / close chapter by chapter and it is easier to adjust the dynamics to current needs or interests. In principle, the new methodology changes the fact that opening a cluster will mean working on several goals at once, even when it does not correspond (or less corresponds) to current needs or interests. In other words, with the new methodology, order or dynamics will be under some pressure.

Overall, progress only in those sustainable development goals that will be ranked best is not necessarily the best strategy. In fact, policy makers need to focus on their own potential for better performance, respecting all criteria. A country that focuses on important goals of sustainable development will benefit more than those identified externally as important. The biggest advantage of sustainable development is that they are inexhaustible and interconnected goals of sustainable development, which can always be upgraded. And they are visible and measurable, which makes the job easier.

In this paper, it is unequivocally shown that the cluster-based concept in the process of Serbia's accession to the EU is the best ranked. Nevertheless, regardless of that, achieving the goals of sustainable development becomes imperative for a better quality of life and future generations. Bearing in mind that accession to the EU is a strategic goal of the state and that all reforms are in the function of reaching

that goal, there is a complete consensus that the realization of the sustainable development goals is implemented through the process of EU integration (PPS, 2021). Therefore, this research can be a good basis for analyses that would have a different angle of observation, for example, whether the methodological concept of European integration of Serbia could be based primarily on the achievement of sustainable development goals. In this context, a rhetorical question arises as to whether achieving the goals of sustainable development would speed up or facilitate the process of Serbia's European integration?

The final evaluation showed that these different approaches to the SDGs, whether they were conceived with a standard approach and a free choice of the combination of SDGs through the Agenda 2030, or for EU candidate countries through a pre-defined methodology in the mix of SDGs, is the greatest emphasis on the social, ecological and economic aspect from Agenda 2030, and that for the candidate countries the transition to a new methodology and a new mix of goals does not represent a significant change in value and access, how much time was lost in the new adjustment to other groups of indicators. Serbia has not yet managed to fulfil all the necessary calculations for indicators of sustainable development either according to the UN methodology or the EU methodology. In recent years, efforts have been made to adapt the methodology through strategic documents and action plans. A number of new indicators are trying to be subsumed under existing methodologies in order to more easily arrive at the rating of the SDG indicators. The biggest problem is that the implementation of the SDGs is an expensive process (UN SDSN, 2019), as it requires greater capacities in finance, human capital, and time.

The proposed methodology has the potential to consider a new approach to measuring, comparing or ranking countries and regions in terms of sustainable development, as well as to monitor improvements or the impact of policies introduced. Finally, it is important to note that providing this robust information on sustainable development should be the basis for more detailed approaches to addressing sustainability issues.

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Annex

**Table A1 List of indicators that repeat
within the global indicator framework**

7.b.1/12.a.1
8.4.1/12.2.1
8.4.2/12.2.2
10.3.1/16.b.1
10.6.1/16.8.1
13.2.1/13.b.1 (with a slight amendment)
15.7.1/15.c.1
15.a.1/15.b.1
1.5.1/11.5.1/13.1.1
1.5.2/11.5.2
1.5.3/11.b.1/13.1.2
1.5.4/11.b.2/13.1.3
4.7.1/12.8.1/13.3.1

Source: UNGA Global indicator framework.

Vladimir RISTANOVIĆ

ODRŽIVI RAZVOJ U NOVOJ METODOLOGIJI PRISTUPANJA SRBIJE EU

Apstrakt: Cilj ovog članka je analiza svih elemenata održivog razvoja, posebno u kontekstu nove metodologije politike proširenja za zemlje Balkana. U osnovi, analiza se zasniva na konceptu iz Agende 2030. Drugi koncept se sastoji od dve metodologije za pristupanje EU, gde su kriterijumi grupisani kroz poglavlja (stara metodologija) i klastere (nova metodologija). Istraživačko pitanje u ovom radu je da li je nova metodologija pristupanja EU garancija za postizanje boljih vrednosti indikatora održivog razvoja ili ne. Više-kriterijumska analiza odlučivanja (MCDA), tačnije Proces analitičke hijerarhije (AHP metoda), koristi se za određivanje prioriteta kriterijuma održivog razvoja na osnovu indikatora održivog razvoja kroz dva različita koncepta. Rezultati analize su pokazali da je postizanje SDG-a prema Agendi 2030 utvrđeno metodološki po zemljama, uz uvažavanje specifičnosti zemalja i njihovih politika. Takođe, rezultati su pokazali da je prihvatanje nove metodologije, odnosno organizovanje poglavlja u klastere i shodno tome pregrupisanje indikatora, pokazalo bolje rezultate. Zaključci iz ovog članka mogu se primeniti u donošenju odluka o izboru najboljeg pristupa održivom razvoju za pojedine zemlje.

Ključne reči: COR, nacionalni strateški okvir, članstvo u EU, proces pristupanja, poglavlja, klasteri, Agenda 2030, AHP metod.

UDC 327(497.11:4-672EU)
327(4-672EU:470)
Biblid: 0025-8555, 75(2023)
Vol. LXXV, No. 1, pp. 39–64
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2301039J>

Original article
Received 25 November 2022
Accepted 15 January 2023
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Serbia's approach to the EU and Russia – Implications for its internal and foreign policy

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Abstract: This article examines Serbia's approach to European integration and relations with Russia and its implications for its internal and foreign policy. Serbia's policy is characterized as a "small state" foreign policy designed to maintain good relations with the EU and Russia, believing that this will help it overcome internal and international challenges. In light of the tense relations between the West and Russia, the article examines how this policy has developed over the last two decades and whether it is sustainable in changed international circumstances. It focuses on the fact that Serbia's approach toward the EU and Russia has shown continuity despite the growing polarization at the international level caused by the crisis in Ukraine in 2014. However, due to the rapid and dramatic deterioration of EU-Russia relations caused by Russia's attack on Ukraine, Serbia's current policy has become very difficult to maintain. Serbia's pragmatic policy, shaped by internal and foreign political interests and guided by a series of economic, legal, and security arguments, was put to the test. These arguments have emerged as new key trends in Serbia and can be traced through the state's response to the war in Ukraine and the EU and Russia's responses to the country's policy. Serbia found itself under pressure from both sides to choose one side over the other, which causes tension and uncertainty and put the country in a difficult position. This article shows that despite the pressure and expectations of both sides, there was no drastic change in Serbia's policy towards the EU or Russia. However, the fact is that there is

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The paper presents the findings of a study developed as a part of the research project "Serbia and Challenges in International Relations in 2023", financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

less space for the fulfillment of the country's foreign policy priorities, which now seem mutually incompatible. Therefore, in a broader sense, this article calls into question the sustainability of Serbia's current foreign policy as a framework for preserving the strategic and national interests of the country.

Keywords: Serbia, foreign policy, national interest, European integration, the European Union, Russia, Russia-Ukraine war.

Introduction

Each country's foreign policy comprises self-serving approaches and tactics to safeguard its national and domestic interests and accomplish its objectives in international relations (Hudson 2018). To comprehend the activities and interactions of Serbia with regard to the European Union (EU) and Russia, we must know the country's foreign policy decisions and the motivations behind them. To understand where Serbia stands on this unfriendly EU-Russia relations, we must also look at its geography, officially stated foreign policy goals, national interests, domestic issues and concerns, and the current state of international relations.

Small states such as Serbia have distinct demands from larger ones, pursue various foreign policies, and struggle more than bigger states to meet successful foreign policy outcomes. They have limited opportunities for independent foreign policy formulation and implementation. Their economies are completely dependent on international cooperation, often lacking sufficient resilience, and they have small territories and populations. Depending on conditions at home and abroad, small states adopt different security methods to compensate for their size and use the appropriate techniques to protect their interests. It is common practice for smaller states to favor multilateralism to gain influence and exert restraint over larger states (Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2017). Despite their limited scope of influence and lack of power autonomy, small states frequently seek to expand their power. In these circumstances, one approach could be to enact a foreign policy that does not fully support the goals of any major state but instead attempts to act as an honest mediator. Some estimate Serbia's pragmatist strategy, which includes close integration with the EU and close cooperation with Russia, is based on the need to guarantee security and economic growth, leading to a neo-Titoist foreign policy of balancing (Reid 2021, 729). Others think Serbia is still far from obtaining such independence, despite its uncertain position between the East and the West, which may be related to Yugoslavia's nonalignment policy (Kovačević 2019, 420). However, this is more than just a one-way street. The specificities of

being a small state make the country also extremely vulnerable to the direct influence of more powerful international actors.

Given that this article is about Serbia's European integration and relations with Russia, it begins by providing an overview of the steps Serbia took to join the EU and its policy toward it. Since Serbia's foreign policy has long anticipated a clear commitment to European integration while maintaining and expanding comprehensive cooperation with Russia, the research then focuses on the country's ties with the Russian Federation. Following that, the research focuses on the fact that the war in Ukraine caused significant changes to overall international relations. This new geostrategic reality has called into question Serbia's attempt to lead a pragmatic foreign policy based on the belief that balancing its tactics and strategy with other major world powers will strengthen its geostrategic position. On the contrary, the rapid changes in the international environment brought about by the Ukraine war made it difficult to achieve primary foreign policy priorities. They placed Serbia in a highly complicated international position. Given that the EU and Russia are significant and influential actors whose actions have regional and global ramifications, the measures through which they attempt to influence Serbia's foreign policy are examined in greater depth. In light of the new international circumstances, the question of whether Serbia can still maintain its foreign policy course, which it believes is in its national interest, arises.

Following the purpose and goals of the research, a comparative analysis of Serbia's foreign policies toward the EU and Serbia's policies toward Russia is used as a methodological framework. In order to better understand this issue, a comprehensive overview of the legislative frameworks established in the country's relations with these two sides and the content of key strategic documents that define Serbia's national and foreign policy objectives directly or indirectly is given. Also considered are the official statements and agreements Serbia has made with the Russian Federation and the EU and the social and political climate in the country. To determine how the conflict in Ukraine has affected Serbia's foreign policy stance, documents from various international organizations—the EU and the UN—that address the question of Serbia's compliance are examined.

An overview of Serbia's foreign policy and approaches toward European Union integration

Serbia's approach to the EU is motivated by its geographic location and critical economic interests. Due to the recognition that any political strategy that separated

Serbia from the EU would be unsuccessful and detrimental, European integration has stood out as a primary foreign policy aim in all important Serbian national documents. Despite the country's lengthy and complicated EU accession process, it remains a top priority for its foreign policy. The dispute between Belgrade and Pristina has made Serbia's relationship with the EU more difficult because the optimization of those ties is a condition for EU membership. The EU participates in the ongoing dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, which aims to normalize relations and resolve outstanding issues. Also, since the Ukrainian crisis started in 2014, the issue of EU sanctions has been a source of tension between Serbia and the EU.

As this chapter is devoted to an overview of Serbia's foreign policy and approaches toward EU integration prior to the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022, we will start by noting that the long road toward Serbia's compliance with EU norms and standards began after the political changes in the Republic of Serbia in October 2000. During the 2003 European Council summit in Thessaloniki, Serbia was recognized as a potential candidate for EU membership, along with five other Western Balkan countries. In October 2004, the National Assembly of Serbia adopted the Resolution on Joining the European Union, which identified European integration as a key foreign policy goal (Official Gazette of RS No. 112/2004). According to the 2005 National Strategy of Serbia for EU Accession, "inclusion in European integration flows – joining and accession to the European Union – is a strategic commitment of Serbia that enjoys high political and social support" (NSS EU, 2005). Three years later, Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and the Interim Trade and Trade-Related Issues Agreement with the EU (Official Gazette of RS[a] No. 83/2008). The visa-free regime, which enabled citizens of Serbia to travel to the EU and other Schengen countries without visas, entered into force on December 19, 2009. Even before becoming an EU candidate country, Serbia adopted the National Program for integration to show its dedication to the process of European integration; the amended version was adopted in December 2009 (NPI 2009).² In December 2009, Serbia formally applied for EU membership. The government's accompanying memorandum emphasized that this request reflects the prevailing social consensus about Serbia's orientation toward Europe and its aspirations to become a member of the Union. In 2010, the EU Council of Ministers began implementing the Transitional Agreement and unfroze the EU-Serbia SAA ratification process. In October 2011, the European Commission, among others, gave its opinion on Serbia's application to join the EU.

² NPI is a document prepared by each candidate country applying to join the EU and outlines a detailed strategy for fulfilling all criteria necessary for EU membership.

In this document, the European Commission requested that Belgrade normalize relations with Pristina in order to set a date for the beginning of membership negotiations (EC COM[2011] 666 final). In March 2012, the European Council decided to grant Serbia candidate country status after the General Affairs Council's recommendation on February 28, which reaffirmed Serbia's ongoing, credible commitment, and continued progress in putting into practice the agreements reached in the dialogue with Kosovo (EUCO 35/12 Presse 84). The European Council decided to begin accession talks with Serbia in June 2013, a few months after the EU-sponsored Brussels agreement on normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina was reached (Council of the EU Press Release 2013). Following the decision, the Council approved the framework for those talks in December 2013 and opted to hold the first intergovernmental conference with Serbia in January 2014. This conference, which took place on January 21, 2014, marked the beginning of the opening of talks for Serbia's EU membership (Council of the EU 5486/14, PRESSE 15 2014). In the meantime, in July 2013, the EU Council confirmed that all member states had ratified the SAA, which provided a framework for further improvement of Serbia's cooperation with the EU in many areas. Establishing a free trade zone and harmonizing legislation with EU law were the two most important obligations that Serbia undertook when it signed the agreement. Due to this agreement and the liberalization of trade with the EU, citizens of Serbia are able to buy goods at lower prices and choose from a broader range of products. At the same time, Serbian producers were enabled to sell their products in a market of close to 500 million people, which attracts foreign investors. Furthermore, this agreement gave Serbia access to much larger EU funds.

Serbia and the EU have also intensified their cooperation in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This was in line with the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, adopted in October 2009, which stated that Serbia is ready to align its security capacities with EU standards and will conduct its foreign and security policy keeping in mind the views of the Union (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 88/2009). In 2011, Serbia and the Union concluded the Agreement with the EU on security procedures for the exchange and protection of confidential data. They also concluded the Agreement on establishing a framework for participation in civil and military operations for crisis management; this made it possible for representatives from Serbia and members of the Serbian army and police to take part in Union missions (Official Gazette of RS(a) No. 1/2012-266; Official Gazette of RS No. 1/2012-260). Serbia ratified these agreements in February 2012. A deeper partnership with the EU in regard to CFSP is also called for in the SAA, which among other things, asks for increased cooperation in this policy.

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, adopted in 2019, stated that European integration and EU membership are Serbia's national interests and strategic orientation. It is further noted that the national interest is achieved by shaping a modern and developed society based on common European values that are part of the Serbian national identity and historical heritage, as well as by achieving internal readiness for membership in the EU and improving national security and defense through the process of European integration. This document stated, among other things, that Serbia is "firmly committed to contributing to the EU Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy as part of the accession process and to integrate into the concepts of that European policy." It further states that Serbia "endorses the European values and foreign policy objectives expressed in the basic documents of the European Union, as well as the main guidelines of its foreign policy actions based on those values." The document stated that Serbia would work to align its foreign policy with the goals and guiding principles of the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy. Additionally, it declares that the Republic of Serbia's military and civilian capabilities for participating in EU missions and operations are a crucial aspect of its foreign policy, contributing to global, European, and regional security and the observance of international law. It declares its readiness to increase mutual trust and shoulder shared responsibility in addressing security challenges. Finally, it is stated that Serbia will continue to gradually align its foreign policy with the Union's positions leading up to EU membership under the SAA and the Negotiating Framework. As a result, it will align with its foreign policy at the time of membership (Official Gazette of RS No. 94/2019). With regard to actions internationally, Serbia should not support initiatives that would contradict the CFSP of the EU, or it risks undermining the progress it has made (Jović-Lazić 2020, 321). The 2021 National Security Strategy of Serbia also reflects EU membership and European integration as Serbia's strategic goal. The strategy states that Serbia must make internal preparations for EU membership, develop a modern society based on common European values that are a part of its national identity and historical heritage, and strengthen its national security and defense through European integration to realize this national interest. It is noted that Serbia "is committed to building its security on democratic standards, a cooperation policy, and a European foreign policy orientation" and that this kind of foreign policy orientation gives it a stronger position on the world stage (NSS RS 2021).

Despite lengthy negotiations and the fact that European integration is mentioned in official documents as one of Serbia's vital national interests, Serbia's membership in the EU is still up in the air. At the same time, the influence of the EU in Serbia and the Western Balkans has been declining. In particular, several

crises have made the Union less attractive, and disagreements between member states have made it difficult to trust the future of the Union's enlargement process. To re-establish a credible perspective of membership of the Western Balkans in the EU, the EU Council approved a new methodology for the accession process in March 2020.³ The Republic of Serbia stayed committed to European integration by approving the new methodology in September 2020. On May 6, 2021, the EU Council approved a document that explains how the revised enlargement method will be used in negotiations with Serbia.⁴ Serbia's first intergovernmental conference on May 22, 2021, used the new methodology. On that occasion, it was noted that the chapters included in Cluster one —Fundamentals—were already open. Cluster four—green agenda and sustainable connectivity—was opened by Serbia at an intergovernmental conference on December 14, 2021(Council of the EU Press release 2021).

In the meantime, the stagnation of the European integration process significantly reduced euro enthusiasm, allowing Russia to strengthen its influence. Russia has been particularly effective in leveraging its soft power and developing the idea that it is a critical strategic partner that takes more care of the country's needs than the EU does (Panagiotou 2020, 219). After relations between Moscow and Brussels worsened in 2014 due to the Ukraine crisis and the Crimean annexation, Serbia began to lag notably behind regarding demands for harmonizing its foreign policy with the Union's policy. Serbia has supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine, arguing that the crisis in Ukraine poses a serious threat to European security and calls into question the very foundation of such fundamental political documents such as the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter for a New Europe of 1990, and the Istanbul Charter for European Security of 1999 However, annual reports from the EU Commission have become very critical of Serbia's refusal to join the EU in imposing restrictive measures on Russia.

Some believe that Serbia wants to join the EU, but only under its own conditions, and political and social elites in Serbia having different views on what is best for the

³ The main feature of the new enlargement methodology is the six thematic clusters of negotiating chapters. The new methodology retains the suspensive clause and applies the principle of reversibility if there is a significant deadlock in any area covered by the accession process. Also, countries that have made enough reforms will be allowed to join EU policies, programs, and markets, with more money and investment to encourage them.

⁴ Chapter 35, which covers Serbia's overall normalization process with Pristina, will be handled separately from the other clusters. Chapter 34 will be addressed after the negotiation process. Fundamentals; internal market; competitiveness and inclusive growth; green agenda and sustainable connectivity; resources, agriculture, cohesion, and external relations are other clusters ("Negotiation Clusters" 2021).

country prevents it from leading a coherent foreign policy (Seroka, 2010, 439–40). Serbia has come under criticism for attempting to keep a balance between its relations with the EU and Russia, leading some to claim that it is trying to have its cake and eat it too. Serbian officials, however, argue that the country is simply trying to pursue its own national interests and maintain good relations with both sides. As the EU has made the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina one of the critical preconditions for accession, this issue, besides alignment with the EU sanctions, will continue to be a significant factor in the EU-Serbia relationship. It is also a fact that as the crisis in Ukraine has worsened, the enlargement of the EU into the Western Balkans has fallen to the bottom of its priority list. The European perspectives of Serbia and other Western Balkan countries will depend not only on their ability to adapt to and harmonize with EU laws and policies but will also be determined by the EU's internal economic and institutional stability, the practical application of its new enlargement methodology, and factors that emerge from the changing international and geopolitical environment.

Overview of Serbia's relations with Russia before the outbreak of the Ukraine War

In the meantime, Serbia and Russia have developed close political and economic relations. They are based on good historical and cultural ties between Serbia and Russia, as illustrated by the majority of Serbs' favorable opinion of Russia. The majority of political parties and the Serbian Parliament's foreign policy reflect this. Over and above the ties mentioned, Serbia also has a strong economic relationship with Russia, particularly in the energy sector. Russia is a critical natural gas supplier to Serbia and has agreed to provide funding for a pipeline's construction there. At the core of Serbia's good relations with Russia is the need for Belgrade to maintain Moscow's support for its position on the status of Kosovo.

Since 2008, when Pristina proclaimed its independence, relations between Russia and Serbia became more vital. Given that most of the EU and other Western countries recognized this unilaterally declared independence, Russia had the opportunity to reassert its position as a fierce defender of the territorial integrity of Serbia. As a result of this, the Serbian government started to turn to Russia (Reid 2021, 728-9). This was also supported by the gradual strengthening of the Russian economy, which enabled it to conduct an active policy in an area beyond its immediate neighborhood. After the two countries signed a free trade agreement in 2000, Russian investments in the Serbian economy grew, particularly in the

energy sector. At the end of January 2008, Serbia and Russia signed an agreement on cooperation in the oil and gas industry, which the Serbian Parliament ratified in September of the same year (Official Gazette of RS[a] No. 83/2008). It was a framework document for the signing of several following agreements in the field of energy. Thus, in December 2008, Serbia and Russia signed a deal to sell a 51 percent stake in the oil industry of Serbia-OIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije-NIS) to Gazprom. The OIS was sold with exclusive rights to exploit natural oil and gas reserves on Serbia's territory. By signing this agreement, Russia gained a dominant position in the Serbian energy market. Serbia chose to sell the national company to Russia without holding a tender because of Belgrade's efforts to ensure Moscow's continuing political support, notably about Kosovo and expectations that it will be one of the vital transit countries on the future South Stream pipeline. Expecting future earnings from transit taxes, most political parties in Serbia supported a "more flexible approach" to the negotiations with Russia. There was worry that a possible breakdown in negotiations over the Russian purchase of the OIS could have hurt political and economic ties and cooperation between the two countries (Jović-Lazić and Lađevac 2013, 140).

In the 2009 National Security Strategy of Serbia, the importance of historically close and comprehensive ties between Serbia and Russia is stated; it is emphasized that the strategic energy partnership strengthens cooperation with regard to issues of broader national interest. It is also said that Serbia will keep working to improve bilateral relations with Russia, which, given its goal of joining the EU and its growing importance in the region, should open up new ways for the two countries to work together (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 88/2009). At the end of February 2009, Serbia and Russia signed a visa-free agreement in Moscow (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 31/2009). By promising Serbia a loan of more than \$1 billion to balance its budget, Russia demonstrated that it was willing to be its creditor. Thus, Russia gave Serbia a \$200 million state loan in April 2010, and in April 2013, Russia also agreed to a \$500 million loan to support the Serbian budget (Official Gazette of the RS, No.3/2013). Following this, Serbia and Russia signed six more bilateral agreements in different areas of cooperation. Russia's financial support was crucial after Serbia deviated from the fiscal program in February 2012 and the first IMF revision failed. The agreement on long-term natural gas deliveries from Russia signed in Moscow in October 2012 was also very important for Serbia. The agreement was supposed to guarantee supply security and lower gas prices (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 3/2013).

The opening of the regional Serbian-Russian humanitarian center in Niš in 2012 established another area of security cooperation between Russia and Serbia. The goal of establishing the center was to make it easier for the two countries to work together to help people and protect them in case of floods, fires, or other natural

disasters in Serbia or nearby countries (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 6/2012). There was a lot of debate and disagreement over the decision to open the center. According to some US and European security officials, the center has advanced communications equipment that can exceed its emergency rescue needs. If Serbia were to grant diplomatic immunity to its Russian personnel at Russia's request, the Government of Serbia would lose control over the facility and personnel, and this center would become a kind of Russian consulate. Russia could use the center as an intelligence gathering station, given its proximity to the US Bondsteel base in Kosovo (Birnbau 2018).

In May 2013, Russia and Serbia signed the Declaration on Strategic Partnership in Sochi. It states that both sides "rely on deep mutual feelings of friendship, the centuries-old history of relations, and the tradition of linguistic, spiritual, and cultural affinities of the fraternal peoples of the two countries". The strategic partnership, among other things, envisages military and intelligence cooperation and the harmonization of positions in international organizations (DSP of Serbia and Russia). Serbia joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance led by Russia, as an observer the same year. To further strengthen military cooperation, Serbia and Russia signed the Agreement on Military Cooperation in November 2013, which served as the basis for all later agreements between the two armies on particular areas of cooperation (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 7/2014). In the following years, Serbia and Russia signed agreements on the mutual protection of confidential data, an agreement on military-technical cooperation, and a memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Serbia and the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation (Official Gazette of RS No. 10/2015; Official Gazette of RS No. 4/2016). The leaders of Russia and Serbia stressed the value of enhancing and diversifying bilateral cooperation during Vladimir Putin's visit to Belgrade in October 2014. On that occasion, Serbia held its first military parade in thirty years, and the Russian president received the highest military and state honors. Some thought that the Russian president's visit showed that Russia was ready to protect its interests in the Balkans and confirmed that Serbia is in Russia's sphere of influence (Szpala 2014). The following month the first joint anti-terrorist exercise by Serbian Army ground units and Russian Army paratroopers, named "Srem 2014", was held at a military training ground near Ruma. Cooperation between the Serbian and Russian air forces resulted in a joint Russian-Serbian tactical air exercise. The First BARS-2015 (Brotherhood of Aviators of Russia and Serbia) was held in Russia in October 2015, and military exercises were held at several military airports in Serbia the following October ("Exercise BARS Completed", 2015). Since September 2015, members of the Russian Federation, Belarusian Armed Forces, and Serbian Armed

Forces have decided to convene annually for military drills known as the “Slavic Brotherhood.” Joining the EU in condemning the irregularity of Belarus’s elections and the violent suppression of post-election protests, Serbia decided not to take part in joint military exercises held in Belarus in 2020. But it again participated in the “Slavic Brotherhood 2021” exercises in Russia. To create a quicker exchange of information in the fight against terrorism and the exchange of experiences and practices in this crucial security area, an agreement between Serbia and Russia on cooperation in this area was signed in June 2020 in Belgrade (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 1/2021).

In October 2019, a new agreement was signed approving a Russian credit export to the Government of the Republic of Serbia in the amount of more than 170 million euros (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 16/2019). Serbia and the Eurasian Economic Union member states signed a free trade agreement in Moscow on October 25, 2019, which entered into force after ratification by all member states in July 2021 (Official Gazette of RS No. 3/2020). As long as Serbia joins the EU, the free trade agreement’s exit provision ensures that it may be canceled (Jović-Lazić and Lađevac 2022, 48). Given that the previous ten-year contract on the supply of Russian gas to Serbia expired in 2021, the two parties agreed to extend it for another six months, until May 2022. After that, Serbia and the Russian government’s energy provider Gazprom agreed on a new three-year gas distribution contract that again allows Serbia to purchase gas at a lower price. Although Serbia benefited financially from this agreement, Russia also benefited because it once again had the chance to use gas as a political tool to show that a country with good relations with it could purchase Russian gas at a lower price.

The many interstate agreements approved over the years offer a strong contractual and legal foundation for Serbia and Russia to further their bilateral ties. Russia’s presence in Serbia has grown through loans, trade, energy projects, and other agreements. Even though the EU has imposed several rounds of sanctions on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as the fact that it started accession negotiations with the EU the same year, Serbia has continued to maintain close ties and cooperate with Russia in many areas. Even though Serbia, as a country in the process of EU integration, has pledged to align its foreign and economic policies with those of the EU, which includes implementing EU sanctions, it has refused to do so. Furthermore, it continued to conduct military exercises with Russia, buy weapons and military equipment, and, in general, strengthen military-technical cooperation with Russia. The primary motivation for such an approach is political. Belgrade has refused to take actions that would endanger relations with Moscow, which supports Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo. It has used its influence in various international

organizations to prevent any resolution supporting Kosovo's independence from being passed. Furthermore, due to its reliance on Russia for energy security, Belgrade had an economic reason to be wary of actions that could hinder relations with Moscow.

Aside from sanctions, another source of tension in Serbia-Russia-EU relations even before the Ukraine war was the fact that, while Belgrade accepted the Brussels Agreement in 2013, which gave the EU a role in negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, Moscow remained critical. It is against EU involvement and accuses Brussels of imposing its own solutions. There are opinions that Russia's attitude toward the Kosovo issue is an attempt to influence world politics, which is aimed at preventing the West from being too powerful (Davies 2021). The Western Balkans have become a front in Russia's geopolitical conflict with the West. Moscow uses political and economic challenges to increase its influence, building on long-standing ties that could jeopardize regional stability (European Parliament 2017).

Nevertheless, although there was always a political element to Russia's decades-long involvement in Serbia, it never questioned Serbia's European orientation. Even though it is clear that Serbia's process of joining the EU will change its relationship with Russia, until the Ukraine war, Belgrade's policy had been based on the belief that there is much room for bilateral cooperation with Russia to continue in many areas, even after Serbia joins the EU.

The war in Ukraine and its impact on Serbia in the context of the rapid deterioration of relations between the EU and Russia

The deterioration of relations between the EU and Russia has many repercussions for Serbia, which aspires to join the EU but also has historically close ties with Russia. The lack of mutual understanding between the EU and Russia and divergent expectations significantly impacted their foreign policy and mutual relations (Jović-Lazić and Lađevac 2021, 227). Although their relations have steadily deteriorated since the "colored revolutions" in the post-Soviet states in the early 2000s and the armed conflict in Georgia in 2008, since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, they have entered a new and very challenging phase (Jović-Lazić and Lađevac 2021, 27–51). Relations between the two sides deteriorated further due to mutual sanctions; the West sending weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, and Russia accumulating troops and armaments close to the Ukrainian border. This created enormous tension that

culminated in Russia's attack on Ukraine, bringing relations between Russia, the EU, and the West to an almost openly hostile state. The war has resulted in considerable tensions in international relations and the uncertainty that accompanied them, significantly impacting Serbia. The deterioration of relations between the EU and Russia has also affected Serbia's internal political climate. Some politicians and political parties in Serbia have used the tensions between the EU and Russia to advance their agendas, and the issue has become somewhat polarizing in the country. Before the Ukrainian war, the tension between two strong narratives of collective identity in Serbia—one about belonging to Europe and the other about brotherhood with Russia—already existed. Since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Serbia has adopted a neutral position and sought to maintain good relations with both sides. This was Serbia's strategy for avoiding this internal identity conflict (Ejdus 2014, 348). When the war in Ukraine broke out, it became extremely difficult for Serbia to maintain a balance in its relations with both sides. This could result in increased tensions and conflict within the country, impacting Serbia's foreign policy decisions, and complicating the European integration process.

Namely, Serbia's national security strategy is based on the belief that progress toward EU membership is good for the political, economic, and social stability of the country and that strengthening its ties with the USA, Russia, China, other long-term allies, and other critical members of the international community, are necessary for the stability of the country. Furthermore, the expansion of partnership and engagement with NATO through the Partnership for Peace based on the concept of military neutrality, as well as Serbia's observer status in the CSTO, headed by Russia, are considered ways to help the country's stability (NSS RS 2021). The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict showed that Serbia's national security strategy is unrealistic and based on many deep contradictions. In such a changed and sharply divided international environment, the EU and Russia have used their leverage to force Serbia to choose a clear foreign political orientation. Because of increased and mutually opposed external pressure and strong pro-Russian public sentiment, such a choice would have significant economic and political consequences for Serbia.

Serbia has decided to pursue a policy that will refuse to impose any sanctions on Russia while consistently supporting UN resolutions and EU declarations that support the territorial integrity of Ukraine and condemn the aggression against this country. Although Serbia voted against the UN General Assembly resolution on the militarization of Crimea in December 2020, it has repeatedly voted for resolutions against Russia in the UN Assembly since February 2022. Serbia backed the UN Assembly Resolution that demanded that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukraine in early March 2022 and respect that country's territorial integrity and

sovereignty. Serbia also cast a vote against Russia in April, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Western demand that it be excluded from the Human Rights Council because it invaded Ukraine. When the UN General Assembly voted to permit Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to address the annual gathering of world leaders in a pre-recorded video in mid-September, Serbia supported Ukraine. In October, the UN General Assembly voted against Moscow's request for a secret vote on whether to condemn Moscow's decision to annex four occupied parts of Ukraine, and Serbia voted against Russia again. The UN General Assembly resolution condemning the annexation of the four Ukrainian regions—Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporozhye, and Luhansk—was supported by Serbia.

At the same time, Serbia chose to sign a high-level diplomatic agreement with Russia on a two-year consultation plan between their foreign ministries. The agreement was signed on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York, where most Western leaders avoided top Russian officials because of the war in Ukraine. They stressed, among other things, that it is unacceptable that, when the majority of the world is fearfully monitoring Moscow's activities, Serbia signed a consultation agreement with a country that violates the UN Charter and aims to annex Ukrainian land. Although Serbia defined this document as "technical", meaning that it does not include requirements connected to security but rather bilateral and multilateral activities, European authorities have questioned this decision. It was pointed out that Serbia, as a candidate for EU membership, must defend both international law and European values and that, by signing the agreement on cooperation with Russia, Serbia sent the opposite message.

Despite harsh criticism that Serbia has once again remained outside the EU's foreign policy by refusing to impose economic sanctions and take part in international efforts to isolate Russia, the country supported EU declarations opposing Russia's attempts to divide Ukraine. Serbia also attempted to prove its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. On February 19, 2022, Serbia aligned itself with the EU High Representative's declaration on the situation in Eastern Ukraine and the Russian military build-up, in which the EU urged Russia to de-escalate by withdrawing its military forces from the area around Ukraine's borders (Council of the EU 2022a). Three days later, on February 22, 2022, Serbia joined the EU in condemning President Putin's decision to recognize the government-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine as autonomous entities and his following decision to station Russian soldiers in these areas (Council of the EU 2022b). Serbia also sided with the EU High Representative's statement on May 10, 2022, which denounced Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine, (Council of the EU 2022c). The country also voted for adopting a joint declaration at the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region annual

conference in May 2022, which called Russia's activities in Ukraine illegal and unjustified, pledging support for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity (EUSAIR Ministerial Meeting Declaration 2022). The following month, on June 3, 2022, Serbia added its name to a statement from the EU High Representative about Russia's attempts to forcefully integrate parts of Ukrainian territory (Council of the EU 2022d). During the last declaration on September 28, 2022, Serbia joined the EU High Representative's declaration condemning Russia's illegitimate "referenda" in the regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia (Council of the EU 2022e).

Despite the alignment mentioned above with the EU political declarations since the Ukrainian war erupted in recent years, the EU has been exerting pressure on Serbia to make a more definitive decision on which side to support (Chastand 2022). Previously, the EU's approach to Serbia and the Western Balkans was more flexible and less prescriptive. However, recent developments in EU-Russia relations have resulted in a more assertive stance from the EU. The EU has made it clear that in order for Serbia to progress on its path toward EU membership, it must align its foreign policy with that of the EU and support EU sanctions on Russia. This means that Serbia would be required to implement and enforce the same economic sanctions on Russia that are currently in place by the EU. Additionally, Serbia would be expected to support the EU's position on sanctions in international forums and refrain from taking any actions that would undermine the EU's sanction regime. This has been reflected in various EU political declarations, statements, and reports. In the EU Commission's last annual report on accession negotiations, published on October 12, 2022, Serbia's foreign policy came under harsh criticism because it persisted in wanting to join the EU while retaining close ties with Russia, regardless of the situation in Ukraine. The report noted that Serbia has significantly regressed in harmonizing with EU foreign and security policy because it didn't join the EU's restrictive measures towards Russia. It also stressed that some Serbian officials' statements and actions contradict EU foreign policy positions and that some Serbian media was implementing an effective pro-Russian disinformation campaign. The report also criticizes that Serbia maintains close relations and frequent high-level contacts with Russia, including regular bilateral visits (EC SWD[2022] 338 final). EU officials warned that this policy raised questions about Serbia's strategic direction, that the EU candidate countries are not expected to stay neutral in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and that picking the wrong side in this conflict would have consequences. Although the EU cannot and does not impose legal consequences on candidate countries for non-compliance with EU CFSP measures, such a policy is usually considered questionable in Brussels. Additionally, some EU members are hesitant to move forward with Serbia's accession because of its close ties to Russia

and concern that the Kremlin will use its leverage over the country to broaden and consolidate its influence throughout the Western Balkans. Due to its ties to Russia, there have also been concerns about Serbia's ability to support the EU's foreign policy objectives and initiatives if it were to join.

The EU has also expressed concern about the influence of Russian state-funded media in Serbia. In light of the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing hostilities between the EU and Russia, the EU sees these media as tools that Russia could use to spread false information and consolidate power in Serbia and the Western Balkans at the expense of the EU. When Russian RT television in Serbia opened in November 2022, EU representatives expressed their concerns, saying that the EU expects Serbia to take steps to fight information manipulation, such as disinformation and other types of hybrid threats. This approach of the EU towards Russian state-funded media such as RT and Sputnik is in line with EU policy. Under the accusation that they were being used to start and support military aggression against Ukraine and destabilize its neighbouring countries, the EU imposed sanctions on RT and Sputnik in March 2022 (Council of the EU Press Release 2022). Within this context, Serbia's decision to open RT television in the country could be seen as a sign of alignment with Russian foreign policy and a deviation from EU foreign policy. It could also raise concerns for the EU about Serbia's commitment to its values and principles, particularly in the areas of media freedom and the rule of law.

If the EU determines that Serbia does not support its principles and implements them in its policy, the country's chances of joining the Union may diminish. The EU may choose to delay or stop the association negotiations with Serbia and may also decide to take other actions to express its disapproval. Due to harsh warnings from the West that the government can no longer play both the European and Russian cards, concerns exist that Serbia's current foreign policy may impede the country's economic development. It also could discourage EU and Western companies from investing in the country and negatively affect the country's economy and development. The EU is Serbia's most significant trade and investment partner, and EU companies have invested heavily in the country. The EU is also one of the primary sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Serbia, accounting for a significant share of the country's total FDI. Access to EU markets and the ability to attract EU investment are essential for Serbia's economic development and modernization.⁵ Serbia faced the first tangible consequence of its policy towards

⁵ The European Union is particularly significant for Serbia because it is the country's most outstanding commercial partner, accounting for 61.4 percent of its overall commerce. The Union is also the largest investor in Serbia, and its investments were two-thirds of the country's net foreign direct investment inflows in 2020. (EC SWD[2021] 288 final)

Russia in December 2022. Due to European sanctions against Russia, Serbia was prohibited from importing Russian oil through the Adriatic pipeline, which is the only way to deliver that raw material to the country.

In contrast to the idea that sanctions and the stoppage of European integration could change Serbia's policy, others claim that resuming the EU accession process would support reforms and serve as a crucial means of pushing Serbia to align its foreign policy with the Union's. It starts from the assumption that the Western Balkans region is necessary for ensuring European security in the EU enlargement strategy and that Serbia, due to its size, population, and location, is a crucial country in regional geopolitics (Saric and Morcos 2022). As a result, Serbia's sanctions against Russia are a contentious geopolitical issue because they involve the interests of the EU and Russia. Since the Kremlin makes decisions about foreign policy based on the balance of power in world politics and believes that Russia is in a zero-sum game with the West, they see the expansion of NATO into Russia's sphere of influence as a threat to the country's national security (Reid 2021, 730). Therefore, Serbia, which NATO bombed in 1999, remains Russia's only potential strategic ally in its opposition to the future NATO expansion. Almost all of the other Western Balkan countries decided to join. As a result, Russia supports Serbia's decision not to join any military alliances and sees this country as a critical ally in a region where the EU and NATO are the most powerful.

Considering that Serbia is traditionally seen as Russia's ally in the region, Moscow expects Belgrade to prioritize its relationship with Russia over its relationship with the EU. Therefore, concerning EU sanctions, Russia expects Serbia to take a more neutral or pro-Russian position rather than support or implement them. Russia also expects Serbia to refrain from taking any actions that would further isolate Russia on the international stage. Moscow officials have warned Belgrade, expressing their hope that Serbia will act in its best national interest and refrain from political *harakiri* by imposing sanctions on Russia (Politika 2022). This message should be interpreted with the knowledge that Russia has multiple means to influence Serbia's foreign policy decisions. These tools include cultural, religious, or historical ties and narratives that emphasize Slavic and Orthodox Christian identity. The fact that Russian state-controlled media is present in Serbia is an additional tool for influencing Serbian public opinion and the internal political climate. Russia also has strong military and security cooperation with Serbia and sells arms and military equipment to Serbia, which is an additional lever of influence in the country. Finally, the most important tools are Russian political support regarding the status of Kosovo and Serbia's reliance on Russian energy supplies, which Serbian officials also cited as the primary justifications for the country's refusal to take part in EU sanctions.

Samorukov points out that Russia has influence in the region and within Serbia due to Serbia's reliance on its veto power in the UN Security Council regarding the status of Kosovo (2019). Although Moscow emphasizes that this support is based on long-standing political, economic, and strategic ties with Belgrade, the issue of Kosovo's status can also be viewed as part of Russia's efforts to maintain its influence in the Balkans and as part of Russia's rivalry with the West, which it intends to use to establish a new framework for mutual relations (Balcer, Kaczmarek, and Stanisławski 2008, 73). Russia also has used the Kosovo issue to justify its actions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine, arguing that Western countries' recognition of Kosovo's independence is similar to its recognition of these territories' independence. Russia has claimed that Kosovo's independence violated international law and that its support for the territories mentioned above was the only way to protect ethnic Russians living there (Ingimundarson 2022). Finally, there is the opinion that Russia's activities in Ukraine should be considered when assessing its position with regards to the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia under the auspices of the EU. In this context, its actions could be seen as a kind of "hybrid warfare" whose goal is to disrupt negotiations and prevent Serbia from joining Western institutions (Davies 2021).

Considering that Serbia likewise pursues a pragmatist foreign policy, it cannot be ruled out that Belgrade would eventually start to adjust to the demands of the EU. Russia could not have surpassed the EU as Serbia's top trading partner, investor, or source of financial aid even before the war in Ukraine, which it entered without adequate political consideration and which further economically isolated and crippled it. However, whether or not the Serbian government decides to take these measures, it is essential to remember that Russian soft power in Serbia is based on closeness and shared historical, cultural, and religious ties. Because of this, the pro-Russian sentiment of the Serbian population is reflected in many pro-Russian political parties. The Russian narrative, which frequently accuses the West of acting aggressively and unilaterally in international politics, is accepted by some groups in Serbia that are pro-Russian and opposed to closer ties with the West. Therefore, there are opinions that every Serbian government must maintain cordial ties with Russia in order to maintain power (Nelaeva and Semenov 2016, 68). This dichotomy is the reason for believing that Serbia's foreign policy decisions result from a severe identity crisis (Guzina, 2022).

Overall, the deteriorating relations between the EU and Russia have negatively affected Serbia. It has found itself in a very complex situation. The country's foreign policy of balancing its relationship with both sides is seriously challenged and jeopardized. It has been shown that the actions that Serbia has undertaken to achieve foreign policy priorities are often carried out on an ad hoc basis, that the

mentioned priorities are not complementary, and that significant mutual disagreement between individual foreign policy priorities should be addressed (Lišanin 2012, 201). Serbia's foreign policy choices have become critical for its economy and further development, and it should be aware of the potential consequences of its actions.

Concluding remarks

Serbia's foreign policy and position in international relations reflect the complicated and nuanced nature of the country's approach to European integration and its relationships with Russia. Russia and the EU are two crucial international players that Serbia has long worked with to maintain good relations. Serbia has had the privilege of deepening its ties with the EU and Russia over the past twenty years. On the one hand, Serbia has made significant efforts to move closer to the EU, recognizing the advantages that EU membership would bring regarding economic development and political stability. On the other hand, Serbia also tried to keep its long-standing close ties with Russia because it knew how important they were to its territorial integrity and energy security. Its government also knew that respecting its religious, cultural, and historical ties with Russia was vital to the internal political stability of the country. This long-term foreign policy orientation was established to be as resistant to tactical changes as possible. Even though the Ukraine crisis and subsequent annexation of Crimea changed the nature of EU-Russia relations, the Serbian government has sought to maintain a delicate balance between these competing priorities.

When Russia attacked Ukraine at the beginning of 2022 and a large-scale war broke out in the country, it became difficult for Serbia to hold onto its foreign policy position. This war has created tectonic shifts in relations between the EU and Russia, which has put Serbia in a problematic situation. Its foreign policy has proven to be very complex and unsustainable and has come under pressure from both the EU and Russia. Serbia's policy of strategic balancing with each of the actors leaves it in a position where it is highly unpredictable and an unreliable foreign policy actor. It has become a place where the West and Russia have practiced their confrontations and shown their influence in this part of Europe.

Given Russia's foreign policy goals and its relations with the West, it is not surprising that Moscow is making significant efforts to keep its stronghold in Serbia. Serbia is important to Russia as it is seen as a key ally in the Balkans and a buffer against the expansion of Western influence in the region. Although it is difficult for

Moscow to support Belgrade's policies on Kosovo due to Russia's geopolitical interests and ambitions, it is still crucial for Serbia.

Russia's support for Serbia's position on Kosovo could be seen as a sign of solidarity and a way to show its commitment to its allies and partners in the region and assert itself as an important player in the region. However, it can make Serbia's EU accession negotiations harder by causing tension and mistrust and giving the impression that it is too close to Russia and that relations between Belgrade and Pristina have not been normalized. This can be an additional challenge, keeping in mind that Serbia, as a candidate country, has already come under pressure from the EU to join its sanctions against Russia and more closely align its foreign policy with that of the EU. Given its geographical position and the fact that most foreign direct investments come from its members, Serbia cannot ignore the EU. As a result, even though its chances of joining the EU are currently "on the long stick", Serbia will continue to give European integration top priority in its foreign policy.

Considering Serbia's above-mentioned foreign policy goals, it is hard to figure out how to strategically position the country so it can get through the current crisis. How much longer Serbia will be able to keep this balance between Russia and the West without putting its chances of entering the EU in danger or seriously deteriorating relations with Russia is an open question. Serbia's room for maneuver in foreign policy is getting smaller, making things harder for the country. Certainty is one thing. The war in Ukraine has once again shown how Serbia's security and economic growth, as a small country, may be significantly affected and determined by the policies and geopolitical ambitions of the major international actors.

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Ana JOVIĆ-LAZIĆ, Ivona LAĐEVAC

**PRISTUP SRBIJE EU I RUSIJI
– IMPLIKACIJE NA NJENU SPOLJNU I UNUTRAŠNJU POLITIKU**

Apstrakt: Ovaj članak istražuje pristup Srbije evropskim integracijama i odnosima sa Rusijom i njihove implikacije njenu spoljnu i unutrašnju politiku. Politika Srbije je okarakterisana kao spoljna politika „male države“ koja je osmišljena da održava dobre odnose sa EU i Rusijom, verujući da će joj to pomoći da prevaziđe unutrašnje i međunarodne izazove. U svetlu napetih odnosa Rusije sa Zapadom, u članku se ispituje kako se ova politika razvijala u poslednje dve decenije i da li je održiva u promenjenim međunarodnim okolnostima. Fokusira se na činjenicu da je pristup Srbije EU i Rusiji pokazao kontinuitet uprkos rastućoj polarizaciji na međunarodnom nivou izazvanoj krizom u Ukrajini 2014. Međutim, usled brzog i dramatičnog pogoršanja odnosa EU i Rusije izazvanog ruskim napadom na Ukrajinu, njenu sadašnju politiku postalo je veoma teško održati. Pragmatična politika Srbije, oblikovana unutrašnjim i spoljnopoličkim interesima i vođena nizom ekonomskih, pravnih i bezbednosnih argumenata, stavljena je na iskušenje. Ovi argumenti su se pojavili kao novi ključni trendovi u Srbiji i mogu se pratiti kroz odgovor države na rat u Ukrajini i odgovore EU i Rusije na politiku države. Srbija se našla pod pritiskom obe strane, što izaziva napetost i neizvesnost i dovodi državu u tešku poziciju. Ovaj članak pokazuje da uprkos pritiscima i očekivanjima obe strane, nije došlo do drastične promene u politici Srbije prema EU ili Rusiji. Međutim, činjenica je da je manje prostora za ispunjavanje njenih spoljnopoličkih prioriteta, koji sada izgledaju međusobno nespojivo. Stoga, u širem smislu, ovaj članak dovodi u pitanje održivost aktuelne spoljne politike Srbije kao okvira za očuvanje strateških i nacionalnih interesa države.

Ključne reči: Srbija, spoljna politika, nacionalni interes, evropske integracije, Evropska unija, Rusija, rusko-ukrajinski rat.

UDC 339.5(497.11:510)
Biblid: 0025-8555, 75(2023)
Vol. LXXV, No. 1, pp. 65–92
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2301065I>

Review article
Received 11 October 2022
Accepted 15 December 2022
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Belt and Road investments in Serbia: Is China a new saviour or a new threat?¹

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Abstract: Versatile political and institutional cooperation between Serbia and China recently spurred the dynamic development of economic relations between the two countries. Those progressed quickly, especially due to Serbia's participation in the format China-Central and Eastern European countries and the Belt and Road initiative. It caused changes in economic relations between China and Serbia in three directions: changes in trade patterns, the volume of loans, and the inflow of Chinese investments. This article focuses on the Chinese Belt and Road investments (foreign direct investments, acquisitions, and joint ventures) in Serbia while using qualitative along with descriptive statistical analysis. The authors analysed the type of companies, value of investments, and industries in which Chinese companies invested capital in the period 2014-2022. Research findings indicate an increase in bilateral trade, especially in export, after the Chinese investments have been made. The value of Chinese investment has grown over time, with a relatively high concentration in the automotive industry and a presence in rather few industries. The first investments were realized by state-owned enterprises and, in recent times, by private-owned companies. The authors indicate

¹ The paper was presented at the *16th Annual Conference of the European China Law Studies Association* held on 21-23 September 2022 in Copenhagen, Denmark.

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The paper presents the findings of a study developed as part of the research project entitled 'Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2023', financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

that while China's role in Serbian economic development is increasing, it should not be categorized either as a saviour or a threat, but as a rather important economic partner of Serbia whose influence in Serbia is increasing. However, the interplay between China and Serbia, determined by the interests of both sides as well as the capabilities of Serbia to design appropriate institutional and policy frameworks will determine the contribution of Chinese investments to Serbian economic development in the future.

Keywords: Serbia, China, economic cooperation, investments, automotive industry.

Introduction

As a latecomer in transition, Serbia has experienced a turbulent period of transition over the last two decades characterized by political instability, institutional failure, and modest economic performance. Initially, it followed the same path as other transition countries: liberalisation, deregulation, macroeconomic stabilisation, and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Tectonic shifts in the political sphere during the first decade of transition, especially the assassination of prime minister Zoran Đinđić (2003), the dissolution of the state union Serbia and Montenegro (2006) and the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo (2008), caused the overall political instability and slow pace of reforms (Ivanović et al. 2022), effectively blocking its economic potential. Overall economic performance was disappointing: private sector share in GDP increased from 40% in 2000 to only 60% in 2010 (Uvalić 2013), almost 50% of all privatized firms bankrupted (Ivanović et al. 2019) and the unemployment rate reached almost 25% (Ivanović 2021).

Interestingly, foreign direct investments (FDI) have played rather a secondary role in the privatization process, dominantly being oriented toward the local market and export-oriented to a far lesser extent (Stošić et al. 2011). While they were officially recognized and announced as one of the pillars of economic development, they remained rather unimportant in practice. Like other Balkan countries, Serbia was far less successful than other central European countries in attracting foreign investments (Slaveski and Nedanovski 2002). In the first decade of transition, the growth model was based dominantly on boosting aggregate consumption and to a far less extent by investments, especially private, and to an even lesser degree foreign. However, this growth model was no more sustainable after the global financial and economic crisis in 2008. The subsequent sovereign debt crisis of the euro area in 2009-2010 exerted additional pressure on the established developmental model, while the inflow of FDI became even more modest. The

fundamental economic parameters were alarming. Insufficient competitiveness, high unemployment, rigid labour market regulation, and shrinking manufacturing share in national production, made the process of catching up with the developed world less probable in the future (Uvalić 2010). Sanfey and Milatović (2018, 5) point out that if WB countries, including Serbia, continue to grow at the average rates recorded in the period after 2008, they will catch up economically with the EU average in 2220.

Combining forces of the hostile external economic environment, political instability and institutional failure in the first decade of transformation caused the change of the political elite in power in 2012 and, parallel with it, a change in the developmental model. After this period, FDI became *de facto*, an important instrument for overcoming economic problems and a mechanism for better integration in the world economy. Parallel with it, Serbia opened for FDI coming from other parts of the world, not just from European countries. However, the biggest share of foreign investors is still coming from European countries, where those from Germany and Italy take the dominant place. From other destinations, investors from China and Turkey, as well as from UAE and Russia, started coming in larger numbers (Bonomi and Uvalić 2019).

The fact that Serbia succeeds to revive the attention of foreign investors and attract considerable amounts of foreign direct investments, despite significant institutional loopholes and a challenging regulatory environment characterized by high corruption and an inefficient legal framework, is not surprising for at least two reasons. One relates to some aspects of the Serbian political and especially economic environment after 2012: political stability, relatively good performing economy, low labour costs, relatively high level of human capital, (regional) location, and access to regional, European, and Russian market(s) based on free-trade agreements Serbia has signed. The other reason refers to the fact that foreign investors' decisions on investments are based on relatively few requirements (Kekić 2005). Investors are relying on peace and basic security, a predictable and sound macroeconomic framework, and modest improvements in the business climate.

Although Serbia's most important economic partner, in terms of trade as well as in terms of FDI, is the EU (Vasa and Angeloska 2020), China became the second most important partner in terms of trade, loans and investments. By the end of 2020, solely Chinese loans reached 14 billion US\$ in the Balkan region, where Serbia attracted more than 60% of it (Marković Khaze and Wang 2021). Chinese investments financed by loans were particularly important in the construction of still poor and underdeveloped infrastructure in Serbia (Estrin and Uvalić 2016), although there is a growing importance of Chinese investments in various manufacturing industries.

In this paper, the authors aim to investigate Chinese investments in Serbia and their characteristics for the period between 2014 and 2022, which correspond, rather than coincide, with Serbia joining the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism and Belt and Road Initiative. Since the period is relatively short, qualitative and descriptive statistical analysis was used to look at the data regarding economic cooperation between China and Serbia, with a focus on Chinese investments. Limitations of this kind of analysis were considered, but other methodological choices were rather limited since the short period of analysis, the number of Chinese investments and sometimes-unknown data. Data presented in the paper were collected from the Serbian Statistical office, the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Finance. In cases in which data were not available on the website of governmental institutions, official statements of Serbian Government officials in Serbian media were used, as well as the websites of Chinese companies in Serbia.

The authors did provide separate lists of Chinese infrastructural projects in Serbia. The nature of these projects is, however, different for China and for Serbia: for China, they are investments, but for Serbia, they are loans. It is a reason why they were not considered as investments in Serbia in our paper. It is important to stress this since there are different approaches in analysis when Chinese investments/loans are considered, while this research does not use the methodology in which investment projects and loans are considered together. It should be also emphasised, that only Chinese investments, in a form of greenfield investments, joint ventures and acquisitions, which are coming directly from China, were considered. This is important to notice since there are other Chinese companies, such as Hisense, which is operating in Serbia (via a subsidiary company), but it is not part of the analysis. The reason behind this is that Hisense acquired the Slovenian company Gorenje, which was already present in the Serbian market, so their presence in Serbia was not part of the acquisition in Serbia, but in Slovenia. Additionally, the analysis in this paper is an economic one, trying to avoid the political context of the investments that most of the researchers are concentrated on. However, (international) political economy aspects may exert a strong influence on national economic development, but the author's choice is to leave it out of this research. The focus is only on economic facts and data to see if this analysis supports the idea of China as a saviour or China as a threat to the Serbian economy.

The first part of the paper provides a literature review of China-Serbia economic cooperation, but with a focus on Chinese investments in Serbia. In the second part, the institutional base for cooperation is explained. The third part is devoted to examining the volume and characteristics of economic cooperation between Serbia and China, while the fourth part discusses closer the foreign direct investments coming from China. In the concluding remarks, the main findings are summarised.

Literature review

While there is a considerable amount of research dealing with different aspects of Serbian-Chinese political ties, political implications of growing economic cooperation with Serbia or economic cooperation, foremost in the domain of foreign trade, a rather limited number of studies deal with the foreign direct investments and their importance for Serbian economic development. However, we present some of the research that deals with overall or some of the aspects of economic cooperation between Serbia and China.

Dimitrijević and Jokanović (2016), Dimitrijević (2017), Rapačić (2018), Bugarčić et al. (2020), and Zakić and Stanojević (2022) analyse the overall economic cooperation between Serbia and China. Thereby, Dimitrijević and Jokanović (2016) and Dimitrijević (2017) analyse the Serbian market and look at the factors that can help future cooperation between China and Serbia. Bugarčić et al. (2020) concluded that economic cooperation with China enables countries that are part of the BRI to improve infrastructure, spur innovations and implementation of new technologies, join new economic integrations, gain competitive advantage, and increase trade. Zakić and Stanojević (2022) provided a comprehensive analysis of economic cooperation between China and Serbia in the fields of trade, loans, infrastructural projects, and investments. Their main findings suggest that Serbia while enjoying some advantages from cooperation, faces at the same time with important disadvantages. Among the main disadvantages are counted increasing trade deficits and unfavourable terms of trade. Yet, infrastructural projects co-financed from Chinese loans are urgently needed and the rising importance of Chinese investments in the auto industry are observed as main advantages.

Jaćimović et al. (2018) studied the effects of Chinese FDI in the new EU member states and the Western Balkans on trade flows. Their research shows that Chinese FDIs had a positive impact on trade flows, especially in the new EU member states. The main conclusion is that the WB states could expect better trade relations with China in terms of export, as they join the EU.

Additional analysis of the major challenges and opportunities in China-Serbia bilateral trade relations could be found in Jovičić et al. (2020). Their analysis shows that the overall trade volume between the two countries has increased since the beginning of 2000. However, the main challenges in trade relations remain the same over time: huge Serbian trade deficit, while a Serbian export to China consists of goods with low value-added. Authors suggest that there are possibilities for Serbia to increase export in future, which requires a more sophisticated strategic approach.

Chen and Yang (2016) examine industrial cooperation between China and Serbia. They analyse which industries in Serbia can be competitive in the Chinese market and which are having the potential to attract Chinese investors to Serbia. Among industries that can be competitive in the Chinese market they identify several: tobacco, paper and paper products, beverage, food processing, non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing, printing, record media and replication, and transportation equipment. On the other hand, Chinese industries like electronic and telecommunication equipment, textile, culture and sports products, electrical machinery and equipment, instrument and office machinery, and the chemical fiber industry can find their place in the Serbian market.

Several studies explored Chinese infrastructural projects and investments in Serbia jointly. The main difference between these studies and the analysis presented in this paper refers to the fact that previous studies dominantly examine Chinese investments in Serbia from the Chinese point of view. Specifically, they do not differentiate between loans, greenfield investments and acquisitions, but look at them as Chinese investment projects.

Šaranović et al. (2019) analyse the effects of Chinese infrastructural projects and FDI on Serbian development. Their conclusion is that the effects of those have been highly beneficial on Serbian macroeconomic indicators such as employment, export, and production, while at the same time increasing the degree of economic openness. But, since their analysis was concentrated on infrastructural projects, they discuss that the main threat is an increasing value of loans that Serbia took, which could lead to problems in repaying them in the future.

The results and risks that Chinese investment projects are facing in Serbia are part of the analysis by Zakić (2020). She used case study analysis for the most important Chinese investment projects to compare the results and risks that accompanied those projects. The main finding is that Chinese projects in Serbia are contributing to the development of the Serbian economy, with similar arguments raised by Šaranović et al. (2019). Nevertheless, Serbia is facing potential problems regarding the repayment of the loans and problems of Chinese companies in complying with environmental regulations in Serbia.

The distribution of Chinese investments globally was analysed by Marjanović et al. (2021), whose research is devoted partially to Serbia as the most attractive destination for Chinese economic activities within the Balkans. While the findings of the study are clear: Serbia is benefiting from China's investments in terms of employment growth, rise of production and export, and poverty reduction, some deficiencies emerge as well. Risks, they are pointing out, are following: over-exploitation of domestic resources, increasing technological dependences, the

outflow of capital, unfair competition, investing in favoured less competitive sectors, and potentially negative influences on Serbia's EU integration process.

Marjanović et al. (2022) are examining the possibilities for the Western Balkan countries. In this research, Serbia is taken as a case study and BRI as a framework for fostering and speeding up developmental processes. The authors discuss the Serbian economic and political importance within the WB, and potential spillovers, positive and negative, Chinese-Serbian cooperation may have on the countries in the WB region. Among other things, authors suggest a better strategic and more focused approach to attracting Chinese investments.

To summarize, there are several common characteristics regarding previous research in the context of China-Serbia economic cooperation. One refers to the fact that dominant approach is from political science view or more political economy perspective. Second, they usually analyse *en général* different dimensions of economic cooperation between Serbia and China or/and put this cooperation in a broader (regional context). We frame our research in a way to fill the gap in previous research investigating foremost Chinese direct investments (greenfield, joint ventures and acquisitions) and observing it in a context of their potential contribution to Serbian economic development.

Overview of institutional cooperation between Serbia and China

The Republic of Serbia, as one of the successors of the former Yugoslavia, has inherited good diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. While Yugoslavia existed, political relations between China and Yugoslavia were oscillating, according to changes in international circumstances, and in accordance to the political changes in both countries. Historically, Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with China in 1955 (Marciacq 2019), but they have been considerably improved since Deng Xiaoping came to power in China in 1979. Moreover, China saw during the 1980s the "socialist market" model in Yugoslavia as a potential model for its own development (Vangeli 2019). After that, they remained friendly until the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. During the civil war in Yugoslavia, although China tried to be reserved and did not choose a side, it was on the political level prioritizing diplomatic and political relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e., its member republics Serbia and Montenegro. In the last two decades, the common communist history of Western

Balkan countries, including Serbia was a good stepping-stone for developing and deepening economic and political cooperation (Markovic Khaze and Wang 2021).

Since the 2000s, which corresponds with the Serbian transformation toward a market economy and democracy, China was contributing considerably to the global economic dynamics. Joining the World Trade Organisation, it was oriented toward further expansion and strengthening its position on world markets (Dimitrijević 2017). New momentum in economic and political cooperation between Serbia and China started in 2009 after the two countries signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership. Serbia is the only country on the WB, which signed this type of agreement with China, making the cooperation far more developed in comparison with other Balkan states. It enabled both parties to establish more versatile relations than before. The agreement has been a basis for promoting four areas of cooperation, namely – political, economic, people-to-people exchanges and strengthening of multilateral cooperation (Lađevac 2020). Although the immersion of comprehensive cooperation is the aim of the signed agreement, economic cooperation is far better developed than political,⁴ which is common for all Balkan countries (Markovic Khaze and Wang 2021).

After that, Serbia joined two Chinese international projects (initiatives). Both of them are in line with previously developed relations. The first one Serbia joined in 2012. It refers to the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism formerly known as 16+1. This platform has several goals, but the main one is to improve economic cooperation and connectivity between China and Central and Eastern European countries. In those countries, China was less present and did not have as successful cooperation as it had with Western European countries. Soon after, China established a new initiative in 2013 at that time known as New Silk Road. Later, this initiative was renamed as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Serbia joined this initiative in 2016, marking in the same year the first visit of the Chinese president to Serbia. BRI is nowadays known as the biggest worldwide geoeconomic project, in which China is financing projects in various types of sectors in member countries, mainly through financial institutions, such as the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. According to Chinese sources (GDFC), around 140 countries are members of this initiative, which is more than 70% of the number of countries in the world. Within the BRI initiative, Serbia is chosen to be the hub for the China-

⁴ Although less pronounced, political relationships are well developed and relay to a great extent to China's stance against the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008, which is related to the One-China policy, i.e., opposition to Taiwanese independence and Tibetan irredentism. The number of bilateral agreements and protocols concluded between 2009 and 2019 is 91, while in the whole period between 1957 and 2008 is 39 (MFARS, 2022).

CEEC Federation for Transport and Infrastructure, which is a pivotal part of the initiative in this part of Europe (Markovic Khaze and Wang 2021). Moreover, since CEEC belong to the periphery or semi-periphery region regarding technology and capital, the BRI initiative has the potential to move countries of this region toward the core world system since it is about the global division of labour (Moldicz 2018).

Parallel with the development of economic cooperation between Serbia and China, Serbia was intensifying the process of European integration, signing the Stabilization and Association Agreements, which effectively came into power in 2013. After that, Serbia started its negotiations with the EU in January 2014.⁵ Although the European accession process is slow and under the strong influence of a wide range of impeding factors (Bonomi and Uvalic 2019), it is of importance regarding Serbian and Chinese economic cooperation. Serbia became additionally attractive for Chinese investments because of the access to the European market as well as the regulatory framework becoming more predictive in the mid and longer term.

The same year as Serbia joined the BRI, it signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Serbia, which is the highest form of partnership that China can have with one country (Subotić and Janjić 2020). In 2017, both countries implemented a visa-free regime for their citizens, meaning that their citizens can spend 90 days without a visa in Serbia/China, which significantly helped in increasing the number of Chinese tourists in Serbia. In two subsequent years, Serbia became European fastest growing destination for Chinese tourists: in 2018, 102.000 Chinese tourists visited Serbia which is a 15-fold increase from 2011, while strong growth continued in 2019 and amounted to more than 42% (Markovic Khaze and Wang 2021).

Comparing the last decade with the period before 2009, economic ties between China and Serbia were loose. Serbia imported a lot from China, but the export to China was almost non-existent. If we look at the data presented in Table 1, in 2008, Serbia exported to China goods worth 5.2 million US\$ while at the same time importing 1468.9 million US\$, which led to a 1.4 billion US\$ trade deficit. At the same time, China did not have any kind of investment project in Serbia. Therefore, it is worth looking at data about economic cooperation between Serbia and China after the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement and joining the


⁵ Serbia started its official negotiations with the EU in 2005. After finishing negotiations, it signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008. Application for EU membership is made in 2009. Serbia got candidate status in 2012, while formal beginning of its membership negotiation process started in January 2014 (Marciacq 2019).

BRI and analysing the influence of these events on Serbian economic position in bilateral cooperation with China.

Economic partners on (un)equal basis: trade imbalances and loans dynamics

Trade relations between Serbia and China were from their beginning marked by a remarkable trade deficit on the Serbian side (Chart 1). China has a trade surplus even with many developed countries,⁶ so this is not an unusual trade situation for a country like Serbia. Table 1 more clearly presents Serbian modest export to China, especially from 2008-2018, showing that figures were between 5 and 91 million US\$. After 2018 it came to a sharp increase in export, reaching the value of 329.2 million US\$ in 2019. The second significant leap happened in 2021 when Serbia exported raw materials and goods with a value of almost 1 billion US\$. The main reason for this increase is the volume of unprocessed copper exported to China. This happened because the Chinese company Zijin Mining acquired a Serbian copper mine in Bor, formerly known as RTB Bor. After its acquisition, it became the biggest exporter from Serbia to China. In total, from 2009 until 2021, the Serbian trade deficit rose from 1.1 billion to 3.3 billion US\$. The case with Zijin Mining shows that the important mechanism of improving trade relations, but not in terms of trade, are investments.

⁶ The development in this regard is similar to the trends recorded in the EU: China is the single most important trading partner of Germany, the value of trade volume between China and the EU is more than one billion per day. At the same time, since 2016 China became a net investor in the EU, where more than 90% of economic exchange is between China and the EU15. These developments correspond to the changing role of China in the global economy: started in 1978 as a role model of a good “player of the game” switching to the role “of the game maker” (Vangeli 2019).



Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Statistical Yearbook.

The main products that Serbia exports to China, besides crude copper, are processed copper, unprocessed silver, raw wood and water pumps. The main importing products from China are mobile phones, computers and monitors, clothing, iron and steel products, and measuring products. These facts suggest that Serbian export to China is unfavourable since it exports raw materials (copper, silver, wood) and imports final products with high value-added (phones, computers). Unfavourable terms of trade and pronounced disbalance are challenging and could create middle- and long-term serious disadvantages for the Serbian economy. In this regard, the efforts of the Serbian government to sign a free trade agreement with China should be observed as an attempt to reduce existing imbalances and improve the long-term benefits of trade for the Serbian economy.

Serbian increase in trade with China is contrary to the findings of Chen and Yang (2016) that claim that the accent of cooperation between China and CEE countries has been shifted toward people-to-people cooperation and investments, while the trade is lagging. Obviously, an important impetus for trade development comes from the investments China is undertaking in CEE countries. At least Serbian experience confirms this pattern. Additionally, according to the announcements of Serbian officials, it is expected that Serbia will sign with China a free trade agreement through 2023. In this case, Serbia would be only the third country in Europe with which China has such kind of contract, besides Island and Switzerland.

It would give an additional impetus for the further development of trade relations. On the other hand, despite strong increases in Serbian export to China, Serbia's dominant export markets are the EU countries and the CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) countries. Export to EU countries rose to almost 13.94 billion US\$, covering 85% of Serbian imports from the EU countries (EUIS 2022).

Table 1. Serbia's export to and import from China, 2008-2021, in millions of US\$

Year	Export	Import
2008	5.2	1468.9
2009	8.9	1135.4
2010	7.3	1202.5
2011	15.3	1488.5
2012	19.8	1385.5
2013	9.1	1509.6
2014	14.2	1561.1
2015	20.2	1540.2
2016	25.3	1603.9
2017	62.2	1767.7
2018	91.7	2167.5
2019	329.2	2507.7
2020	377.0	3290.1
2021	971.7	4308.8

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Statistical Yearbook

Besides trade, Serbia and China cooperate on many infrastructural projects within the platform China-CEEC and the BRI. Projects are mainly financed through Chinese loans, which are negotiated bilaterally. No public tender procedure was done for these projects. Since Serbia is still not an EU member, according to its national law, it can negotiate those kinds of projects bilaterally, without public

procurement procedure.⁷ The Serbian Government is also participating with its own funds in some of the projects (see Table 2). Chinese loans are financed by Chinese state banks, with a repayment period between 15-20 years, a grace period of 5 years, and an interest rate between 1.5 and 3%.⁸ Typically, Chinese state construction companies work on those projects using the Chinese workforce. In some cases, Serbian companies are subcontractors. All infrastructural projects for which Serbia applied within the BRI are those that have been planned for many years and in some cases even decades (high-speed railway, for example). However, due to the chronic scarcity of capital, Serbia did not find financial resources in the past to implement them. For some of these projects, Serbia applied for EU funding in the past, but because of the influence of the financial crisis in 2009 and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, the EU funds were not available for financing. China as an investor in some of these projects was not only an alternative that has emerged but also, even so, a desirable alternative, because of relatively few requirements and frequently more favourable financial requirements. For example, the construction of the railway Belgrade-Budapest is financed by China. However, a small section of this infrastructure project, the part of the railway between Stara Pazova and Novi Sad, is financed also by Russia, so Serbia did find a solution that would fit its needs. Serbian state or local Governments are also funding some smaller infrastructural projects in Serbia, but there are also cases in which EBRD or IMF are (co)financing them.

⁷ After signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2009 with China, Serbia also signed in the same year, the “Agreement on economic and technical cooperation in the field of infrastructure between the governments of the Republic of Serbia and the government of the People’s Republic of China” on August 20 (which was published in Serbian official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 90). According to it all the projects that Serbia conducts with China in the field of infrastructure, could be done without public tender procedure (<http://otvorenavlada.rs/pz-srbija-kina-infrastruktura0166-lat-doc-2/>).

In 2013, Serbia also signed the Annex of the same Agreement, which confirms conducting infrastructural projects with China without public tenders. (http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat/pdf/predlozi_zakona/3644-13Lat.pdf).

The list of bilateral agreements that Serbia has with China can be found on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia: <https://www.mfa.rs/sites/default/files/inline-files/kina.pdf>

⁸ This is general information that could be found for most of the projects since there are no publicly available data regarding the financial part of the agreements.

**Table 2. Projects financed by Chinese loans in Serbia (2014–2022)
in million US\$**

	Chinese partner/ investor	Structure of loans	Sector	Status (finished, in progress)	Value
High-speed railway Belgrade-Stara Pazova and Novi Sad – Subotica	China Communication Construction Company and China Railway International	Chinese loan (85%) and the budget of the Republic of Serbia (15%)	Transport	In progress	1490 million
Kostolac thermal power plant	China Machinery Engineering Corporation	Chinese loan	Energy	In progress	715.6 million
Highway Miloš Veliki (Corridor 11) 1. Surčin-Obrenovac 2. Obrenovac-Ub	Shandong Hi-Speed Group and China Communication Construction Company	Chinese loan (85%) and the budget of the Republic of Serbia (15%)	Transport	Finished	541 million
Corridor Fruška gora	China Road and Bridge Company	Chinese loan	Transport	In progress	690.8 million
Traffic bypass around Belgrade, sector B (bridge over river Save near Ostružnica and sections of roads 4, 5, 6)	Power Construction Corporation of China	Chinese loan and the budget of the Republic of Serbia	Transport	In progress	267.9 million
Belgrade metro	Power China International Group Limited	/	Transport	In progress	/

Source: Zakić Katarina, and Nataša Stanojević. 2022. "Between aspiration and reality: Sino-Serbian economic relations". In: *China in World and Regional Politics. History and Modernity*, edited by Elena Safronova: 298-311 Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Science

In addition, Serbia is currently undergoing several infrastructural projects that it is solely financing, but Chinese companies are working on the construction. These are Novi Beograd – Surčin highway (part of Miloš Veliki highway), traffic bypass around Belgrade sector C (Bubanj Potok-Vinča-Pančevo), Preljina-Požega highway (part of Miloš Veliki) highway, traffic bypass around Užice – Čačak, the heating pipeline between Obrenovac and Novi Beograd and design and construction of infrastructure for municipal solid waste disposal in 65 municipalities and cities in Serbia (Zakić and Stanojević 2022).

Versatile political and economic relationships between Serbia and China definitely contributed to the broad involvement of Chinese companies in big infrastructure projects in Serbia. Still, they would be probably engaged in these projects even without existing strong political and institutional ties between the two countries. The reason lies in the competitive prices they bid with. Related to it, the competitiveness of Chinese companies relies strongly on numerous state policies and agencies, which are supporting Chinese businesses investing abroad – from providing information and technical assistance over financial and fiscal incentives to insurance and guarantee schemes (Du and Zhang 2018). However, because of the (Comprehensive) Strategic Partnership Serbia has signed with China, Chinese companies do not need to follow public procurement procedures, and they can negotiate the project price and conditions bilaterally, which additionally provides a comparative advantage for them.

Chinese investments in Serbia: ownership structure, value and sectoral distribution

The first Chinese investment in Serbia was in 2016, and that was the acquisition of a Serbian state steel factory Železara Smederevo by the Chinese state company Hesteel Group. This acquisition was important because it gave the signal to the Chinese investors, especially private ones, that Serbia is an attractive location to invest. Chinese companies have a tradition and specific process of how they approached the Serbian market and how they invested over time (Zakić 2019). The first step in that process was establishing good political relations between the Chinese and Serbian governments. After that, Chinese state enterprises were the first investors in Serbia. They primarily invest in the state sector in a form of acquisitions rather than greenfield investments, which is in line with the findings of Du and Zhang (2018). Only in the later phase of expansion did Chinese private companies invest in the private sector in Serbia. However, the volume of Chinese

private investments is still rather low compared with the state ones. This disbalance in investments between the private and state-owned companies coming from China could be explained, at least partially, by the different strategies they pursue, i.e., Chinese state-owned companies are indifferent to political risks and overall economic situation in host countries, while private investors from China are not only targeting large markets and strategic assets when making investment decisions, then also are quite risk averse (Amighini et al. 2013).

Table 3 presents Chinese investments in Serbia, starting from 2016 until June 2022. The total value of investments through acquisitions, joint ventures, and greenfield projects amounts to more than 3 billion US\$. Acquisitions are dominating, taking 64.7% of the total amount invested.

In this period, Serbia had two investments coming from Chinese state companies. The first one was the previously mentioned acquisition of Železara Smederevo, while the second refers to the acquisition of the copper mine Bor (RTB Bor) by Zijin Mining company. All the rest of the investments were in the form of the FDI, except in the case of Mei Ta, which was in a joint venture form. A minority shareholder in a joint venture is a Serbian state.

**Table 3. Chinese investment projects in Serbia (2016 – June 2022)
in million US\$**

Year	Project	Chinese partner/ investor	Status of the ownership of the Chinese company	Type of the project	Sector	Status (finished, in progress)	Value
2016	Hesteel, Smederevo	HBIS Group Iron and Steel	State company	Acquisition	Metallurgy	Finished	330 million
2016	Eurofiber, yarn, Ćuprija	China Prosperity Industrial Corporation	Private Company	FDI	Textile	Finished	1.21 million
2017	Mei Ta, Obrenovac	Mei Ta	Private Company	Joint venture with the Serbian Government	Auto industry	Finished	124 million
2018	Zijin Mining, Bor	Zijin Mining	State company	Acquisition	Metallurgy	Finished	1.722,8 million

Year	Project	Chinese partner/ investor	Status of the ownership of the Chinese company	Type of the project	Sector	Status (finished, in progress)	Value
2019	Shandong Linglong tire company, Zrenjanin	Shandong Linglong	Private Company	FDI	Auto industry	In progress	896 million
2019	Yanfeng, internal interiors for cars, Kragujevac	Yanfeng Seating	Private Company	FDI	Auto industry	Finished	44.8 million
2020	Xingyu, lights for cars, Niš	Changzhou Xingyu Automotive Lighting Systems	Private Company	FDI	Auto industry	Finished	68.4 million
2021	Yanfeng, car security systems Kragujevac	Yanfeng Seating	Private Company	FDI	Auto industry	In progress	21.2 million
2021 and 2022	Minth, Loznica and Šabac	Minth	Private Company	FDI	Auto industry	Finished	100 million

Source: Zakić Katarina, and Nataša Stanojević. 2022. "Between aspiration and reality: Sino-Serbian economic relations". In: *China in World and Regional Politics. History and Modernity*, edited by Elena Safronova: 298-311 Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Science.

It is also worth noting that there is a trend in investments of Chinese private companies. They are investing in the auto industry, and so far, five companies are conducting business in Serbia, namely Mei Ta, Shandong Linglong, Yanfeng, Xingyu and Minth. The biggest direct investment comes from Shandong Linglong, which plans to invest around 900 million US\$ in a tire factory in Zrenjanin. Besides this, two other Chinese companies already have two production facilities in Serbia. Namely, company Yanfeng has two factories in Kragujevac and company Minth has two factories situated in Loznica and Šabac. Since they have made subsequent investments, it may be a signal of the high returns they have achieved from initial investments.

An important fact is that the automotive industry is the dominant destination for the bulk of Chinese investments. Since there is a relatively long tradition of the automotive sector in Serbia, dating back to the time of former Yugoslavia and the production of cars in the factory called Zastava Kragujevac,⁹ the availability of a skilful and experienced workforce played a role. For Serbia, those investments are nowadays even more important because of the uncertainty of the largest car company in Serbia – Fiat. It is still not clear whether it will continue production or it will withdraw from the Serbian market. If Fiat decides to leave Serbia, then the importance of the Chinese companies will be even more significant since it could absorb part of the labour force employed in the Fiat factory.

Initial Chinese investments, realized by the acquisition of steel company Železara Smederevo and copper mine RTB Bor, are the investments with the greatest economic and political importance. They contributed to solving the problems of these two companies lasting for decades and making huge social, economic, and political burdens for local communities and even for national governments in Serbia.

In the case of steel company Železara, there were many vicissitudes in its business over many decades. The biggest trouble started in 2012, when the previous owner, US Steel sold the factory to the Serbian Government after many years of successful operation in Serbia. The main explanation for why US Steel withdrew from Serbia was that the price of the steel was low at that time, and they did not have an interest to continue with the production. After that, the Serbian Government managed the company for several years while at the same time trying to find a strategic partner. The financial burden of overtaking was huge. State-financed salaries for 5000 workers, even though the company was barely producing steel. Due to Serbia's, at the time, newly established Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China, the deal was made with the Chinese Government in 2016 that the state company Hesteel Group would buy Železara under the condition that it would not lay off its 5000 workers. Until recently, Hesteel Smederevo was very successful, and in 2019, the company became the number one exporter from Serbia, holding that position through 2020 and 2021. However, due to a decrease in global demand, in July 2022, Hesteel Smederevo closed one steel melting furnace, which means that uncertainty about the future work of this company still exists. Additionally, because of the war in Ukraine, the import of iron ore from

⁹ Fiat Group signed an agreement with the Serbian Government about starting a joint venture with this state company in 2008.

Ukraine and Russia is stopped (Avakumović 2022), but the alternatives are currently found in imports from India, Africa, and Latin America (Blic 2022).

RTB Bor had, as well, a long history of unsuccessful management, which eventually led to a debt of more than 1.2 billion US\$ in 2016. Many governments, during various times, tried to find a strategic partner or to sell the mine, but these attempts failed. In 2018, after several Chinese state companies visited Serbia and expressed their interest in buying the mine, Zijin gave the best offer regarding the price, including modernization of the mine, keeping all the employees and providing further investments. In 2021, Zijin was Serbia's number two exporter after Hesteel Smederevo.

So far, six Chinese companies invested in the automotive industry in Serbia. The leading investment (900 million US\$) is coming from Shandong Linglong, which is building the tire factory in Zrenjanin. Since the construction of the factory was planned for 2020, and then the pandemic started, the start of construction was postponed, and the factory is still not finished. Shandong Linglong's investment refers to the production of tires, targeting the EU market since its factory in China is selling them to the Asian market.

Mei Ta company located in Obrenovac is a company that is fabricating automotive parts, engine parts, and general industrial parts. It is the only case in which a Chinese private company started a joint venture with the Serbian Government, while all other Chinese investments are in the form of greenfield investments. Yanfeng company initially invested in a production facility for the interiors of cars in Kragujevac in 2019. After its completion, two years later, it started the construction of the new factory in the same city. The new facility is more technologically sophisticated and refers to the production of car security systems. Xingyu company, which specialized in the production of lights for cars, opened its factory in Niš in 2020. Company Minth works on the production of exterior auto parts for passenger vehicles. It opened two factories in two different cities in Western Serbia, namely Šabac and Loznica.

Those investments, although relatively new, will improve better positioning of Serbia in global supply and value chains, improving undoubtedly export performance and terms of trade. Still, the issues regarding the contribution to the development of the domestic market and the local economy in terms of technology transfer, accumulation of human capital, and socio-economic contributions are to be evaluated in the future since there is no clear evidence in this regard worldwide (Abodohoui et al. 2018). On the other side, even the structure of European investments in Serbia has not been favourable, mostly concentrating in non-

tradable sectors and with limited spillover effects in manufacturing sectors (Estrin and Uvalic 2016; Estrin and Uvalic 2014).

Encouraging development refers to the fact that an influx of Chinese investments in Serbia is coming from both the state and private companies. Since they globally follow different investment strategies (Fuest et al. 2019; Amighini et al. 2013), the inflow of both types of investments indicates that Serbia represents an attractive investment location with low or at least acceptable political, institutional and investment risk. Versatile and institutionalized cooperation between Serbia and China, together with the process of European integration, made Serbia even more attractive for Chinese investments. Another important fact relates to the regional distribution of Chinese investments. They are distributed over different regions in Serbia, although concentrated in bigger urban areas. Thus, their contribution to more equal regional development is of great importance. This is partly because some of the investments are resource-dependent and/or associated with old industrial capacities acquired through acquisitions. This could be the opposite case compared to experiences in Central European countries (Pavlínek 2004), where FDIs produced to some extent adverse effects on regional development. However, whether and how Chinese investments really contributed to the regional development, in terms of linkages with and spillovers on local and regional economies, is to be estimated.

According to the 14th Development Plan, China will foster high-quality growth focusing on the development of telecommunications, IT, and smart agriculture (ADB 2021), which could be of potential importance for Serbia. Attracting investments from these sectors, some of which Serbia is having a comparative advantage, such as agriculture, could enable parts of the Serbian economy to effectively take a part in global value chains and prosper in the long run. However, the relatively poor performance of the Chinese economy, at least in terms of results achieved between 1978 and 2011, coupled with the war in Ukraine, the fragile recovery of the world economy in post-pandemic times, soaring energy and food prices, trade disputes with the USA, and internal economic imbalances, make future predictions regarding Chinese foreign direct investments, its volume and structure uncertain.

Conclusions

After the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis in Europe, Serbia was actively seeking alternative sources for financing its economic development. It coincided with the rise of China's global expansion. Possibilities for economic

cooperation emerged. After 2009, numerous interstate arrangements have been signed between the two countries, which gave the impulse for a greater Chinese economic presence in Serbia. Serbia later even became a regional hub for some initiatives within the BRI and a leading destination in Western Balkan for Chinese loans and investments.

Although cooperation with China has been constantly growing in the last decade, especially after 2016, Serbian economic relations in the domain of trade and investments are dominantly linked to the economies of the EU. In this regard, Chinese investments make still up only a fraction of the overall economic activity between the EU and Serbia. Still, developed economic relations and the proximity of the EU market to Serbia are playing an important role in attracting some Chinese investments in Serbia.

In Serbia, Chinese investments (FDI, acquisitions and joint ventures) started in 2016, and the volume of investments is more than 3 billion US\$. Comprehensive political and economic bilateral relations with China contributed to finding investors for two large, inefficient and highly indebted state companies, i.e., steel company Železara Smederevo and mining company RTB Bor, eliminating not only a financial burden but also solving serious problems regarding equal regional development as well as with it related social and political challenges. Subsequent investments coming from already established Chinese companies are signalling that Serbia is an attractive investment site. Additionally, Chinese investments contributed to improving foreign trade imbalances with China and with the EU as well. The most remarkable evidence is to be found in the fact that the two biggest exporters in Serbia are Chinese companies: one dominantly oriented on the Chinese market, the other-oriented on the European one. It is interesting to note that Chinese private companies are aiming to invest mainly in the auto industry, particularly having in mind the problems in the Serbian automotive industry that are increasing due to the production problems in Fiat. Such Chinese investments are very beneficial for the Serbian economy in such uncertain times. At the same time, Chinese companies in this industry are opening their production facilities in different regions in Serbia, promoting in that way, additionally, more even regional development. It produces important spillover effects, especially in the domain of employment and municipal and state finances.

Besides the positive influence of Chinese investments on the Serbian economy, there are several concerning factors related to them. While the volume and value of export are growing, terms of trade are not, at least significantly, improved. The reason for that lies in the fact that Chinese companies are exporting raw materials and low-value-added products. Although Chinese investments are growing over time, problems in the internal market in China, disruptions caused by the pandemic and trade tensions

and unresolved issues it has with the leading western economies, may curb the investment dynamic in the (near) future. Last but not least important note. The question of sustainability and the high environmental costs some of the Chinese investments have been producing in Serbia could jeopardize the overall positive assessment of capital inflow from China, and Chinese companies should be aware of them.

China should not be considered either as a saviour or as a threat at least for the time being. It is probably both of them to some extent. Chinese investments contributed to solving some of the urgent social, political, and economic challenges Serbia is confronting with. In this regard, they made an important contribution. At the same time, some aspects of Chinese investments, not closely examined in our paper, foremost an environmental impact or long-term sustainability of investments (in copper mining), could be considered rather as threats. The capability of Chinese investors to accommodate to Serbian regulatory framework and the willingness and capability of the Serbian political elite in power to develop appropriate it, the administrative capability of its bureaucracy to implement it in an impartial way and the judicial capacity to secure adherence to it, will eventually determine the sign – whether the impact of Chinese investments are rather positive or negative.

The relatively short period the research covers and the limited number of Chinese companies in Serbia limited us in applying more methodological tools in analysis. It is the main limitation of this research. However, it implicitly points out some potentially important future research avenues. For example, future research could compare Chinese versus European investments and their contribution to Serbian development. It is an important issue since, in previous times, Serbia did not record a good score regarding the spillover effects of foreign direct investments. One of the reasons for that consists of the dominant sectoral distribution of foreign investments: wholesale/retail sector, banking and insurance, and production of products with low value-added. Although there are some changes recently, it is important to identify whether they are of systematic or incremental nature and how and whether Chinese investments differ in comparison with investors coming from other countries.

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**INVESTICIJE U OKVIRU „POJASA I PUTA” U SRBIJI:
DA LI JE KINA NOVI SPASITELJ ILI NOVA PRETNJA?**

Apstrakt: Raznovrsna politička i institucionalna saradnja Srbije i Kine nedavno je podstakla dinamičan razvoj ekonomskih odnosa dve zemlje. Oni su brzo napredovali, posebno zahvaljujući učešću Srbije u formatima Kina – Centralne i istočne evropske zemlje i inicijativi Pojas i put. Svi pomenuti događaji su izazvali promene ekonomskih odnosa Kine i Srbije u tri pravca: promene trgovinskih obrazaca, obima kredita i priliva kineskih investicija. Ovaj članak se fokusira na kineske investicije (strane direktne investicije, akvizicije i zajednička ulaganja) u okviru Pojasa i puta u Srbiji, koristeći pri tome kvalitativnu i deskriptivnu statističku analizu. Autori su analizirali tip preduzeća, vrednost investicija i industrije u koje su kineske kompanije plasirale kapital. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju na povećanje bilateralne trgovine, posebno izvoza, nakon kineskih investicija. Vrednost kineskih investicija je vremenom rasla, sa relativno visokom koncentracijom u automobilskoj industriji i relativno malom broju u drugim industrijama, dok su investicije prvo realizovala državna preduzeća, a danas ih uglavnom realizuju privatna preduzeća. Autori su zaključili da se uloga Kine u ekonomskom razvoju Srbije povećava, ali da se ona ne treba posmatrati ni kao spasilac niti kao pretnja, već ju je potrebno posmatrati kao važnog srpskog ekonomskog partnera, čiji se uticaj u Srbiji povećava. No, na samoj Srbiji će ostati da odluči kakva će biti budućnost ekonomske uloge Kine na njenoj teritoriji.

Ključne reči: Srbija, Kina, ekonomska saradnja, trgovina, krediti, investicije, automobilska industrija.

UDK 327.56::351.86(570)
Biblid: 0025-8555, 75(2023)
Vol. LXXV, br. 1, str. 93–115
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2301093P>

Originalni naučni rad
Primljen: 5. septembra 2022.
Odobren: 30. novembra 2022.
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Uspon savremene Kine i Vilhelmove Nemačke: izazovi produktivne analogije¹

Igor PEJIĆ², Srđan BLAGOJEVIĆ³

Apstrakt: Uspon kopnene sile koja teži da svoju moć proširi i na pomorski aspekt oružanih snaga vidi se kao jedan od važnih pokretača sukoba između velikih sila, kao i značajan element nemačke politike zbog čega je Velika Britanija odlučila da uđe u Prvi svetski rat. Politički odnosi ključnih aktera u regionu istočne Azije u protekle dve decenije pojedini autori vide kao slične okolnosti koje su uticale na izbijanje sukoba u Evropi na početku 20. veka. Istorijska analogija o kojoj je reč pruža obilje korisnih informacija, ali propušta da objasni procese ravnoteže snaga koji su bili prisutni i uticali na politiku ključnih aktera. U radu ćemo se fokusirati na sagledavanje procesa ravnoteže snaga i ravnoteže pretnje i na koji način su uticali na politiku država uoči Prvog svetskog rata i u kom obliku su prisutni danas u istočnoj Aziji. S obzirom da je reč o konceptu ravnoteže snaga rad je načinjen u okvirima realističke škole međunarodnih odnosa. Upoređivanjem različitih procesa uravnotežavanja pokušali smo da ukažemo na pojedine konceptualne nedostatke ove istorijske analogije, kao i zbog čega istorijske okolnosti i odnosi velikih sila uoči Velikog rata ne odgovaraju strateškom okruženju istočne Azije.

Ključne reči: Vilhelmova Nemačka, Kina, ravnoteža snaga, ravnoteža pretnje, realizam.

¹ Rad je nastao u okviru projekta „Projekcija trendova od značaja za bezbednost Republike Srbije do 2030. godine“.

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Uvod

Analiza savremenih kinesko-američkih odnosa i njihovog razvoja u budućnosti često se vrši metodom analogije sa britansko-nemačkim rivalstvom u godinama koje su prethodile Prvom svetskom ratu. Brojni pisci u oblasti teorije međunarodnih odnosa, kao što su Kristofer Lejn (Christopher Layne 2018), Džon Morer (John H. Maurer 2014), Henri Kisindžer (Henry Kissinger 2010, 514-527), Edvard Lutvak (Edward N. Luttwak 2012, 56-67), Stiv Čen (Steve Chan 2004), Ričard Rouzkrens (Richard N. Rosecrans 2006), Džejms Houms i Toši Jošihara (James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara 2010), Rene Džefri (Renée Jeffery 2009), Žengju Vu (Zhengyu Wu 2016), Daglas Fajfer (Douglas C. Peifer 2011), ukazuju na određenu dozu „izvesnosti” koju ovaj metod pruža. Drugim rečima, analogija upućuje da je neizbežan sukob pomorske sile kao svetskog hegemonu, sa jedne strane, i kopnene sile kao izazivača koja teži uspostavljanju regionalne pomorske hegemonije, sa druge strane. Iako se to eksplicitno ne spominje, većina navedenih autora u svojim radovima sledi princip teorije o tranziciji moći, koji se ogleda u tome da kada sila u usponu ostvari određene preference ona pokušava da promeni poredak u svoju korist.

Jedan od navedenih autora, Kristofer Lejn, pronalazi analogiju između anglo-nemačkog i kinesko-američkog rivalstva u tome što sile u usponu uvek predstavljaju potencijalnu pretnju, jer takve sile teže da dominiraju svojim regionima i žele da ostvare prestiž sličan onom koji imaju *status quo* sile (Layne 2016). Morer ističe da sukob ovih sila kao pretnja proizilazi iz ubrzanog naoružavanja izazivača koji dovode u pitanje političke stavove i predanost liberalnih *status quo* sila trenutnom poretku (Morer 2014, 515-520). Edvard Lutvak smatra da se aktuelni kinesko-američki odnosi mogu porediti sa okolnostima od pre Prvog svetskog rata kada je Velika Britanija imala ozbiljne kolonijalne probleme, a Nemačka se ubrzano razvijala i jačala vojnu moć (Luttwak 2012, 56-59). Rouzkrens smatra da je sukob Velike Britanije i Nemačke počeo onda kada je Kajzer video mogućnost transformacije Nemačke kao kopnene sile u pomorsku silu koja bi potisnula moć Velike Britanije (Rosecrans 2006, 32). Džejms Houms i Toši Jošihara smatraju da se Peking, za razliku od Berlina, nalazi u boljem geopolitičkom položaju. Fizička distanca između Kine i Sjedinjenih Država, pored ostalih faktora koje autori navode, omogućava ovoj državi da razvije respektabilne pomorske snage, a da pritom ne ugrozi bezbednost Vašingtona (Holmes and Yoshihara 2010, 17-32). Žengju Vu, sa druge strane, problem kinesko-američkog rivalstva vidi u kineskoj strategiji kontrole prostora A2/AD, zanemarujući većim delom ostale aspekte kineske regionalne politike (Wu 2016, 15-18). Iako ovaj autor bazira svoje zaključke na istraživanjima obavljenim pre 2015. godine, čak i tada su postojale indicije da se kineska regionalna politika neće zadržati u striktno defanzivnim okvirima. To se pokazalo tačnim sa daljom

militarizacijom ostrva u Južnom kineskom moru tokom narednih godina vojnim reformama koje su stupile na snagu nakon 2015. godine.

Ova istorijska analogija, zajedno sa konceptom Tukididove zamke o kojoj je govorio Graham Allison (Graham Allison), obezbeđuje relevantne informacije o tome kako kopnene i pomorske sile reaguju na akumulaciju moći kod potencijalnih rivala (Allison 2017). Međutim, ista analogija poseduje određene nedostatke koji se, pre svega, odnose na strategije uravnotežavanja i savezničke koalicije koje su ove sile uspele da oforme. Kritiku ovakvog pristupa izneli su Ljan Čong (Ja Ian Chong) i Tod Hol (Todd H. Hall), oni ističu da je analogija uprošćena verzija istorijskih dešavanja koji se ne mogu preslikati na savremenu situaciju u istočnoj Aziji. Analogija anglo-nemačkog rivalstva za ove autore ne razmatra tri važna elementa: 1) „zamršena” struktura saveza uoči Prvog svetskog rata čija je bileteralna forma proizvela multilateralne posledice, 2) opasnost rastućeg nacionalizma koji je vršio pritisak na unutrašnju politiku evropskih država i 3) učestale krize u odnosima između velikih sila. Autori zaključuju da navedeni elementi nisu uočljivi u savremenim sino-američkim odnosima, kao i da se analogijom pokušavaju generalizovati određena pitanja koja mogu da vode do pogrešnih političkih pristupa savremenim problemima (Chong and Hall 2014).

Cilj rada nije da ospori značaj navedenog istorijskog primera. Brojni dokumenti, pre svega memorandum britanskog diplomate Er Kroua (Eyre Crowe), i istorijske analize ukazuju da je anglo-nemačko rivalstvo značajno uticalo na animozitet ovih aktera i na eskalaciju neprijateljstva. Određeni aspekti ovog istorijskog primera mogu se uočiti, kao što navedeni autori ističu, na primeru savremenih kinesko-američkih odnosa. Ipak, smatramo da ova analogija ne može biti celovita ako se u razmatranje ne uključi strateško okruženje pre Prvog svetskog rata i karakteristike savremenog regionalnog poretka istočne Azije. U oba slučaja raspored saveznika i saveznička politika uticale su na procese uravnotežavanja. S tim u vezi, cilj rada neće biti da se samo potvrdi istraživanje Čonga i Hala. Iako ovi autori iznose važna zapažanja, deo rada koji se tiče ravnoteže snaga i savezništva većim delom se bavi pitanjem uloge malih država u politici velikih sila. Sa druge strane, strategije uravnotežavanja koje su sile implementirale, a koje su uticale i na formiranje savezništava, nisu adekvatno predstavljene.

U radu biće učinjen pokušaj da se detaljno predstave procesi uravnotežavanja, kao i da se ukaže na razlike u odnosu na to kako su ovi procesi izgledali u godinama pre Prvog svetskog rata i kakvi postoje danas. Izučavajući procese uravnotežavanja rukovodićemo se principima realističke škole koja pruža dobru osnovu za razumevanje kako velike sile funkcionišu u međunarodnom sistemu. Pokušaćemo da pokažemo da međunarodne okolnosti i način uravnotežavanja velikih sila uoči Prvog svetskog rata dobrim delom ne odgovaraju trenutnoj situaciji u istočnoj Aziji.

Teorijski okvir istraživanja

Prema stanovištu autora realizma formiranje saveza između država uglavnom je sagledavano kroz proces uravnotežavanja.⁴ U tradicionalnoj školi realizma formiranje saveza i kontra-saveza karakteristično je za mnogobrojne države u međunarodnoj politici. Savezi se stvaraju kako bi se uravnotežila moć drugih aktera ili drugih saveza i očuvala pozicija u međunarodnom sistemu (Morgenthau 1948, 137-142). Za tradicionalne realiste proces uravnotežavanja je važan mehanizam koji održava stabilnost sistema, ali na koji mogu da utiču različiti faktori. Umeće i znanje državnika koji rukovode velikim silama za autore ove škole predstavlja važan aspekt koji doprinosi ili umanjuje sistem ravnoteže (Nedeljković 2020, 100-103).

Novo viđenje uravnotežavanja ponudili su neorealisti koji se oslanjaju na strukturalne odlike sistema koje bi trebalo da upravljaju ponašanjem aktera. Struktura međunarodnog sistema, kao što Kenet Volc (Kenneth N. Waltz) ističe, ograničava i oblikuje ponašanje država na način koji ih usmerava ka sličnim ishodima, iako ciljevi i mogućnosti država mogu da variraju (Waltz 1979, 74,104). U anarhičnom okruženju države žele da obezbede prvenstveno opstanak i sigurnost, a ne da akumuliraju moć, pa otuda teže stvaranju saveza da bi ostvarile željenu ravnotežu snaga. Zbog ovoga akumulacija moći kod pojedinih država u međunarodnom sistemu uglavnom izaziva reakciju ostalih zemalja koje će pokušati takvu moć da uravnoteže, formiranjem saveza ili jačanjem sopstvenih oružanih kapaciteta (Waltz 1979, 125-128).

Stiven Volt (Stephen M. Walt) je kasnije usavršio navedeni koncept ističući da države nužno ne uravnotežavaju samo moć već pretnju. Definicija Voltovog koncepta počiva na temeljima tradicionalne koncepcije uravnotežavanja, odnosno države uravnotežavaju aktera kod koga akumulacija moći može da postane opasna. U tradicionalnom konceptu moguće je ipak uočiti određene nedostatke, prvenstveno zbog razmatranja ukupne moći (*aggregate power*) kao glavnog indikatora. Dodajući varijable poput geografske distance, ofanzivnih kapaciteta i političkih namera Volt je uspeo detaljnije da razradi tradicionalni koncept ravnoteže snaga. Kako je u pitanju teorija koja promatra nastanak saveza, Volt je takođe ispitivao uticaj ideološke orijentisanosti država. Iako utiče na aktere, Volt zaključuje da ideologija nije presudan faktor za formiranje savezništva. Štaviše,

⁴ O svrstavanju uz jačeg kao alternativni uravnotežavanju nećemo diskutovati u ovom radu zbog ograničenog obima forme naučnog članka. Iako svrstavanje uz jačeg predstavlja važan proces za razumevanje kako države vrše odabir saveznika, ono za naš rad nije od primarnog značaja (Opširnije videti kod Schroeder [1994], Schweller [1994, 1998, 2006]).

uravnotežavanje i strah od neposredne pretnje može da navede aktere na savezništvo uprkos ideološkim razlikama (Walt 1987, 17-49; 1985; 1991, 53-56).

Objašnjenje načina na koji države, prvenstveno izazivači, mogu da formiraju koalicije ponudio je i Džoša Šifrinson (Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson). Za ovog autora sile u usponu se grupišu u odnosu na potencijalnu korist koju vide u drugim silama čija moć počinje da slabi. Tako, pojedine sile u usponu će pokušati da sklope koalicije sa drugim silama kako bi ubrzale pad *status quo* igrača, ili će pokušati da podrže *status quo* koaliciju ako vide pretnju u drugim silama u usponu. Ciljeve koje sile pokušavaju da ostvare ovim strategijama zavise od mogućnosti koje trenutni međunarodni poredak pruža i sredstava, tj. resursa koja su im na raspolaganju. Ako stanje stvari u međunarodnoj politici dozvoljava primenu radikalnih mera, poput rata, za šta država ima neophodne resurse pretpostavka je da će sile u usponu pokušati to da iskoriste i ubrzaju pad *status quo* aktera. U suprotnom, ove sile će koristiti „jednostavnije“ strategije koje podrivaju, ali suštinski ne utiču na položaj *status quo* sila. Isti pristup sile u usponu imaće i kada pokušavaju da podrže *status quo* koaliciju protiv drugih potencijalnih revizionista. Na osnovu navedenog Šifrinson pruža četiri strateška pristupa poput: proterivanja (*relegation*), kada sile u usponu radikalno otpočinu reviziju međunarodnog poretka protiv *status quo* aktera; jačanje (*strengthening*), kada sile u usponu pomažu *status quo* igračima kako bi sprečile druge izazivače; slabljenje (*weakening*) se odvija onda kada sile u usponu podrivaju položaj *status quo* država, ali ga radikalno ne menjaju; učvršćivanje (*bolstering*) se dešava onda kada sile u usponu pokušavaju da uspore pad *status quo* država (Shifrinson 2018, 13-42). Suštinski Šifrinson pruža novi pogled na procese uravnotežavanja iz aspekta sila u usponu, pri čemu se fokus stavlja na strategije ovih sila i način na koji će pristupiti transformaciji međunarodnog poretka.

Važan aspekt Šifrinsonove teorije, koji nam omogućava da pretpostavimo kako će se države ponašati, predstavljaju dve varijable poput strateške vrednosti država (*strategic value*) i borbene gotovosti (*military posture*), odnosno kvaliteta i kvantiteta, kao i rasporeda oružanih snaga. Stratešku vrednost određuju parametri poput geografske udaljenosti, vojne i ekonomske moći kao i kompatibilne političko-ideološke strukture država. Što je strateška vrednost sile u opadanju veća, sila u usponu će pokušati da ojača ili učvrsti poziciju ove države, u suprotnom sila u usponu primeniće strategije koje će dodatno ubrzati opadanje moći. Bobrena gotovost, sa druge strane, određuje intenzitete strategija koje će sile primenjivati u odnosu na druge. Država koja uspostavi visoku borbenu gotovost zahtevaće umerenije strateške pristupe poput slabljenja ako je strateška vrednost niska, ili učvršćivanja ako država ima visoku stratešku vrednost. U ovom pogledu države koje imaju nisku borbenu gotovost izazvaće primenu radikalnijih strateških pristupa

poput proterivanja, ako je strateška vrednost niska ili jačanja, ako je strateška vrednost visoka (Shifrinson 2018, 33-37).

Šifrinsonov koncept zajedno sa realističkim pristupom poslužiće nam kao osnova na kojoj možemo da preispitamo strukturu saveza neposredno pre Prvog svetskog rata i procese uravnotežavanja između ključnih država ovog perioda. Videćemo da je uravnotežavanje bila dominantna strategija velikih sila u ovom periodu, kao i da je savezništvo Austrougarske i Nemačke bilo dodatno učvršćeno principima koje Šifrinson ističe u svom konceptu. Na osnovu ovog teorijskog okvira, u drugom delu rada biće istraženo kakve sličnosti se mogu uočiti u savremenim odnosima država istočne Azije i koje procese uravnotežavanja ove države implementiraju.

Ravnoteža snaga i uloga saveznika uoči prvog svetskog rata

U godinama nakon Berlinskog kongresa struktura saveza u Evropi postajala je sve izvesnija, što je pre svega bilo uočljivo kod Centralnih sila. Rusija, koja je tada predstavljala silu zavidnih kapaciteta, imala je interese na Balkanu koji su bili suprotstavljani interesima Austrougarske monarhije i Osmanskog carstva. Dvojno savezništvo Nemačke i Austrougarske nastalo nakon Berlinskog kongresa, osim što je imalo za cilj da očuva ravnotežu snaga na kontinentu, trebalo je da spreči potencijalni sukob Beča i Moskve (Taylor 1954, 259). Nakon Velike istočne krize, Austrougarska se suočavala sa konstantnim gubitkom moći u odnosu na druge sile u Evropi, što je uvećavalo njene strahove od potencijalnih protivnika, pre svega Rusije koja je imala teritorijalne pretenzije prema njenim interesnim sferama. Otežavajuća okolnost za Austrougarsku bila je Italija koja, iako je u početku predstavljala relativno pouzdanog partnera, vremenom je sve više postala pretnja (Rothenberg 1967, 124-125, 152).

Savezništvo Austrougarske i Nemačke nesumnjivo je imalo i ofanzivne namere, što je moglo da se primeti u nemačkim spoljnopolitičkim interesima (Fischer 1967). Jedan deo nemačkog stanovništva koji je stasao krajem 19. veka bio je posvećen ideji Nemačke kao sile u nastajanju koja mora da obezbedi svoje „mesto pod suncem“ na međunarodnoj sceni. Ovaj koncept je dodatno dobio na značaju s obzirom da ga je Vilhelm II uokvirio kao svoj politički program. Drugi aspekt nemačke spoljne politike predstavljao je izgradnju velike ratne mornarice. Stvaranje pomorske flote viđeno je kao jedini način da Nemačka „parira“ Velikoj Britaniji i bude prepoznata od strane drugih država kao velika sila. Posedovanje ratne flote, osim prestiža, zadovoljilo bi i praktične političke ciljeve, kao što je promena trenutnog kolonijalnog sistema. Nemačka je smatrala da spram svoje velike

ekonomske moći i uticaja koji ostvaruje u Evropi ne poseduje adekvatne kolonijalne posede, nešto što je bilo moguće izmeniti sa velikom ratnom mornaricom. Treće, Nemačka je bila nezadovoljna svojom pozicijom u postojećem međunarodnom poretku, kao država koja uprkos svojoj moći nije tretirana jednako od strane drugih velikih sila tog doba. Drugačije rečeno, Nemačka je želela promenu međunarodnog poretka koji bi odgovarao njenim potrebama i bio u skladu sa njenom vizijom države kao velike sile (Fischer 1967, 7-10).

Održavanje povoljne ravnoteže snaga na kontinentu bio je jedan od glavnih principa Bizmarkove politike. Strahovi ostalih aktera u Evropi od nemačke brze akumulacije moći bili su poznati ovom državniku. Bizmark je ulagao velike napore da uveri ostale aktere evropske politike da je Nemačka posvećena očuvanju postojećeg poretka, a ne njegovoj promeni. Ovakva mudra politika suštinski je „razoružala“ ostale velike sile i sprečila formiranje ozbiljnijih koalicija koje bi uravnotežavale tj. obuzdavale dalji razvoj Nemačke. Nakon Bizmarkovog odlaska sa vlasti spoljna politika Nemačke postala je nepromišljena, dok je novo rukovodstvo dodatno uticalo na Austrougarsku da se udalji od Rusije (Taylor 1954, 328; Kissinger 1994, 105). Štaviše, nemačka podrška Austrougarskoj nakon krize u Bosni, dodatno je približila Rusiju zapadnim silama. Nemački ekspanzionizam koji je jačao prema Atlantiku i Bliskom istoku dodatno je uticao na spoljnopolitički „imidž“ ove države kao sile u usponu čija će moć promeniti ravnotežu snaga u Evropi (Schmitt 1924, 456-457).

Koncept ravnoteže snaga koji je uticao na stvaranje savezništva Nemačke i Austrougarske još tokom 19. veka, dodatno je učvršćen lošom pozicijom Austrougarske u kojoj se ona našla početkom 20. veka. Učvršćivanje odnosa ovih sila može se objasniti i Šifrinsonovom teorijom. Austrougarska je bila sila u opadanju koja nije imala željene vojne kapacitete, ali je njena strateška vrednost bila značajna za Nemačku. Strateška vrednost, kao što Šifrinson opisuje, predstavlja mogućnosti jedne države da pruži pomoć protiv ostalih aktera i potencijalnih protivnika drugoj sili. Austrougarska naspram Nemačke zadovoljava sve uslove o kojima autor govori. Kontinentalne sile Evrope tokom 19. i početkom 20. veka bile su „gusto“ raspoređene što je uticalo da sile u usponu relativno lako mogu da dođu u sukob sa drugim državama koje mogu da ugroze njihovu poziciju. Zbog toga su sile u opadanju takođe bile važne, jer su uvek mogle da pruže određen vid pomoći. Nemačka koja je imala probleme sa Francuskom na zapadnom delu kontinenta, oslanjala se na Austrougarsku kako bi primorala Rusiju da podeli svoje oružane snage i onemogućio joj da se fokusira isključivo na Nemačku. Geografski položaj Austrougarske naspram Nemačke i Rusije bio je važan aspekt ratnih planova što se moglo videti i u Šlifinovom planu koji je predviđao da početni sukob sa Rusijom najvećim delom podnese vojska Monarhije

(Christensen and Snyder 1990, 151). Uprkos problemima sa kojima se Austrougarska suočavala, moć ove države je bila na zavidnom nivou i ona je mogla da se iskoristi u slučaju rata. Brojnost populacije, proizvodnja uglja i čelika, kao i ukupan privredni rast u tom periodu bili su nešto manji u odnosu na Francusku (Kennedy 1987, 215-216). Važan faktor koji je uvećavao stratešku vrednost Austrougarske jeste i to što Monarhija nije imala druge savezničke opcije (Kissinger 1994, 200). Austrougarska je zbog svega navedenog predstavljala stabilan oslonac i pouzdanog saveznika koji neće napustiti koaliciju i priključi se protivničkoj strani. Uprkos relativno niskoj borbenoj gotovosti austrougarske vojske (Kennedy 1987, 216-219), visoka strateška vrednost ove države uticala je na Nemačku da Monarhiju vidi kao ključnog saveznika.

Za razliku od Austrougarske, Turska nije imala dovoljnu stratešku vrednost koja bi bila interesantna drugim silama u Evropi, pre svega Velikoj Britaniji koja je tokom istorije nastojala da uspostavi balans između sila na kontinentu. Relativno približavanje Velike Britanije i Rusije posle 1905. godine, takođe je signaliziralo Porti da više ne predstavlja važan zupčanik u engleskom mehanizmu ravnoteže. Nakon Balkanskih ratova i Libijskog rata „bolesnik na Bosforu“ viđen je kao nepoželjan akter koji više predstavlja teret nego instrument koji doprinosi ostvarivanju političkih ciljeva velikih sila. Na kraju, savezništvo koje je sklopljeno sa Nemačkom ostvareno je ne toliko zbog berlinskih interesa koliko zbog insistiranja Austrougarske i vešte osmanske diplomatije, kako smatraju pojedini autori, koja je uspela da predstavi svoju državu kao potencijalnog saveznika silama Antante u slučaju neuspešnih pregovora sa Nemačkom (Aksakal 2008, 98; Trumpener 1968, 20). Ipak, treba imati u vidu i ekonomske interese Berlina koji su bili usmereni ka ovom delu sveta, a koji su predstavljali važan deo Kajzerovog *Weltpolitik* koncepta. Iako ovo ne umanjuje značaj turske diplomatije u pregovorima, svakako nam govori i da je Nemačka uvidela određenu korist od bolesnika na Bosforu. Sa druge strane, za Tursku je savez sa Nemačkom predstavljao uravnotežavanje ruske pretnje s obzirom da Berlin nije imao očigledne kolonijalne pretenzije prema osmanskim posedima (Dagi 2018, 149). Formiranjem ovakvog saveza Porta je pokušala da uravnoteži Rusiju kao neposrednu pretnju. Uostalom, pozicija Osmanskog carstva naspram Rusije i politika uravnotežavanja je bila u skladu sa većinom Voltovih indikatora koji ukazuju da države reaguju na pretnju tražeći saveznika čak i kada nisu ideološki kompatibilni.

Struktura saveza kod sila Antante bila je komplikovanija, što je moglo da se uoči u različitim pristupima koje su ove države imale u međunarodnoj politici. Naime, dok je Velika Britanija pokušavala da održi povoljnu ravnotežu snaga u Evropi, prvenstveno da bi zaštitila svoje kolonijalne interese, Francuska i Rusija su se suočavale sa sve izvesnijom pretnjom Nemačke (Taylor 1954, 338-339).

Približavanje Rusije i Francuske krajem 19. veka, kako Pol Kenedi ističe, bilo je uslovljeno delimično zbog straha od Nemačke, kao i zbog situacije u kojoj su se ove sile nalazile (Kennedy 1987, 250). Naime, ove sile nisu imale druge respektabilne saveznike na kontinentu koji su mogli potencijalno da „dopune“ ravnotežu. Velika Britanija i Nemačka uspele su da sklope dogovor u vezi svojih interesa na Balkanu i u Egiptu 1890. godine, dok je Kaprivijeva vlada insistirala da Nemačka nema potrebe za daljim jačanjem pomorskih snaga (Taylor 1954, 329-330). Štaviše, Velika Britanija je tokom 19. veka velike političke napore uložila u obuzdavanje dalje ruske ekspanzije ka Persiji, Carigradu i Indiji (Kissinger 1994, 100). Sa druge strane, zajednički interesi poput povoljnih francuskih zajmova Rusiji i ruska vojna pomoć Francuskoj, učinili su da ove dve sile uđu u savez koji je stvorio grubu ravnotežu snaga u Evropi (Taylor 1954, 325-326).

Suprostavljani interesi budućih saveznika komplikovali su odnose sve do izbivanja rata 1914. godine. Jačanje francusko-ruskog partnerstva u oblasti vojne pomorske saradnje, pre svega u regionu Sredozemlja, predstavljalo je političku meru protiv Velike Britanije. Iako je francusko-ruski savez na kraju ipak bio usmeren protiv Nemačke, ovakav vid političkih igara uticao je na Veliku Britaniju i na njen uzdržan stav po pitanju kontinentalne politike (Taylor 1954, 344-345). Štaviše, krajem 19. veka Velika Britanija je ravnotežu snaga u Evropi posmatrala kao samoodrživu tvorevinu na koju ne treba trošiti previše truda. Kolonijalna i teritorijalna pitanja, poput onog u Alzas Loren regionu, takođe su oblikovala političke stavove ovih država. Tako na primer, dok je Rusija pokušavala da održi dobre odnose sa Nemačkom, Francuska nikako nije dopuštala da se takvi odnosi protumače kao antibritanski, makar dok Pariz ne povрати oblast Alzas Loren (Taylor 1954, 362-363). Komplikacije saveza mogle su se uočiti i u suprotnom smeru. Francuska koja je bila protiv Nemačke i eventualnog približavanja Berlina i Sankt Petersburga nije želela da pogorša odnose sa Austrougarskom, što je bilo suprotno ruskim interesima (Kennan 1984, 119-120). Odnosi Rusije i Velike Britanije takođe nisu bili u potpunosti definisani, prvenstveno zbog suprostavljanih kolonijalnih interesa koji su bili vidljivi na globalnom nivou (Steiner and Neilson 2003, 98). Anglo-japanski savez sklopljen 1902. godine imao je za cilj, pre svega, da ograniči ruske i francuske pozicije na dalekom istoku (Kissinger 1994, 188). Nemačka tada nije viđena kao potencijalna pretnja, iako su se pojavili planovi za razvoj ratne mornarice. Štaviše, Nemačka je tada postala partner od relativnog poverenja britanskoj politici na kontinentu (Taylor 1954, 400-401). Evropske sile su tokom ovog perioda na različite načine pokušavale da uravnoteže jedna drugu da bi obezbedile bolju poziciju kako u Evropi, tako i u kolonijama.

Sve do 1912. godine diplomatski odnosi Velike Britanije i Nemačke su nagoveštavali da dve sile mogu da dođu do kompromisa u pogledu daljeg

naoružavanja i jačanja nemačke mornarice.⁵ Sa druge strane, London nije pokazivao jasne namere u vezi produbljivanja svog učešća u Antanti. Ovakav stav je bio očigledan kada je britanska vlada ostala uzdržana na predlog intenzivnijeg učešća britanske mornarice u Mediteranu koji je došao od strane Francuske (Steiner and Neilson 2003, 100-111). Neodlučnost Velike Britanije da učvrsti svoju poziciju među silama Antante uticala je i na poverenje ostalih sila na kontinentu. Ruski ministar spoljnih poslova Sergej Sazonov ukazao je na sumnje ruskih vlasti u vezi Velike Britanije i njenog učešća na strani sila Antante. Tokom 1914. godine, Sazonov je insistirao da ako Evropa želi da izbegne rat i da zauzda nemačke želje za hegemonijom, sile Antante moraju da formiraju defanzivni savez koji će biti formalan, bez tajnih klauzula i javno objavljen (Bobroff 2014, 242). Zbog odsustva interesovanja za evropsku politiku, Francuska nije računala na pomoć britanske vojske sve do izbijanja rata 1914. godine, pa čak je i tada postojalo mišljenje da će Francuska morati sama da zauzda početni udar nemačkih oružanih snaga na zapadnom frontu (Taylor 1954, 438). Sumnje saveznika potvrdio je i britanski diplomata Krou 1911. godine ističući da Antanta nije istinski savez i da takva struktura predstavlja samo opšti pravac politike bez jasne sadržine (Joll and Martel 2013, 73).⁶

Politika Velike Britanije uticala je i na kalkulacije nemačkih političara. Stiven Van Evera (Stephen Van Evera) ističe da je britanska dvosmislena politika navela Nemačku na pomisao da London neće učestovati u sukobu kontinentalnih sila (Van Evera 1984, 100-101). Za Centralne sile odsustvo Velike Britanije u potencijalnom sukobu predstavljalo je važno političko pitanje koje je moglo da odluči konačni ishod rata. Kako Skot Segan (Scott D. Sagan) navodi, Nemačka iako je bila spremna za sukob sa silama na kontinentu nije želela rat većih razmera u kome bi Velika Britanija bila na strani saveznika. Neizvesnost britanske politike na kraju je omogućilo nemačkom generalštabu da ubrza mobilizaciju i pokrene ofanzivne planove, kako bi „preduhitрили” Engleze u slučaju da se predomisle i pruže podršku drugim silama (Sagan 1991, 126-129).

⁵ Blagonaklon stav Londona prema daljem naoružavanju Nemačke, dobrim delom, bio je uslovljen i problemima sa kojima su se engleske vlasti suočavale sa Francuskom u Africi i Rusijom u centralnoj Aziji (Kissinger 1994, 185).

⁶ Neophodno je napomenuti da Henri Kisindžer u potpunosti ne deli stavove navedenih autora i njihovog pogleda na učešće Velike Britanije u evropskoj politici u godinama pre Prvog svetskog rata. Naime, savezništvo Velike Britanije-Rusije-Francuske bilo je rešeno nakon 1905. godine i pobede Japana nad Rusijom. Dve godine nakon poraza na dalekom Istoku, Velika Britanija je pružila kolonijalne ustupke ruskoj carevini u centralnoj Aziji što je predstavljao, kako Kisindžer ističe, očigledan znak svrstavanja Engleza na suprotnu stranu od Nemačke (Kissinger 1994, 190-198).

Mehanizam uravnotežavanja u istočnoj Aziji na početku 21. veka

Iako je teško osporiti da klasična ravnoteža snaga ne utiče na politiku država, pa time i na njihove odnose, način na koji se države istočne Azije grupišu razlikuje se od onog koji je bio prisutan u evropskoj politici krajem 19. i početkom 20. veka. Procesi uravnotežavanja koji su uticali na formiranje suprostavljenih blokova takođe nisu isti. Sjedinjene Američke Države i ostale zemlje istočne Azije, koje se grupišu oko ove sile u odnosu na Kinu, nisu rukovođene prvenstveno principom ravnoteže snaga već konceptom ravnoteže pretnje. Kina, sa druge strane, ne uspeva da oformi širu koaliciju koja bi uravnotežila moć Sjedinjenih Američkih Država u regionu. Štaviše, strateško partnerstvo Kine sa Rusijom koje ima za cilj uravnotežavanje američke moći takođe se može dovesti u pitanje, iako na prvi pogled sledi principe Šifrinsonovog koncepta.

Odsustvo klasičnog uravnotežavanja Kine kao sile u usponu od strane ostalih igrača u regionu uočili su pojedini autori. Kritikujući koncept ravnoteže snaga Stiv Čen napominje da regionalni akteri nisu uravnotežavali Kinu uprkos akumulaciji moći koju je ova država ostvarila nakon Hladog rata. Autor ide dalje objašnjavajući da čak i države koje su blizu Kine, poput Južne Koreje i Tajvana, težile su da prodube saradnju sa ovom državom pre nego da joj se suprostave (Chan 2012). Dejvid Kang (David C. Kang) takođe potvrđuje mišljenje prethodnog autora ističući da pošto Sjedinjene Države ne uravnotežavaju Kinu ne može se očekivati da će ostali regionalni akteri raditi nešto drugačije (Kang 2007). Aron Frajdberg (Aaron L. Friedberg) delimično odstupa od mišljenja prethodnih autora, govoreći da se politika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država prema Kini odvija između procesa obuzdavanja i saradnje (Friedberg 2011). Strateški dokumenti Sjedinjenih Država potvrđuju ovakva razmišljanja. Tako na primer, u strategijama nacionalne bezbednosti iz 1996. i 1997. godine, neposredno nakon Tajvanske krize, Sjedinjene Države zagovaraju produbljivanje saradnje sa Kinom i važnost pristupanja ove države Svetskoj trgovinskoj organizaciji (NSS 1996, 40; NSS 1997, 19). Isti dokumenti u periodu od 2000. do 2010. godine takođe ističu značaj saradnje sa Kinom, pristupanje STO i značaj njenog položaja u svetskoj politici kao odgovornog aktera koji treba da doprinese stabilnosti ne samo regiona, već i šire. Rezerve koje američka vlast ostavlja jesu po pitanju procesa demokratizacije, ljudskih prava i veće transparentosti u pogledu modernizacije oružanih snaga (NSS 2000; NSS 2002; NSS 2006; NSS 2010).

Kod ostalih država regiona istočne Azije percepcija kineske moći je bila slična. Države su težile da prodube saradnju sa Kinom, a da potencijalno jačanje vojnog

prisustva, pre svega Sjedinjenih Država ograniče. Najbolji primer za to najverovatnije predstavlja delimičan neuspeh prvog Kvadrilateralnog dijaloga iz 2007/08. godine koji je trebalo da ojača saradnju između Indije, Sjedinjenih Država, Australije i Japana, ali je otkazan zbog straha da bi takva platforma nepotrebno naškodila političkim i ekonomskim odnosima sa Kinom (Pejić 2021, 322-326).⁷

Tokom druge decenije 21. veka, a pogotovo nakon 2015. godine, situacija u regionu je počela da se menja. Kada je Kina otpočela intenzivniji proces modernizacije ratne mornarice koji je pratio velike vojne reforme 2015. godine, što se odrazilo na kinesku politiku prema Južnom i Istočnom kineskom moru, regionalni akteri počeli su da menjaju svoj odnos prema Peking (Raditio 2019).⁸ Sagledavanje Kine kao moguće pretnje u regionu može se uočiti u poslednjim izveštajima Pentagona iz 2019. i 2021. godine koji ukazuju da razvoj kineskih oružanih snaga može da vodi do destabilizacije regionalnog poretka (DoD 2019, 2021). Pojedini autori su takođe ukazali na slične probleme. Robert Ros (Robert Ros) je još početkom 21. veka naveo da Kina ima neophodne oružane kapacitete kojima bi mogla da utiče na ravnotežu snaga u regionu, pre svega u Tajvanskom moreuzu (Ros 2006, 372). Ejvri Goldštajn (Avery Goldstein) je izneo slična zapažanja, ističući da razvoj kineskih oružanih snaga prati trendove ostalih država u regionu, pre svega SAD i Japana, sa kojima se kineskih politički interesi prepliću (Goldstein 1997/98, 17). Raš Doši (Rush Doshi) u svojoj monografiji iz 2021. godine objašnjava da ne postoje sumnje u vezi kineske pretnje. Naime, izučavajući razvoj kineske velike strategije od kraja Hladnog rata, Doši objašnjava da Kina nikada nije imala iskrene namere u vezi partnerstva sa SAD. Štaviše, celokupni razvoj kineske strategije koncipiran je tako da „izmesti“ Vašington sa pozicije moći i promeni regionalni, a potencijalno i globalni poredak u korist Kine (Doshi 2021).

Uvećano prisustvo kineskih oružanih snaga, izgradnja veštačkih ostrva, kao i razmeštanje oružanih sistema na njima viđeni su kao pretnja od strane ostalih regionalnih igrača poput Japana, Vijetnama, Filipina, Tajvana (teritorija sa osporenom suverenosti) i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Vojna strategija Kine iz

⁷ Prvi razgovori u okviru KVAD-a iako su ispunili određene ciljeve, poput jačanja saradnje u oblasti civilne zaštite, suštinski nisu doveli do šire strateške saradnje između država. Odlazak japanskog premijera Šinzo Abea sa vlasti 2007. godine, kao jednog od glavnih zagovornika ove inicijative, kao i promene u spoljnoj politici Australije i Indije prema Kini, uticali su na to da se „prvi“ KVAD ne relizuje u potpunosti. Komentari američkih zvaničnika iz tog perioda da je „inicijativa viđena samo kao jačanje saradnje između tradicionalnih saveznika“ poput Australije i Japana, pokazalo je nedostak volje i interesovanja Vašingtona za stvaranje nove regionalne platforme (Madan 2017).

⁸ Razvoj kineskih oružanih snaga u kontekstu regionalne stabilnosti predstavlja problem i zbog razvoja kineskog strateškog naoružanja koje SAD vide kao pretnju (Kostić 2020, 686-690).

2015. godine koja eksplicitno navodi da država mora napustiti kopneni mentalitet i okrenuti se razvoju kapaciteta koji omogućava upravljanje morima i okeanima (Zarić 2018, 196), dodatno je uticala na percepciju kineskih namera kod ostalih regionalnih aktera. Kao odgovor na ovu kinesku politiku, države poput J. Koreje, Japana, Tajvana (teritorija sa osporenom suverenosti), Vijetnama, Indije, Australije i SAD počele su da uvećavaju sopstvene oružane kapacitete. Ovaj proces je najuočljiviji u oružanim snagama Japana, Tajvana (teritorija sa osporenom suverenosti) i J. Koreje kao najbližih država koje promene u kineskoj politici vide kao očiglednu pretnju. Japan je povećao vojni budžet za 2% u odnosu na prethodnu deceniju dok je vojni budžet Južne Koreje u protekloj deceniji uvećan za 36% pri čemu se najavljuje uvećanje za još 7.5% do 2023. godine (Pejić 2021, 325). Zahtev japanskog ministarstva odbrane za dodatno uvećavanje vojnog budžeta za narednu godinu takođe potvrđuje percepciju Kine kao potencijalne pretnje po regionalni poredak (Takahashi 2022). Razvoj i razmeštanje tajvanskih protiv-vazdušnih sistema, razvoj japanskih i južnokorejskih protiv-vazdušnih sistema, najava nabavke većeg broja nuklearnih podmornica za australijsku mornaricu i veće prisustvo američkih trupa u regionu predstavljaju neke od najnovijih pokazatelja uravnotežavanja Kine koje su ove države pokrenule (Strong 2021; Kim 2020; Brimelow 2021).

Uravnotežavanje kineske pretnje može se videti i u načinu saradnje Sjedinjenih Američkih Država sa zemaljama regiona Indo-Pacifika.⁹ Uvećavanje vojnih pomorskih vežbi u zapadnom Pacifiku zajedno sa američkim snagama postala je rutina u politici regionalnih država. Uspostavljanje saradnje između Sjedinjenih Država i Vijetnama, koja se može uočiti na strateškom nivou u pogledu ukidanja embarga na izvoz oružja i uključivanja vijetnamskih oružanih snaga u multilateralne vojne vežbe sa ostalim državama u regionu, takođe ukazuju na buduće pravce spoljne politike ovih zemalja (Pejić 2021, 325). Oživljavanje Kvadrilateralnog dijaloga (QUAD 2.0) tokom 2017. godine predstavlja verovatno jedan od važnijih pokazatelja uravnotežavanja kineske pretnje. Ova diplomatska platforma osim što doprinosi jačanju ekonomskih i diplomatskih veza uključenih aktera, doprinosi i jačanju vojne saradnje između država. Tako je Indija tokom 2018., 2019. i 2020. godine otpočela

⁹ O mogućoj kineskoj pretnji diskutovali su i drugi autori još krajem 20. veka. Pol Kenedi o Kini kao mogućem izazivaču govorio je u svom epohalnom delu *Uspomina i pad velikih sila* (Kennedy 1987, 447-458). Robert Art (Robert Art), čuveni američki strateg, još na početku 21. veka ukazao je na jačanje kineskih oružanih snaga kao proces koji direktno ide na račun američkih interesa u regionu istočne Azije (Art 2005/06, 178-179). Miršajmer je takođe ukazao na problem Kine kao izazivača za SAD, govoreći da ove države ne mogu da ostvare saradnju već će verovatno doći u neki oblik sukoba. Velike ekonomske kapacitete Kine, kako ovaj autor ukazuje, Peking će pokušati da pretvori u vojnu moć u cilju stvaranja regionalne hegemonije (Mearshimer 2001, 397-402).

izvođenje vojnih vežbi sa oružanim snagama Japana, Sjedinjenih Država i Australije (Satake 2020, 46; Naval News 2020). Proteklog leta Sjedinjene Države zajedno sa ostalim zemljama KVAD-a održale su pomorske vojne vežbe u blizini ostrva Guam (Zhou 2021). Ova diplomatska platforma uspela je da privuče pažnju i drugih država poput Francuske, koja je aprila 2021. godine takođe učestovala u pomorskim vojnim vežbama organizovanim u bengalskom zalivu (Purohit 2021). Značaj KVAD-a potvrđen je i ove godine maja meseca kada su se učesnici platforme istakli da će nastojati da očuvaju *status quo* regiona i spreče nasilne i unilateralne poteze koji mogu da vode ka destabilizaciji (Rajagopalan 2022).

Jačanje strateške saradnje između ovih zemalja predstavlja neposrednu posledicu kineske regionalne politike koja je u drugoj deceniji 21. veka postala agresivnija. Sa druge strane, slabljenje ekonomskih i političkih odnosa Kine sa Sjedinjenim Državama, Australijom, Japanom i Indijom tokom druge polovine protekle decenije uticalo je da ove države učvrste KVAD kao platformu koja do pre petnestak godina nije viđena kao mudro rešenje za kinesku regionalnu politiku (Smith 2018). Nedavni zahtev američkog predsednika da Kongres odobri prodaju naoružanja Tajvanu u iznosu od preko milijardu dolara, kao i posete američkih zvaničnika ostrvu dugogodišnju američku politiku „dvosmislenosti“ (strategic ambiguity), u dobroj meri ostavljaju po strani (Seligman and Desiderio 2022).

Razvoj velike ratne flote, što je predstavljalo važan aspekt nemačkih spoljnopoličkih interesa, verovatno najbolje objašnjava zbog čega se Kina vidi kao pretnja od strane SAD. Razvoj velike pomorske flote od strane Nemačke za Veliku Britaniju, kao pomorsku silu, predstavljalo je pretnju po vitalne interese te države. Džozef Parent i Sebastijan Rozato (Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato) u svom radu objašnjavaju da pomorske sile sporije reaguju na akumulaciju moći kod drugih država, koja potencijalno može biti opasna, s obzirom da su pomorske sile najčešće geografski „izolovane“ što doprinosi osećaju bezbednosti. Ipak, kada akumulacija moći ukazuje na razvoj pomorske ratne flote, pomorske sile će reagovati i težiti da uravoteže tog aktera (Parent and Rosato 2015; Levy and Thompson 2010). Drugačije rečeno, pomorske sile su „osetljive“ na akumulaciju pomorske moći kod mogućih rivala. Kina je tokom poslednje dve decenije uložila veliku količinu sredstava u razvoj ratne mornarice, a pre svega u razvoj preko-okeanske površinske flote (Cole 2010). Promene u kineskoj vojnoj strategiji 2015. godine kojima se ističe da se Kina mora usmeriti na razvoj kapaciteta koji omogućavaju upravljanje morima i okeanima, kao i zaštitu prekomorskih interesa, potvrđuju da Kina želi da se pozicionira i kao ozbiljna pomorska sila (Zarić 2018, 199). Ovaj aspekt kineske politike takođe je često predstavljao i argument istraživača koji je poistovećuju sa Vilhelmovom Nemačkom.

Sa druge strane, položaj savremene Kine nije identičan u odnosu na sile sa početka 20. veka. Kao što smo videli u prethodnom delu, promene u kineskoj regionalnoj politici koje su počele da se pojavljuju početkom druge decenije 21. veka rezultirale su promenama u opažanju kineske moći kod skoro svih ključnih aktera u istočnoj i jugoistočnoj Aziji. Kina koja predstavlja veliku silu impresivnih ekonomskih i vojnih kapaciteta svakako privlači interesovanje različitih država što dobro potvrđuje i Šangajska organizacija za saradnju. Blagonakloni stav Kine prema državama poput Severne Koreje, Irana i Mjanmara, koje zapadne sile tretiraju kao nepoželjne elemente međunarodnog poretka, takođe doprinosi ideji da Kina može da uspostavi mrežu saveznika-partnera koji bi želeli da promene trenutni međunarodni poredak koji još uvek počiva na moći zapadnih država. Ipak, država koja je viđena kao ključni igrač za uravnotežavanje američke moći i glavni saveznik Kine u tom poduhvatu je Rusija.

Strateško partnerstvo Rusije i Kine može se pratiti od početka 21. veka, pri čemu su odnosi ovih sila dostigli novi nivo nakon Ukrajinske krize 2014. godine (Bekkevold and Lo 2019); i još jednom ove godine nakon početka rata u Ukrajini. U velikoj meri odnosi ovih zemalja prate Šifrinsonov šablon koji ukazuje na razloge zbog kojih sile u usponu i potencijalni revizionisti žele partnerstvo sa drugim sličnim silama. Naspram ove dve sile strateška vrednost Sjedinjenih Država je relativno niska, dok je njena borbena gotovost i raspored snaga još uvek na visokom nivou. Nekoliko aspekata upućuju na ovo. Prvo, Sjedinjene Države su u strateškom pogledu izolovane od ostalih kopnenih sila u Evroaziji. Drugo, Vašington ne odobrava ruske i kineske političke poduhvate obnove sfera uticaja, koji se vide kao loša praksa realpolitike iz XIX veka. Treće, Rusija i Kina imaju relativno kompatibilne ideološke poglede na svet. Četvrto, Sjedinjene Države još uvek imaju velike vojne kapacitete koji mogu da ugroze bezbednost ovih izazivača i utiču na njihov dalji uspon. U skladu sa Šifrinsonovim konceptom, zbližavanjem Rusije i Kine ove sile umanjuju, odnosno slabe moć Sjedinjenih Država.

Ipak, slučaj kinesko-ruskog partnerstva u kontekstu dosadašnje analize treba uzeti sa određenom dozom rezerve, pre svega zbog aktuelnih dešavanja u Ukrajini. Rat u Ukrajini koji je otpočeo ove godine na prvi pogled dodatno je približio Peking i Moskvu. Vojna intervencija u Ukrajini koja je dovela do „ocepljivanja“ (*decoupling*) Rusije od Zapada, logično je uticala na dalje približavanje Rusije Kini. Uostalom na ovome je insistiralo i političko rukovodstvo ovih sila, koje je nastojalo da krivicu rata prebaci isključivo na zapadne sile. Sa druge strane, Kina nije načinila značajne političke poteze koji bi Rusiji olakšali trenutni položaj, nešto što bi se očekivalo od predanog saveznika. Kupovina jeftinih ruskih energenata i drugih sirovina od strane Kine, iako se propagira kao način na koji Rusija uz pomoć svojih partnera zaobilazi sankcije zapadnih država, suštinski predstavlja unosan posao za Peking koji je u

poziciji da eksploatiše rusku nepovoljnu poziciju. Razmišljanja pojedinih kineskih autora takođe dovode u pitanje da li je ovakva Rusija potrebna Kini. Tako na primer, Jun San (Yun Sun) smatra da Kina i Rusija, iako dele neke dugoročne interese, imaju suštinske razlike u pogledu izgleda budućeg međunarodnog poretka. Kina teži hijerarhijskom uređenju u kome je ona na vrhu, dok Rusija teži multipolarnom poretku u kome je ona jednaka sa ostalim polovima u sistemu. Inferiorni status koji bi Rusija imala u kinekoj viziji međunarodnog poretka suštinski ne odgovara politici Moskve. San smatra da zbog ovoga Peking nema iskreno savezništvo sa Rusijom, kao i da Kina strahuje da će Rusija u jednom trenutku pokušati da uravnotežava njenu moć (Sun 2022). Hu Vei (Hu Wei), profesor sa šangajskog univerziteta, govori da Kina ne može da podržava Rusiju, pogotovo ako se ispostavi da je politika Moskve u Ukrajini neuspešna. Vei smatra da „vezivanje“ sa Rusijom može loše da se odrazi na kinesku poziciju u svetskoj politici i odvede je u izolaciju od strane zapadnih sila (Wei 2022). Na kraju, treba imati u vidu da slabi rezultati ruskih oružanih snaga u Ukrajini takođe utiču na promene u shvatanju strateške vrednosti Rusije za Kinu. Ako posmatramo nemačko-austroougarsko savezništvo, Berlin je video očiglednu korist u austroougarskoj vojsci koja je imala potencijala da se suprotstavi rivalima na istočnom frontu. Potencijal ruskih oružanih snaga pre i nakon rata u Ukrajini predstavljaju dve dosta različite kategorije, pri čemu Kina može da ima opravdane sumnje u konvencionalne mogućnosti ruske vojske da se suprotstavi zapadnim silama u slučaju da dođe do ostvarivanja tzv. Tukididove zamke.

Zaključna razmatranja

Ravnoteža snaga koja je tokom 19. veka u Evropi navodila na učestale promene savezništva i partnerstava među velikim silama na kraju se odrazila i na nivo međusobnog nepoverenja sve do izbijanja Velikog rata. Tako je Nemačka sumnjala da Italija neće ostati privržena dogovoru, dok su Francuzi strahovali da će Rusija možda uspeti da sklopi povoljan dogovor sa Nemačkom. Na kraju, London je morao da bude siguran da na kontinentu neće doći do stvaranja jedne snažne koalicije, pri čemu bi Velika Britanija ostala bez potencijalnih saveznika (Schmitt 1924, 463). Ravnoteža snaga, a ne ravnoteža pretnje je u većoj meri rukovodila strategijske koncepte tadašnjih država evropske politike. Zbog navedenog percepcija pretnje nije bila jedinstvena, s obzirom na to da su uvek postojale kalkulacije kako bi se potencijalno došlo do dogovora sa protivnikom i preuredila ravnoteža snaga. Centralne sile, za razliku od sila Antante, uspele su da ovo u određenoj meri prevaziđu. Austroougarska je imala visoku stratešku vrednost za Nemačku po svim kriterijumima koje je Šifrinson postavio. Sa druge strane, Turska, iako je pokušavala

da „odigra” na kartu zapadnih država, neizbežna pretnja ruske moći je navela da traži pomoć Centralnih sila.

Trenutna situacija u istočnoj i jugoistočnoj Aziji nešto je drugačija. Iako ne osporavamo da će države ovog regiona uvek gledati da uspostave ravnotežu sa Kinom koja bi omogućila saradnju sa ovim važnim centrom međunarodne ekonomije, podizanje borbene gotovosti i jačanje vojnih partnerstava potvrđuje da druge zemlje ovog regiona neće staviti ekonomsku saradnju ispred svojih nacionalnih i strateških interesa. Među članovima *status quo* koalicije koju predvode Sjedinjene Američke Države, mehanizam ravnoteže pretnje dominira kada je reč o svrstavanju ovih država i formulaciji njihove spoljne politike prema Kini kao sili u usponu i potencijalnom izazivaču regionalnog poretka. Sa druge strane, Kini još uvek ne polazi za rukom da formira širu koaliciju država koje bi htele da se suprostave nosiocima trenutnog poretka. Moskva kao najbitniji partner Pekinga, iako ima interesa da uravnoteži moć Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, takođe nije u poziciji koja zahteva potpunu predanost kineskim ciljevima. Suprostavljene vizije budućeg međunarodnog poretka mogu da predstavljaju ozbiljnu prepreku za dublje savezništvo između ovih sila. Štaviše, dosadašnji rezultati ruske vojne intervencije u Ukrajini dodatno opterećuju partnerstvo Rusije i Kine, pri čemu Peking ne želi da rizikuje svoj položaj u međunarodnoj politici svrstavajući se u potpunosti na rusku stranu.

Proces uravnotežavanja moći koji je bio osnovna odlika evropske politike na početku 20. veka nije prisutan u istom obliku u regionalnim odnosima istočne Azije. Percepcija kineske pretnje, a ne akumulacija kineske moći je prvenstveno uticala na politiku regionalnih zemalja da pokrenu proces uravnotežavanja. Istorijska analogija anlgo-nemačkog i kinesko-američkog rivalstva izostavlja ove elemente uravnotežavanja drugih aktera u međunarodnoj politici koji su suštinski uticali na raspored snaga u sistemu. Kao što pojedini autori ističu, da je Velika Britanija otvoreno bila na strani saveznika i time pokazala u kom pravcu se kreće ravnoteža snaga, umanjila bi neizvesnost između evropskih sila i verovatno umanjila šanse za izbijanje rata (Niou, Ordernshook and Rose 1989, 266). Sa druge strane, analogija pruža značajne informacije o tome kako kopnene a kako pomorske sile reaguju na transformaciju moći kod svojih rivala. Značaj ovog istorijskog primera je i u tome što ukazuje na tzv. crvene linije u politici pomorskih sila i kada ove države strategiju odvrćanja kod svojih protivnika počinju da vide kao strategiju projekcije moći. Na kraju treba napomenuti da ova analogija pruža dobar temelj za dalje proučavanje pojedinih pojava u međunarodnim odnosima. Tako je moguće dublje proučavati koheziju savezništava i kako ona utiče na ostale aktere u sistemu, pogotovo u pogledu izbijanja sukoba. Empirijski aspekt koji zaslužuje istraživačku pažnju predstavlja i položaj Belgije uoči Prvog svetskog rata i u kojoj meri Tajvan može da predstavlja „belgijski momenat” za velike sile u istočnoj Aziji.

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Igor PEJIĆ, Srđan BLAGOJEVIĆ

**THE RISE OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA AND WILHELMINE GERMANY:
CHALLENGES OF PRODUCTIVE ANALOGY**

Abstract: The rise of a land power that is trying to develop its maritime forces has been viewed as an important conflict instigator among great powers. Great Britain shared similar concerns with the rise of Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. Power relations among states in East Asia, during last two decades, share many similarities with those of pre-World War I Europe. This historical analogy provides abundant information regarding the behavior of land and maritime states. On the other hand, the analogy is often used without reference to other great powers in the system and how these states influenced the overall balance of power. In other words, we get the notion that the conflict between land and maritime power is inevitable regardless of other actors and their position in the system. In our work we shall focus our attention on the two processes that are balance of power and balance of threat; and try to understand how these mechanisms affected the politics of key actors in Europe before the Great War and how they affect the politics of contemporary states in East Asia. Since we are discussing the balance of power concept the article follows ideas set forth by authors of realism. Comparing different approaches of great powers to balancing in the years before the Great War and what balancing looks like in contemporary East Asia we shall try to point out to some strategic misconceptions regarding this historical analogy.

Keywords: Wilhelmine Germany, China, balance of power, balance of threat, realism.

PRIKAZ

Strateška stabilnost u multipolarnom svetu

Pavle NEDIĆ¹

Marina Kostić Šulejić, *Strateška stabilnost u multipolarnom svetu*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2022, 259 str.

Rat u Ukrajini vraća u prvi plan geopolitičke odnose velikih sila i njihove nacionalne interese, sferu u kojoj pitanja relativne moći i potencijalnih relativnih dobitaka igraju presudnu ulogu. Jedna od najznačajnijih oblasti u kojima se ovi odnosi iskazuju jeste oblast nuklearnog naoružanja i održavanje strateške stabilnosti. Knjiga „Strateška stabilnost u multipolarnom svetu“ autorke dr Marine Kostić Šulejić analizira načine na koje se izmene u međunarodnom poretku i opadanje dominacije Sjedinjenih Američkih Država (SAD), te multipolarni poredak čije se posledično formiranje nazire, odražavaju na odnose u ovoj, za globalnu bezbednost ključnoj, oblasti.

Monografija je podeljena na pet delova i zaključak. Oni su organizovani sistemski i po logičnom redosledu obrađuju niz ključnih pitanja i aktera za stratešku stabilnost. Prvi deo nudi objašnjenje ovog koncepta, prateći njegov razvoj kroz različite faze Hladnog rata i posthladnoratovskog perioda. Autorka se sa pravom fokusira na dve ključne nuklearne sile SAD i Rusiju (ranije Sovjetski savez) koje su suštinski važni akteri za oblikovanje strateške stabilnosti. Pod ovim terminom podrazumeva se da je „odnos uspostavljen između SAD i Rusije, najvećih posednika nuklearnog naoružanja, tokom više decenija (ranije između SAD i SSSR), a nakon ozbiljnih kriza, bio sračunat na izbegavanje izbijanja nuklearnog sukoba“ (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 15). Različiti predlozi i viđenja dve sile po ovom pitanju su tokom

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Rad je nastao u okviru naučnoistraživačkog projekta „Srbija i izazovi u međunarodnim odnosima 2023. godine“, koji finansira Ministarstvo nauke, tehnološkog razvoja i inovacija Republike Srbije, a realizuje Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu tokom 2023. godine.

godina evoluirali i rezultovali pregovorima i sporazumima poput SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), START I i II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) i Novi START. Ovi procesi su u prvom delu knjige izvrsno stavljeni u kontekst širih istorijskih događaja, odnosa moći i razvoja tehnologije u oblasti nuklearnog naoružanja. Autorka takođe otvara pitanje mogućnosti za multilateralizaciju kontrole strateškog naoružanja, gde suprotstavlja ambicije SAD za uključivanje Kine i težnje Rusije da iz procesa ne budu isključene Francuska i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, objašnjavajući da bi ovaj proces podrazumevao dogovor SAD i Rusije o nužnosti multilateralizacije, postizanje okvirnog sporazuma SAD i Rusije o verifikaciji kontrole naoružanja i dobijanje saglasnosti drugih država čije bi se uključivanje zahtevalo (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 47).

Drugi deo dublje zalazi u odnos dva ključna aktera, SAD i Rusije, prema procesu kontrole strateškog naoružanja. Netiretirajući stratešku stabilnost kao izolovan domen, Kostić Šulejić objašnjava kako je ona oblikovana pod uticajem širih američko-ruskih odnosa, a posebno u pogledu bezbednosti na evropskom kontinetu. Različiti stavovi Vašingtona i Moskve se direktno odražavaju i na stratešku stabilnost, što je naročito bilo izraženo u pregovorima o produženju Novog START-a tokom 2021. i 2022. godine. Autorka sagledava ovaj proces ne samo na nivou međunarodnog sistema, gde su države viđene kao crne kutije, već se, posebno u analizi iz ugla SAD, spušta i na nivo analize iz ugla pojedinca i iz ugla države, ukazujući na različite stavove koje su iskazivali članovi Kongresa ili predstavnici vojnog establišmenta. Naročito je osvetljena uloga Džona Boltona (John Bolton), bivšeg savetnika za nacionalnu bezbednost predsednika Donalda Trampa (Donald Trump), te njegova duboka averzija prema sistemima kontrole strateškog nuklearnog naoružanja koju je pokazivao tokom celokupne karijere (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 77). Ovakav pristup, koji prožima sva tri nivoa analize, potvrđuje značaj isprepletanosti faktora koji utiču na oblikovanje politika jedne velike sile.²

Treći deo sagledava različite delove mozaika koji čini stratešku stabilnost između SAD i Rusije. To su pitanje kontrole konvencionalnih snaga u Evropi, modernizacija strateških snaga, domen nestrateškog nuklearnog naoružanja, transparentnost i verifikacija, te uticaj američko-ruskog dijaloga na širi režim neproliferacije (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 97). Autorka uspešno pokazuje kako se usponi i padovi u regulisanju odnosa u jednom aspektu prenose na modalitete funkcionisanja drugih, i kako njihova međusobna povezanost čini ključnu karakteristiku kompleksnih napora za održavanje strateške stabilnosti između SAD i Rusije. Kao naličje ovog procesa, kroz analizu pobrojanih posebnih sektora monografija paralelno prati povlačenja dve sile iz važnih međunarodnih sporazuma, SAD iz ABM sporazuma (Anti-Ballistic

² O odnosu faktora sa tri različita nivoa analize videti više u: Waltz [1959] 2001.

Missile Treaty) 2002. i INF sporazuma (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) 2019. godine, odnosno moratorijum Rusije na učešće u CFE sporazumu (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) 2007. i povlačenje iz tog sporazuma 2015. Ovim potezima Vašingtona i Moskve je ukupni nivo strateške stabilnosti značajno smanjen, a strah od moguće nuklearne eskalacije povećan.

Autorkina analiza modaliteta kontrole strateškog naoružanja između SAD i Rusije donosi nekoliko važnih uvida. Tako se u poglavlju posvećenom modernizaciji strateškog naoružanja podcrtava bitna razlika između novih tipova i novih vrsta naoružanja, budući da samo prvi potpadaju pod postojeće načine kontrole. Takođe, jasno je ukazano na drugačije prioritete velikih sila u pogledu različitih vidova strateškog naoružanja, pa tako SAD insistira na ograničenju antisatelitskog naoružanja, koje razvijaju Rusija i Kina, dok kod ove dve države najveću zabrinutost izaziva američki sistem protivrakete odbrane i smeštanje njegovih komponenti u svemir (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 110-111). Dodatno, istaknut je značaj nestrategskog nuklearnog naoružanja, posebno u svetlu sukoba u Ukrajini, koji je u prvi plan stavio pitanje da li bi i pod kojim uslovima Rusija upotrebila ovu vrstu naoružanja (Betts 2022; Gessen 2022; Krepinevich, Jr 2022).

Četvrti deo obrađuje mogućnosti multilateralizacije kontrole strateškog naoružanja iz ugla preostale tri države priznate kao države sa nuklearnim naoružanjem prema Ugovoru o neproliferaciji iz 1968. godine – Kine, Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva i Francuske. Pogledi sve tri države uslovljeni su prvenstveno kvantitativnim prednostima koje SAD i Rusija imaju u pogledu količine nuklearnog naoružanja u svom posedu i posledičnih kapaciteta koje im to donosi. Pitanje kineskog stava o kontroli nuklearnog naoružanja naročito je važno u kontekstu rastućeg rivaliteta Pekinga i Vašingtona i činjenice da kreatori američke spoljne politike vide upravo Kinu kao najznačajnijeg izazivača američke nadmoći u budućnosti (National Security Strategy 2022, 23). Kineski ambivalentni odnos prema ovim pitanjima najbolje se oslikava u činjenici da Peking sa jedne strane poziva na sklapanje globalnog sporazuma o ne-prvoj upotrebi nuklearnog naoružanja, a sa druge ima izuzetno razvijen program modernizacije i razvoja balističkih raketa, uvećavajući njihov broj i sposobnosti. Za SAD je takođe zabrinjavajući izostanak uvida u kineske kapacitete, budući da Kina primenjuje pristup kontigentne transparentnosti zasnovan na otkrivanju samo onoliko svojih sposobnosti koliko smatra da neće narušiti njeno efektivno odvracanje (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 158).

Francuska i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo imaju razvijenu saradnju i koordinaciju u oblasti nuklearnog naoružanja, kako međusobno tako i sa SAD. Ipak, „odnos prema SAD u pogledu svoje bezbednosne i odbrambene politike, uključujući i razvoj nuklearnog naoružanja i politiku njegove upotrebe, glavna su razlika između UK i

Francuske“ (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 172). U pogledu njihovih nuklearnih kapaciteta, Rusija zagovara pristup integralnog posmatranja zajedno sa američkim nuklearnim arsenalom, budući da su sve tri države NATO članice. SAD se ovome protive. Međutim, autorka primećuje da „čak i u slučaju kad bi SAD pristale na njihovo uključivanje u kontrolu strateškog naoružanja, UK i Francuska bi navodile razloge svoje nacionalne bezbednosti i percepcije pretnji“, a naročito u svetlu rastućih bezbednosnih tenzija između NATO i Rusije kao posledice rata u Ukrajini (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 181).

Peti deo fokus stavlja na Indiju, Pakistan, Severnu Koreju i Izrael. Nuklearni programi Indije i Pakistana su u korelaciji zbog njihovog rivaliteta i stalne mogućnosti izbijanja novog međusobnog sukoba. Tome u prilog govore i njihove doktrine, indijski „Hladni početak“ i pakistanski „Sveobuhvatni odgovor“ (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 197-198). Ipak, pozicioniranje Indije je daleko više sistemsko u odnosu na Pakistan, čija je nuklearna politika indocentrična (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 211). Severna Koreja sa druge strane ima jedinstven fokus svog nuklearnog programa na odvratanje SAD. Na kraju, Izrael vodi politiku namerne dvosmislenosti povodom (ne)posedovanja nuklearnog arsenala, te je usled neprijateljskog bezbednosnog okruženja primarno orijentisan na sprečavanje dostizanja nuklearnih kapaciteta rivala u regionu, na čelu sa Iranom, pristup poznat kao Beginova doktrina (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 208).

Politike u oblasti nuklearnog naoružanja ne postoje u vakuumu, nezavisno u odnosu na ostale aktere, već direktno utiču i na globalnu stratešku stabilnost. Autorka objašnjava kako je povlačenje SAD iz ABM sporazuma 2002. godine, što je direktno uticalo na opadanje poverenja na ruskoj strani i vodilo daljoj modernizaciji ruskih nuklearnih kapaciteta, delom prouzrokovano zabrinutošću u Vašingtonu zbog budućih nuklearnih mogućnosti „otpadničkih država“ kao što je Severna Koreja. Isto tako, razvoj pakistanskog nuklearnog arsenala predstavlja odgovor na indijske investicije u razvoj i modernizaciju svog nuklearnog naoružanja, a čiji je cilj da prati poteze Kine u ovom pogledu (Kostić Šulejić 2022, 199). Ukazivanje na ove kauzalne veze daje analizi kapaciteta i strategija o upotrebi nuklearnog naoružanja ove četiri azijske države dodatnu vrednost, jer potvrđuje da usled razorne moći nuklearnog naoružanja i potezi država sa manjim arsenalima uveliko mogu uticati na odluke najvećih nuklearnih sila.

Monografija „Strateška stabilnost u multipolarnom svetu“ je sveobuhvatna i dubinska analiza različitih aspekata ovog kompleksnog pojma, koji je neraskidivo povezan sa nacionalnim interesima velikih sila, njihovim strategijama za ostvarenje tih ciljeva i metodama koji im u tim nastojanjima stoje na raspolaganju. Dodatno, zbog nesagledivih posledica koje bi potencijalna upotreba nuklearnog naoružanja imala po ceo svet, ova pitanja su od suštinske važnosti za razumevanje globalne

bezbednosti. Pored preciznog i jasnog stila, integralnog pristupa, važnosti teme koju obrađuje i novih uvida do kojih autorka u istraživanju dolazi, monografiju izdvajaju dve naročite pozitivne karakteristike. Prva jeste konstantno ukazivanje na logiku međuzavisnosti nuklearnih strategija sila koje poseduju ovu vrstu naoružanja, zasnovane na interakciji poteza u oblasti nuklearnog naoružanja i (ne)planiranih posledica koje oni izazivaju. Druga jeste uključivanje u analizu i najnovijih događaja, poput rezultata pregovora o produženju važenja Novog START-a i efekata koje je na stratešku stabilnost izazvao rat u Ukrajini, što monografiju čini dodatno relevantnom u aktuelnom turbulentnom međunarodnom kontekstu.

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The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project “Serbia in contemporary international relations: strategic development directions and strengthening the position of Serbia in international integrative processes – foreign-political, international economical, legal and security aspects“ (No. 179029) for the period 2011–2015, realized by the Institute of International Politics and Economics, and financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

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Johnson and Axinn (2013, 136) argue that killing with emotions is morally superior to killing without emotions, because military honour demands a clear will to assume a risk of sacrifice of health and life.

If the reference is in parentheses, use square brackets for additional parentheses: (see, e.g., Johnson and Axinn [2013, 133–136] on this important subject).

In text, separate the references with semicolons:

(Jabri 2007; Herman 2004; Rohrbach 2020)

If citing more than one work by an author, do not repeat the name:

(Jabri 2007, 2011; Gregory 2014a, 2014b)

Book

Reference list entry:

Jabri, Vivienne. 2007. *War and the Transformation of Global Politics*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, and Anuradha Chenoy. 2007. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Vasquez, John A., Sanford Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and Linda Stamato, eds. 1995. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bentham, Jeremy (1907) 2018. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Reprint, London: Clarendon Press. www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html.

Dal Lago, Alessandro, and Salvatore Palidda, eds. 2010. *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilization of War*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 2011. *The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition*. Edited by Ronald Hamowy. Vol. 17 of *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek*, edited by Bruce Caldwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988–.

In-text citation:

(Jabri 2007, 59)

(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007)

(Vasquez et al. 1995)

(Bentham [1907] 2018)

(Dal Lago and Palidda 2010)

(Hayek 2011, 258)

Journal article

Reference list entry:

Nordin, Astrid H.M. and Dan Öberg. 2015. "Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43 (2): 395–423.

Adams, Tracy, and Zohar Kampf. 2020. "'Solemn and just demands': Seeking apologies in the international arena". *Review of International Studies*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210520000261>.

In-text citation:

(Nordin and Öberg 2015, 401) (Tracy and Kampf 2020)

Article in edited volume

Reference list entry:

Herman, Michael. 2004. "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001". In: *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, edited by Len V. Scott and Peter D. Jackson, 567–581. London and New York: Routledge.

Reference list entry:

(Herman 2004)

Conference paper (if not published in conference proceedings)

Reference list entry:

Korać, Srđan. 2016. "Human Security and Global Ethics: Can International Organizations be Moral Agents?". Paper presented at the Third International Academic Conference on Human Security, Human Security Research Center (HSRC), Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, November 4–5.

Reference list entry:

(Korać 2016)

Book review

Reference list entry:

Firchow, Pamina. 2020. "Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices and Politics", Review of *Measuring Peace*, by Richard Caplan. *International Peacekeeping* 27 (2): 337–338.

Reference list entry:

(Firchow 2020, 337)

Legal and official documents***International treaties***

Reference list entry:

[PTBT] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. 1963. Signed by US, UK, and USSR, August 5. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20480/volume-480-I-6964-English.pdf>.

[TFEU] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2012. *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326, October 26. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN>.

[UN Charter] Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/index.html>.

In-text citation:

(PTBT 1963, Article III, para. 3)

(TFEU 2012, Article 87) (UN Charter, Chapter X)

UN documents

Reference list entry:

[UNSC] UN Security Council. Resolution 2222, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/2222. May 27, 2015. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml>.

[UNGA] UN General Assembly. Resolution 67/18, Education for Democracy, A/RES/67/18. November 28, 2012. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/67/18>.

In-text citation:

(UNSC Res. 2222)

(UNGA Res. 67/18)

National legislation

Reference list entry:

[Constitution RS] Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 2006. *Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia*, No. 98/2006.

Homeland Security Act. 2002. United States of America, 107th Congress, 2nd Session (November 25). https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hr_5005_enr.pdf.

In-text citation:

(Constitution RS 2006, Article 111) (Homeland Security Act 2002)

Official reports

Reference list entry:

[YILC] Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 2014. Vol. 2, Part Two. https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_2014_v2_p2.pdf&lang=ES.

[The 9-11 Commission] U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Publication Office.

US Congress. 1993. Nomination of R. James Woolsey to be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. 104th Congress, 1st session, February 2–3, 1993. <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/103296.pdf>.

[USAFH] United States Air Force Headquarters. 2014. United States Air Force RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling Concepts: 2013–2038. www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts2013-2038.pdf.

In-text citation:

(YILC 2014, 321)

(The 9-11 Commission 2004, 437) (US Congress 1993, 125)

(USAFH 2014)

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Reference list entry:

Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosir). *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 295, 6 November 2013. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&from=EN>.

[EC] European Commission. 2010. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 final, Communication from the

Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, November 22. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0673&from=GA>.

Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 141, 5 June 2015. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849&from=EN>.

In-text citation:

(Regulation [EU] No. 1052/2013, Article 11, para. 4)

(EC COM[2010] 673 final)

(Directive [EU] 2015/849)

Decisions of international courts and tribunals

Reference list entry:

[ICJ] International Court of Justice. Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports. <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>. [ICJ Order 1999] *Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom)*. International Court of Justice, Order ICJ Rep. 1999 (June 2). <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/113/113-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf>.

[ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A] *Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32-A. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Indictment, 30 October 2000. <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/ind/en/vasonly-ii000125e.pdf>.

Costa v Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica, Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61964CJ0006>. [CJEU Judgment T-289/15] *Hamas v Council*, Case T-289/15. Court of Justice of the

European Union, Judgment, 6 March 2019, ECLI:EU:T:2019:138. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?language=EN&critereEcli=ECLI:EU:T:2019:138> [Opinion of AG Bobek] *Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission*, Case C-352/19

P. Court of Justice of the European Union. Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 16 July 2020(1), ECLI:EU:C:2020:588. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?jsessionid=485A5D9AC129179D3D2F2.EC571A384CD?text=&docid=228708&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5064004>.

In-text citation:

(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010, 411)

(ICJ Order 1999, para. 3)

(ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A)

(*Costa v ENEL*)

(CJEU Judgment T-289/15, para. 23)

(Opinion of AG Bobek C-352/19 P)

Newspapers and magazines

Reference list entry:

Gibbs, Samuel. 2017. "Elon Musk leads 116 experts calling for outright ban of killer robots", *The Guardian*, August 20.

Power, Matthew. 2013. "Confessions of a Drone Warrior", *GQ*, October 22. <https://www.gq.com/story/drone-uav-pilot-assassination>.

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(Power 2013)

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Audio and visual media

Reference list entry:

Scott, Ridley. [1982] 2007. *Blade Runner: The Final Cut*. Directed by Ridley Scott. Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. Blue-Ray disc, 117 min.

Future Weapons. 2019. Waddell Media. Aired on August 7–16 on Discovery Science HD, 3 seasons, 30 episodes (43 min. each). <https://go.discovery.com/tv-shows/future-weapons/>.

Tech Legend. 2020. "Best Drones 2020 – Top 8 Best Drone with Cameras to Buy in 2020". Uploaded on February 7, 2020. YouTube video, 27:20 min. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6_4JU5Mspw.

In-text citation:

(Scott [1982] 2007)

(Future Weapons 2019)

(Tech Legend 2020)

Social media

Reference list entry:

National Library of Australia. 2020. "National Library of Australia's Facebook Page". Facebook, August 1, 2020. <https://www.facebook.com/National.Library.of.Australia/>.
Kruszelnicki, Karl (@DoctorKarl). 2017. "Dr Karl Twitter post." Twitter, February 19, 2017, 9:34 a.m. <https://twitter.com/DoctorKarl>.

Trapara, Vladimir. 2018. "Victory or nil". *Unwrapping the Essence* (blog). May 29, 2018. <https://unwrappingtheessence.weebly.com/blog/pobeda-ili-nista>.

In-text citation:

(National Library of Australia 2020) (Kruszelnicki 2017)

(Trapara 2018)

Doctoral dissertation

Reference list entry:

Rohrbach, Livia. 2020. *Beyond intractability? Territorial solutions to self-determination conflicts*. Doctoral dissertation. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

Petrović, Miloš. 2018. *Nepotpuna integracija kao prepreka političkom razvoju Istočnog partnerstva Evropske unije*. Doktorska disertacija. Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu.

In-text citation:

(Rohrbach 2020)

(Petrović 2018).

Internet source

If citing an undated online document, give an access date and use the year of access as year of publication.

Reference list entry:

Oxford Library. 2012. "Library Strategy". Oxford Library. Accessed 3 June 2012. <http://www.ol.org/library/strategy.html>.

Google Maps. 2015. "The British Library, London, UK". *Google*. Accessed February 5, 2015. <https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/The+British+Library/@51.529972,-0.127676,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m2!3m1!1s0x48761b3b70171395:0x18905479de0fdb25>.

IPE [Institute of International Politics and Economics]. n.d. "Mission". Accessed August 1, 2020. <https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/en/mission/>.

In-text citation:

(Oxford Library 2012)

(Google Maps 2015) (IIPE n.d.)

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Personal communications include conversations, interviews, lecture material, telephone conversations, letters and e-mail messages. Place references to personal communications such as letters and conversations within the running text and not as formal end references, because they do not contain recoverable data:

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In his 1975 book *Power* [Macht], Luhmann bases his understanding of power mainly on the social exchange and community power literature (cited in Guzzini 2013, 79).

Reference list entry:

Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. *Power, realism, and constructivism*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

TABLES, FIGURES AND GEOGRAPHICAL MAPS

It is necessary to give their number and full title – e.g. *Table 1: Human Development Index among EU members* or *Figure 2: State-Building or Sovereignty Strategy* or *Map 1: Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region*.

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The list of references should only include works that are cited in the text, tables, figure legend, and footnotes, and that have been published or accepted for publication.

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If the reference list contains two or more items by the same author in the same year, add a, b, etc. and list them alphabetically by title of the work:

Gregory, Derek. 2014a. "Drone Geographies". *Radical Philosophy* RP 183: 7–19.

Gregory, Derek. 2014b. "The Everywhere War". *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3): 238–250.

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- Transformation of world politics in the early 21st century.
- Phenomenology and practice of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism.
- Institutionalisation of international relations and its challenges.
- Various theoretical standpoints on current global processes.
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(Vučić 2019, 59)

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(Petrović 2018).

Izvor sa interneta

U slučaju da navodite nedatirani dokument sa interneta, priložite datum kada ste pristupili tom elektronskom sadržaju i godinu pristupa računajte kao godinu objavljivanja tog izvora.

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Lična komunikacija

Izvori iz područja lične komunikacije obuhvataju razgovore uživo, intervjuje, materijale sa predavanja, telefonske razgovore, klasičnu i elektronsku prepisku. Izvore ove vrste navedite samo u tekstu, bez stavljanja u Bibliografiju, zato što je najčešće reč o podacima u koje čitalac nema uvid ili se zbog nematerijalnog oblika ne mogu naknadno proveriti:

... kao što je dr Slobodan Janković naveo u mejlu koji mi je poslao 10. decembra 2019. godine ...

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U pismu koje je Univerzitet u Beogradu 13. maja 2017. godine uputio Grinovoj (Green 2012, 34) ...

Sekundarni izvor (posredno navođenje izvora)

Kada želite da navedete izvor koji ste pročitali u nekom drugom izvoru, uvek treba da ukažete na oba izvora – originalni i posredni:

Navođenje u tekstu:

U knjizi *Moć*, objavljenoj 1975. godine, Luman shvatanje moći pretežno zasniva na literaturi o društvenoj razmeni i moći zajednice (navedeno prema Guzzini 2013, 79).

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Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. *Power, realism, and constructivism*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

TABELE, DIJAGRAMI I GEOGRAFSKE KARTE

Grafičke priloge (tabele, dijagrame, geografske karte, grafikone i sl.) numerišete i dajete im pun naslov:

Tabela 1: Indeks ljudskog razvoja u zemljama članicama EU

Dijagram 2: Strane direktne investicije kineskih kompanija u Africi (u milionima dolara)

Karta 1: Nacionalne pomorske jurisdikcije i granice na Arktiku

Ukoliko je grafički prilog preuzet od nekog drugog autora ili iz nekog dokumenta neophodno je ne samo navesti izvor, već i dobiti pisanu saglasnost za objavljivanje priloga pre podnošenja rukopisa na razmatranje Uredništvu časopisa *Međunarodni problemi*. Dobijena saglasnost se dostavlja uz rukopis.

BIBLIOGRAFIJA

Na kraju članka, a pre apstrakta na engleskom jeziku, prilažete spisak korišćenih izvora naslovljen **Bibliografija**, koji sme da sadrži samo reference koje ste koristili u tekstu.

Bibliografske jedinice navodite prema prethodno predstavljanim pravilima za navođenje izvora, a ređate ih prema abecednom redosledu.

Ako imate dva ili više radova istog autora objavljenih iste godine, onda uz godinu dodajte slova a, b, c, itd. i ređajte bibliografske jedinice po abecednom redosledu prvog slova naslova rada:

Gregory, Derek. 2014a. "Drone Geographies". *Radical Philosophy* RP 183: 7–19. Gregory, Derek. 2014b. "The Everywhere War". *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3): 238–250.

Rukopisi koji nisu usaglašeni sa navedenim smernicama neće biti uzeti u postupak recenziranja.

Uređivački odbor

UREĐIVAČKA POLITIKA

Međunarodni problemi/International Problems je najstariji naučni časopis u Srbiji i na Balkanu posvećen međunarodnim odnosima. Prvi broj je objavljen u aprilu 1949. godine, samo godinu dana nakon početka rada njegovog izdavača – Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu iz Beograda. Objavljuje se na kvartalnoj bazi i kategorisan je kod resornog ministarstva kao nacionalni časopis međunarodnog značaja (M24).

Međunarodni problemi objavljuju rezultate naučnih istraživanja iz oblasti međunarodnih odnosa, međunarodne bezbednosti, međunarodnog prava i studija globalizacije. *Međunarodni problemi* objavljuju originalne i pregledne naučne radove i prikaze knjiga, na srpskom ili engleskom jeziku, koji prethodno nisu nigde objavljeni niti se nalaze u postupku razmatranja za objavljivanje u nekoj drugoj publikaciji. *Međunarodni problemi* ne objavljuju stručne radove, analitičke komentare niti predloge javnih politika, pa Vas najljubaznije molimo da ne šalžete te vrste članaka.

Uređivački odbor daje prednost analizi kontroverznih pitanja savremene teorije i prakse međunarodnih odnosa uz poštovanje bogatstva disciplinarnih i sazajnih perspektiva. Bez zastupanja konkretnog političkog i teorijsko-metodološkog stanovišta, a sa namerom da podstakne obuhvatniji naučni dijalog o ubrzanim promenama u svetskoj politici u 21. veku, Uređivački odbor smatra da su prioritetne sledeće tematske celine:

- Preobražaj prirode svetske politike u ranom 21. veku;
- Fenomenologija i praksa transnacionalnosti i kosmopolitizma;
- Problemi institucionalizacije međunarodnih odnosa;
- Različita teorijska tumačenja aktuelnih globalnih procesa;
- Kontroverzna pitanja upotrebe spoljnopolitičkih instrumenata vodećih globalnih aktera;
- Uticaj naprednih tehnologija Četvrtе industrijske revolucije na oblikovanje međunarodnih odnosa u 21. veku;
- Civilizacija, religija i identitet u kontekstu svetske politike i globalizacije;
- Konceptualni i metodološki iskoraci izvan tradicionalnog epistemološkog okvira naučne discipline međunarodnih odnosa.

OBAVEZE UREDNIKA, UREĐIVAČKOG ODBORA I IZDAVAČKOG ODBORA

Izdavački savet je savetodavno telo koje aktivno doprinosi razvoju časopisa *Međunarodni problemi/International Problems*. Zadaci i dužnosti članova Saveta su: podrška razvoju časopisa, promocija časopisa, podsticanje stručnjaka u naučnom istraživanju političkih, bezbednosnih i pravnih aspekata međunarodnih odnosa da se uključe u rad časopisa kao autori i/ili recenzenti, pisanje uvodnika, recenzija i komentara o radovima.

Članovi Uređivačkog odbora imaju zadatak da u akademskoj javnosti deluju kao svojevrsni ambasadori časopisa, da pruže doprinos u vidu preporučivanja kvalitetnih autora i rukopisa, podsticanja potencijalnih autora da podnose rukopise za objavljivanje u *Međunarodnim problemima*, te da recenziraju rukopise i pripremaju uvodnike i uredničke komentare.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik odgovara za objavljeni sadržaj i treba da teži stalnom unapređenju časopisa uopšte i procesa osiguranja kvaliteta objavljenog sadržaja, kao i zaštiti slobode izražavanja, integriteta i standarda naučnoistraživačkog rada od upliva političkih, finansijskih i drugih interesa. Glavni i odgovorni urednik treba uvek da objavi ispravku, objašnjenje, obaveštenje o povlačenju članka i izvinjenje.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik donosi konačnu odluku o tome koji će rukopis objaviti na osnovu: 1) ocene njegovog uklapanja u tematski okvir uređivačke politike, 2) ocene naučnog značaja, originalnosti, validnosti i disciplinarnе relevantnosti istraživanja predstavljenog u rukopisu, 3) ocene njegove usklađenosti sa zakonskim propisima koji se odnose na klevetu, kršenje autorskih prava i plagiranje. Glavni i odgovorni urednik zadržava diskreciono pravo da primljeni rukopis proceni i odbije bez recenziranja, ukoliko utvrdi da ne odgovara tematskim zahtevima uređivačke politike i opšteprihvaćenim standardima naučnoistraživačkog rada (tj. ako ne sadrži strukturne elemente originalnog ili preglednog naučnog rada). Radovi koji ne zadovoljavaju tehničke standarde propisane Uputstvom za autore, čak i u slučaju da je sadržaj korektan, biće vraćeni autorima na usklađivanje. U redovnim okolnostima, Uređivački odbor obaveštava autora u roku od sedam dana od datuma prijema rukopisa o tome da li se tema rukopisa uklapa u uređivačku politiku i da li je pokrenut postupak recenziranja.

Novi glavni i odgovorni urednik ne sme da preinači odluku svog prethodnika o objavljivanju rukopisa, osim ukoliko nisu utvrđene nove činjenice koje ukazuju na sporan kvalitet tog rukopisa.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora ne smeju da budu u bilo kakvom sukobu interesa u vezi sa rukopisima koje razmatraju. Iz postupka izbora recenzenata i odlučivanja o sudbini rukopisa isključuju se članovi Uređivačkog odbora kod kojih postoji sukob interesa. Ako takav sukob interesa postoji, o izboru recenzenata i sudbini rukopisa odlučuje glavni i odgovorni urednik.

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OBAVEZE AUTORA

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Prilikom slanja rada, autor(i) šalju potpisanu Izjavu autora, čiji je sadržaj dostupan ovde: [https://internationalproblems.rs/wp-content/uploads/doc/izjava-autora-\(mp-email\)-02.pdf](https://internationalproblems.rs/wp-content/uploads/doc/izjava-autora-(mp-email)-02.pdf)

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Predavanjem rukopisa redakciji *Međunarodnih problema* autori se obavezuju na poštovanje navedenih obaveza.

OBAVEZE RECENZENATA

Recenzenti časopisa *Međunarodni problemi/International Problems* su dužni da stručno, argumentovano, nepristrasno i u zadatim rokovima dostave uredniku ocenu naučne vrednosti rukopisa.

Recenzenti ocenjuju usklađenost teme rukopisa sa tematskim okvirom časopisa, naučnu relevantnost istraživane teme i primenjenih metoda, originalnost i naučni značaj rezultata predstavljenih u rukopisu, stil naučnog izlaganja i opremljenost teksta naučnom aparaturom.

Recenzent koji ima osnovane sumnje ili saznanja o kršenju etičkih standarda propisanih Kodeksom ponašanja u naučnoistraživačkom radu od strane autora dužan je da o tome obavesti glavnog i odgovornog urednika. Recenzent treba da prepozna važne objavljene radove koje autori nisu citirali. On treba da upozori glavnog i odgovornog urednika i na bitne sličnosti i podudarnosti između rukopisa koji se razmatra i bilo kojeg drugog objavljenog rada ili rukopisa koji je u postupku recenzije u nekom drugom časopisu, ako o tome ima lična saznanja. Ako ima saznanja da je isti rukopis razmatra u više časopisa u isto vreme, recenzent je dužan da o tome obavesti glavnog i odgovornog urednika.

Recenzent ne sme da bude u sukobu interesa sa autorima ili finansijerom istraživanja. Ukoliko postoji sukob interesa, recenzent je dužan da o tome momentalno obavesti glavnog i odgovornog urednika.

Recenzent koji sebe smatra nekompetentnim za temu ili oblast kojom se rukopis bavi dužan je da o tome obavesti glavnog i odgovornog urednika. Glavni i odgovorni urednik uvažiće zahtev autora da određeni pojedinac ne bude recenzent njihovog rukopisa ako proceni da je taj zahtev valjano obrazložen i praktičan.

Recenzija mora biti objektivna. Sud recenzenata mora biti jasan i potkrepljen argumentima. Uputstvo za recenzente detaljnije propisuje merila i smernice za ocenu rukopisa.

Rukopisi koji su poslani recenzentu smatraju se poverljivim dokumentima. Recenzenti ne smeju da koriste neobjavljen materijal iz predatih rukopisa za svoja istraživanja bez izričite pisane dozvole autora, a informacije i ideje iznesene u predatim rukopisima moraju se čuvati kao poverljive i ne smeju se koristiti za sticanje lične koristi.

POSTUPAK RECENZIJE

Radovi koji se razmatraju za objavljivanje u časopisu *Međunarodni problemi/ International Problems* podležu recenziji. Cilj recenzije je da glavnom i odgovornom uredniku pomogne u donošenju odluke o tome da li rad treba prihvatiti ili odbiti i da kroz proces komunikacije sa autorima poboljša kvalitet rukopisa. U normalnim okolnostima, rok za okončanje postupka recenziranja je 30 dana od datuma prijema rukopisa.

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Izbor recenzenata spada u diskreciona prava glavnog i odgovornog urednika. Recenzenti moraju da raspolazu relevantnim znanjima u vezi sa oblašću kojom se rukopis bavi; oni ne smeju da budu iz iste institucije kao autori rukopisa niti smeju da sa njima imaju nedavno objavljene zajedničke radove.

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Glavni i odgovorni urednik može da tokom postupka recenzije zahteva od autora da dostavi dodatne informacije (uključujući i primarne podatke), ako su one potrebne za ocenu naučnog doprinosa rukopisa. Glavni i odgovorni urednik i recenzenti moraju da čuvaju takve informacije kao poverljive i ne smeju ih koristiti za sticanje lične koristi.

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Glavni i odgovorni urednik *Međunarodnih problema* je dužan da pokrene odgovarajući postupak ukoliko razumno sumnja ili utvrdi da je došlo do povrede etičkih standarda propisanih Kodeksom ponašanja u naučnoistraživačkom radu – bilo u objavljenim člancima ili u još neobjavljenim rukopisima. Svako može da u bilo kom

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Nародна библиотека Србије, Београд

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MEĐUNARODNI problemi : časopis Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu =
International problems : a journal published by the Institute of international politics and
economics / odgovorni urednik Ivona Lađevac. - [Latinično izd.]. - God. 1, br. 1 (apr. 1949)-
. - Beograd : Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1949- (Beograd : Donat Graf).
- 24 cm

Dostupno i na: <http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/journal.aspx?issn=0025-8555> (Od 2002.). -

Dostupno i na: <http://www.internationalproblems.rs/>. -

Dostupno i na: <https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/>. - Tromesečno. -

Drugo izdanje na drugom medijumu: Međunarodni problemi (Online) = ISSN 2406-0690

ISSN 0025-8555 = Međunarodni problemi

COBISS.SR-ID 6012674



Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu dobitnik je ovogodišnje Svetosavske nagrade, najuglednijeg društvenog priznanja Republike Srbije za doprinos prosveti i nauci.

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
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
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